Customer Reviews

Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941-1945

5 star:		(57)
4 star:		(33)
3 star:		(12)
2 star:		(8)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

I picked this up after seeing Thomas do a book signing (which was mostly his discussion of the battle and some Q/A). It was interesting to hear about a battle that was so deadly, so historically significant (the last "traditional" sea battle of significant size), and yet so overlooked. The battle itself takes up less than a fifth of the book and doesn't unfold until well past the midpoint. It's also easily the least interesting part of the book. Battle buffs and others expecting a blow by blow will be disappointed, as will less intense WWII buffs. What Thomas actually gives us is a short history of the US and Japanese naval fleets in the Pacific and brief biographical sketches of their commanders and some of the rank and file sailors. Thomas sometimes snarky observations liven up the early parts of the book and show an incisive, funny side that was missing in the last book of his that I'd read (the RFK bio; the book also flows better than the RFK book which seemed choppy). Thomas gives us personal sides of Admiral Halsey and his Japanese counterparts, with somewhat broad portraits of Admirals Nimitz and King, as well as General MacArthur. I'm surprised that he didn't mention that Nimitz and MacArthur were momma's boys--both lived in my former apartment building in the 1920s (a few years apart) with their mothers and MacArthur probably hoped that the malarial jungles of the South Pacific would keep his mother away (she followed him, anyway). We get some review of tactics and examples of the limits of cultural knowledge and within-military communication systems that caused problems for both sides and contributed to the battle at Leyte taking place.

It's an enjoyable book and full of things I didn't know before--why only three stars? In Thomas' effort to show the cultural blinders on both sides, he tends to over stereotype. He made visits to Japan, but I got the impression they were largely orchestrated by Newsweek staff, which is hardly the way to learn about a culture. He also makes annoying comments about people's instincts and other motivational states that seem pretty unknowable from a historical distance. The broadness of his characterizations of Halsey and others also fall apart in places. The battle, itself, was the least interesting story in the book, despite access to survivors. I would have expected a longer, richer narrative with more detail. I'm not an intense war buff, but I've watched my share of "The World at War" and BBC's battle by battle history of the European and Pacific theatres, etc. and the book left me wanting more. Thomas does tell us what happened to key figures after the war, which is nice addition to the usual war narrative. Halsey's decline into irrelevance and the problems he suffered in dealing with his mentally ill wife are among the sadder transitions that occurred. John McCain, the media's favorite 2008 contender for President, makes a cameo appearance in a footnote, and his grandfather plays a small part in the main narrative. All-in-all a readable, interesting book, but not Thomas' best work. It's not as enlightening as the also-flawed RFK book nor the dense, incisive, entertaining ride of his early work on the CIA.

Evan Thomas presents an outstanding, extraordinarily researched, and easy to read narrative of one of the Pacific's greatest sea battles in `Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941-1945'. Uniquely, and most interesting is the balanced research it is clear Thomas completed in order to share a vivid picture of the mind-set of the combatants at sear: The U.S. Navy appeared to have a view that the Japanese Navy was not up to their combat ready level, and the Japanese Navy viewed the U.S. Navy as being made of individuals not willing to sacrifice for their beliefs. Obviously both perspectives were wrong; Thomas gives understanding of actions based upon these perspectives in a manner never told before.



The Battle of Leyte Gulf, the focus of Thomas' work, is history's largest and most compelling naval battle. Writing from the perspectives of four officers: William Halsey, who commanded the U.S. 3rd Fleet; and Cdr. Ernest Evans, captain of a lowly destroyer, the U.S.S. Johnston; Adm. Takeo Kurita; Adm. Matome Ugaki, readers and historians alike are about to embark on a breath-taking journey onto the high seas of the Pacific where brave men sacrificed in the name of their country.

