Although I largely disagree with the author, I appreciate his willingness not to see science as the end of it all, to open the door for farther realities, and to tackle the difficulties involved. In the process, however, I find a too unquestioning commitment to the latest contentions of science. He correspondingly cites many recent thinkers, regrettably mainly philosophers, evidently because he is himself one.
He also speaks amply of historical figures and their deeds, although I was early in the book discouraged by careless inaccuracies. He writes (pp.12-13): "The Egyptians...knew that a 3, 4, 5 triangle is right-angled. It was Pythagoras or someone in his group who generalized it to all right-angled triangles (the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides)..." But the "it" only speaks a right-angled triangle, not mentioning squares. Worse, the author then describes Euclid's fifth postulate (he also oddly applies "postulate" to "common notion") as stating that "parallel lines never meet". This is the definition of parallel lines; the postulate states that certain lines meet.
Notwithstanding such weaknesses, the author takes us through numbers of progressions in scientific, philosophical and spiritual thought, the progressions in my view not always constituting progress. Here I will concentrate on alluded to recent views and arguments the author concurs with and I find decidedly faulty.
The author cites (pp.138-9) philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland as making "some very good points" about us being "hung up on folk psychology. We think that what we believe today must be the absolute bedrock of inquiry. Our sense of consciousness must be untouched. However, they argue that that is not the way things go in science".
The belittling "folk psychology" is familiarly claimed by these philosophers. But they misunderstand "the way things go in science". Science has known that indeed "Our sense of consciousness must be untouched" in that "we must save the appearances". We are hopelessly dependent in all knowledge on the form in which things appear in our consciousness, and if we learn more (through consciousness) about things our senses first disclosed, it must comport with those disclosures.
The author writes: "as we come up with new findings and theories, so our bedrock beliefs [perceptions] have to be...changed, and sometimes discarded", quoting Mr. Churchland regarding light: "From the standpoint of uninformed common sense [belittling again], light...seemed to be utterly different from...", continuing with a litany of that philosopher's understanding of electromagnetism, and saying: "that is exactly what light turns out to be".
But initially "light" means exactly a visual sensation, opposite to darkness. If after connected physical findings it is decided to name the electromagnetic spectrum "light", including "invisible light", then "light" has been redefined, rather than misunderstood.
Dr. Ruse then turns to Mrs. Churchland's "pathetic story" of her onetime science teacher: "a happy vitalist [proposing a life force distinct from other forces] he. But he was wrong! Who today would deny that the concept of life has been explained fully? We know about the DNA, about the cell, about physiology, and much, much more... Molecules in motion are what we find, and molecules in motion are all we need... The story of vitalism is salutary... I will agree with the Churchlands that life has been reduced to molecules in motion".
But it is their salutary story that is wrong. The DNA, the cell, the physiology, and all the molecules in motion are merely means utilized in life processes, as are means to our purposes all physical factors utilized in our own actions. All those molecules are in motion aimed at life's preservation, this aim of the process signifying life itself, which ends with the end of the process. That is to say, there indeed exists a force aimed at life's preservation, beside the forces made use of for achieving that aim.
The author thus relies unjustifiably on many contemporary pronouncements. While admirably not wanting to exclude spiritual and theological matters from consideration in the search for knowledge, he writes (p.238): "great care must be taken to see that the theological conclusions are infused with the findings of really up-to-date science". This is quite questionable. Not only because "up-to-date science" may turn out false science, but also because of the possibilities, traditionally associated with natural theology and dismissed by the author too lightly, of resolving theological and similar issues by the application of reason coupled with fundamental experience, like that of purposeful life discussed.