An authentic historian attempts to ferret out the facts of past events without allowing their personal biases to intrude. Beginning a couple of decades ago, the phenomena of revisionist "historians" emerged where facts were seen as impediments to pushing a particular agenda. After that, the celebrity "historian" came into vogue, such as television talking head Tom Brokaw. Evan Thomas, in my view, falls into the celebrity journalist category. He is not a bonafide historian and he is a revisionist in that he applies the "political correctness" of today to the reality of six or more decades ago.

The result is not history. In fact, Thomas besmirches the characters of four men, each noble in their own way, while deprecating the extraordinary nature of the United States' objectives in World War II.

Thomas's stated desire was to write a history of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, what may very well have been the last clash of large naval fleets. The basic premise of viewing the battle, its prelude and aftermath through the eyes of four widely disparate characters could have worked in competent hands. Thomas's hands are not competent in this regard.

Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, commander of an American naval fleet, had the familiar biases of a man of his time. Halsey was a war leader, not a social worker. It is not unexpected that he decorated his bases with exhortations to kill the enemy. It is likewise not unexpected that his public statements were peppered with statements alluding to the alleged racial inferiority of his enemy. There was a massive, worldwide struggle going on; freedom pitted against tyranny.

But Thomas measures Halsey by the standards of today's "political correctness" and, of course, finds Halsey wanting. In fact, Halsey is essentially the target of what appears to be an anti-war hatchet job all through the book.

Thomas chose Commander Ernest Evans as his second profile of American command. Evans commanded a destroyer in the Battle of Leyte Gulf and was the recipient of the Medal of Honor. Thomas wastes a considerable number of words lamenting the cruelties of American prejudice against Evans, who had Cherokee Indian blood. Never does Thomas note that Evans was able to attend the Naval Academy at Annapolis and rise in command in the American Navy based on his abilities, not his ethnic heritage.

Both Halsey and Evans are depicted in what is supposed to be, I guess, a sly way as crazed, demented warriors. Halsey is further denigrated by Thomas's repeated references to Halsey having one or two drinks before sleeping on the recommendation of his personal physician. The last moments of Evans' life are described in an unflattering manner.

Overall, Thomas leaves the impression - and I think this is intentional - that people who fight for their nation, especially the United States, are madmen. Moreover, American war heroes aren't heroes at all, but should be remembered for their blunders and misunderstandings.

Thomas profiles Admiral Takeo Kurita, the Japanese battleship commander and Admiral Matome Ugaki. Kurita comes off in Thomas's accounting as a noble figure, perhaps because he fled the battle. (Fleeing was a judicious decision, since Kurita's mission was suicidal; but Thomas imbues the flight with motives that may not have existed.)

Ukagi was a strange character, a true Japanese nationalist, who was willing to sacrifice himself for the Emperor. Oddly in his recounting of Ugaki, Thomas attempts to separate Ugaki from the spirit that inspired the Japanese to resist so fiercely. It is as if Thomas is attempting to play down the particularly hideous nature of Japanese aggression. Not once, for example, does Thomas point out that the Japanese occupation of China, the Phillipines and other conquered nations cost the lives of 10 million or more innocent people. Rather, I was left with the feeling that Thomas was subtly making an anti-war argument on the order of "All Quiet On The Western Front".

War is a dirty business and many wars are not entirely, if at all, justifiable. But American participation in World War II was fully justified and its heroes were heroes and their reputations should not be sullied by dilettante journalists playing at being historians.

The writing itself has the feel of a high schooler desperately trying to impress teacher with his scholarship and "mature" style. While Thomas trumpets his interviews with survivors of the battle, the narrative itself has the feeling of being cut and pasted from cullings of old newspapers and magazines. Thomas apparently considers his readers unable to grasp significant issues, such as the military use of the 24 hour clock to render times; there are seeming endless instances of Thomas describing a time in the military way, i.e. 0934, and immediately appending 9:34 a.m., as if the average reader doesn't already know this or is too stupid to keep it in mind.

Interestingly enough, the very poltically correct Evan Thomas includes a line saying that even the prostitutes of Hawaii were rolling bandages in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor. While ripping Halsey, a bonfide American hero to shreds, Thomas seems to be a bit a of a prude and puritan when it comes to prostitutes; why would they not have also been concerned citizens wanting to do whatever they could to help their fellow Americans? Thomas seems to buy into rather common stereotypes about prostitutes and it is, in fact, surprising that he doesn't use the more poltiically correct contemporary term of sex worker.

If you get the impression that I don't think much of Evan Thomas's attempt to set forth military history, you are correct. War does not need to be glorified in any way. But the truth is that some wars are necessary and in the words of yet another journalist cum historian, there are "good wars". Thomas does not bring a respectful attitude to this retelling of a historic battle. My advice is to pursue other, less biased, histories.

Jerry

Whatever the other failings of this book might be, I found the maps irritatingly poor. When one reads about a battle, geographical information is paramount - you don't get the big picture or the context without being able to understand relative locations. Just a few examples: the map on p. 95 does show part of the Pacific Theater, but other than land masses, the only location it identifies is Rabaul, while the text of the book discusses many more (Truk, for example). It also only shows the location of one event discussed in the book, the attack on General Yamamoto's aircraft - it would have been easy to include sites of other events discussed in the text but they are absent. This requires one to consult other maps to appreciate the book. The map on p. 188 is especially frustrating. It lists tracks of progression of various Japanese fleets, but, although it would have been easy to annotate these tracks with events discussed in the book (the attack on Musashi, for example), they are absent. It also has a track labeled "Shima," although Admiral Shima's fleet is not mentioned in the book until probably 50 pages later, so one is left to wonder what this track means (or why it wasn't discussed). There are several maps showing the progression of the Yamato task forces' attack on Taffy 3, which is a good notion, but I found the placement of the vessels on the map to be somewhat at odds with the descriptions in the book, which was confusing. A bit more care should have been spent on these maps.

I wasn't particularly impressed with "John Paul Jones", another book by Evan Thomas but I gave "Sea of Thunder" a shot anyway. By covering the careers and wartime actions of four different naval officers, Thomas was unable to deliver enough depth to satisfy me. With so much material available on Leyte Gulf, I could think of many recommendations I would make before this.

By the time I finished "Sea of Thunder", I was left wondering what Thomas' intent was. It seemed to me that he really wanted to write this solely about the two Japanese commanders. Halsey was looked upon with a sort of latent disdain and Evans was forgotten about around 1/3 of the way through the book.

There are far too many books about Leyte Gulf that don't contain large amounts of personal opinion and judgement.

Bottom Line: Look Elsewhere

Thomas tells the tale through the voice of four naval Commanders, two Americans, and two Japanese. Background stories about the men are given before the build up to an accounting of the battle that would eventually lead to liberation of the Philipines. There is more information on the Japanese side than perhaps any other book in English on the subject. If you have found that neglected, you will enjoy the book.

To me, the narative seems a bit strained in it's desire to show cultural conditioning and misses much opportunity for tactical analysis such as in H.P. Willmont's book on the subject, but that does not mean the material is uninteresting. However, with the high degree of cultural history emphasis, there should have been more addressing of Japanese atrocities against POWS from U.S., Australia, and the allies, the Rape of Nanking, and the treatment of the Filipinos and Filipinas-- in the area of the battle no less. That is, the depravity of the Imperial Army as a debilitating factor. Yes, old fashioned a concept as it may be, we won because we were on the side of right in that one. Despite the mistakes.

Leyte Gulf was a fierce Naval battle that took place in waters near a province of the Philipines. Many say that it was the largest Naval battle in history, including this author, but it is hard to compare it to the ancient great sea battles at Salamis between Greece and the Persians or at Ecnomus between the Romans and Carthaginians. Certainly in terms of gross tonage, Leyte Gulf was larger hands down, but Leyte was a series of engagements over a few days. The Leyte struggle was in four main engagements: Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, Cape Engaño, and Samar. That is, the battle covered a fairly large area, as well as the devotion of a large number of ships and men.

Regardless of hair splitting, it was a terrible episode of modern warfare with great loss of life and I am thankful to the American sailors and aviators as well as the men of the 96 infantry "Deadeyes," 7th Infantry "Lightfighters" and 6th Army "Alamo Force" who did the heavy lifting of the land battle and the 11th Airborne for securing the mountains and the many others. Their sacrifice and hardships for our freedom is without measure.

This book very much appears to be a publisher's effort to capitalize on Evan Thomas's acclaim for his John Paul Jones biography by lumping together four biographical sketches that lacked sufficient development to command volumes of their own.

This volume offers little that is either new or useful for serious students of this battle, and much that is skewed by being taken out of context, or by the author's and publisher's lack of understanding of their topic.

For casual readers, this volume is a pitfall that will send them away with a highly distorted and incomplete picture of the battle and the people that fought it. You would spend your money better on Morison, Friedman, or Cutler.

The book's subtitle implies that the book is a study in command. It is not. It is four interwoven biographical sketches. The officers profiled are admirals Halsey, Kurita and Ugaki, and Commander E.E. Evans of the USS Johnston. Only the first two personalities make sense with respect to a command study, and at least three personalities that would be essential to any true command study of this battle--Kinkaid, Ozawa and Nishimura--are neglected.

The information on Halsey is nearly valueless and a reader would be better served reading E.B. Potter's biography of the man, and Carl Solberg's eyewitness observations of the functioning of Halsey's staff as a member thereof during this battle. Thomas tarnishes his entire work (and his reputation as an author) by reporting salacious details of Halsey's personal life that are essentially hearsay, lack pertinence to the topic at hand, and ignore the full context of Halsey's marriage--here again I direct readers to Potter's biography. The only conceivable reasons for the inclusion of such information are either to besmirch Halsey or to sensationalize the book. Neither motivation reflects any credit upon the author or publisher.

The information regarding Kurita is the most valuable in the volume, but it is not a revalation to any serious student of the battle. It has long been assumed that Kurita retreated because he had reached the point where his loyalty to the men he commanded finally overrode the ingrained military imperative to execute one's orders. The limited new information that Thomas has obtained merely confirms that impression. This should help rehabilitate Kurita of various ill-considered (and already largely discredited) charges of incompetence or cowardice.

Ugaki was included to provide a contrast to Kurita, but frankly that could have been done by addressing more pertinent Japanese commanders such as Nishimura or Ozawa. Those two officers actually played a significant part in the battle, while Ugaki was merely along for the ride so long as Kurita lived. Where Kurita is representative of the rational, professional camp in the Imperial Japanese Navy, Ugaki is representative of the irrational, romantic camp that embraced the Japanese brand of fascism known as Bushido. Put simply, Ugaki was a bit of a nut and anyone truly curious about him should simply read his biography. Suicidal Nishimura should have been examined in place of this irrelevant individual.

Why Thomas chose Commander Evans is less apparent or well thought out. One suspects he was chosen for a bizarre mixture of political correctness, the need to insert more "action" into the battle than merely discussing the top commanders otherwise would permit, and to inject some tragedy alongside the less fatal drama touted elsewhere in the volume. However brave and tragic Commander Evans and his gallant ship were, he had nothing to do with the command decisions that made this battle. Thomas would have done better to address the character and decisions of Admiral Kinkaid, or even of Admiral Clifton Sprague, before including this officer. Also, very little of real value is provided about Commander Evans. Most of what has not already been known from other sources is a puff-piece about his early life leaning very, very heavily on his Cherokee background and playing up every instance of real or perceived discrimination to the hilt. This is nothing but a glaring example of "spinning" the facts in the way one presents them. Someone less focused on what was unfair in Commander Evans's life might have made note that in spite of it all, he did rise to command and rise to the occasion to join the pantheon of American naval heroes alongside the like of Stephen Decatur, Oliver Hazard Perry, James Lawrence, John Paul Jones, David Farragut, John Waldron, Richard O'Kane, and "Butch" O'Hare. Thomas has provided nothing that cannot be as easily gleaned from Morison and Hornfischer.

Evan Thomas's Sea of Thunder is "pop" history, and a particularly sad example thereof. If you want to know more about the Battle for Leyte Gulf and the men who fought it, seek out these works:

The History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, volume XII, "Leyte" by Samuel E. Morison

"Bull Halsey" by E.B. Potter

"Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet" by Wheeler

"The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation" by James Field

"Afternoon of the Rising Sun" by Kenneth Friedman

"The Battle of Leyte Gulf" by Thomas Cutler

"From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" by Asada

"The Japanese Navy in World War II" by David Evans

I have now read a half-dozen books on Leyte Gulf, not counting Herman Wouk's historical fiction version in "War and Remembrance," and the conclusion that Admiral Halsey blundered at Leyte Gulf by failing to leave Task Force 34 (or at least some significant force) to guard the San Bernardino Strait is now accepted historical truth. The only debatable point is how badly he blundered. He followed that up with two more indefensible mistakes, twice allowing his fleet to get hit with murderous typhoons that could have been avoided. If he hadn't been a hugely popular hero with the American people, he would have been court-martialed after the typhoons, rather than given a fifth star and allowed to retire quietly. Halsey said it best: the fates conspired to have the cautious Ray Spruance in charge at the Battle of the Phillippine Sea (where Halsey would have been the best man to lead the American fleet) and Halsey at Leyte Gulf (where the American landing force could have been torn to shreds, were it not for the "Last Stand of the Tincan Sailors" and Admiral Kurita's decision to retreat rather than risk the destruction of his fleet.

One may quarrel with Evan Thomas's praise for Kurita, equivocal respect for Captain Ernest Evans's courage (Thomas seems almost quizzical as to why Evans made his final charge) and damning of Ugaki and Halsey, but this is a very good read. The fact that the book is provocative is a major part of its interest.

The title "Sea of Thunder" refers to the greatest naval battle in history. The Battle of Leyte Gulf (pronounced Laytee) was fought off the Philipines from October 23 to 26, 1944. There were actually four sub-battles with the final result being the demolition of most of what was left of the Japanese navy.

The author, Evan Thomas, is an editor at Newsweek and previously wrote a well-received biography of John Paul Jones. In Sea of Thunder he concentrates his attention on four individuals; the Japanese Admirals Kurita and Ugaki, the American overall commander William "Bull" Halsey, and the commander of one an American destroyer, Ernest Evans. Thomas offers a fine account, with some debatable opinions.

More than half of the book is taken up with Thomas' examination and evaluation of the four officers; their backgrounds, ways of thinking, how they got to be where they were at. He also presents the Pacific War as being a clash of cultures, with the Japanese not understanding the American pysche, and vice versa.

The author's evaluation of Halsey I am sure raises some hackles. Thomas is certainly measuring Halsey against a somewhat unfair standard - as in how does Halsey measure up as a 21st century liberal? Well it was the 1940's and a war was going on. He repeatedly points to Halsey's famous phrase (which was put up on Naval base billboards) "Kill Japs, Kill Japs, Kill more Japs" as racist. Of course there was plenty of racism in the 40's. (Thomas made an interesting point at the end of the book - Halsey was against the use of nuclear bombs on Japan; he felt it was unnecessary.)

Thomas narrative throughout the book is fast moving and absorbing. While this was a multi-phase battle and all parts of it are described, he is mainly interested in the tactical decisions made by Halsey and Kurita, as well as the battle off the coast of Samar on October 25th.

In a nutshell, Halsey is lured away to the north. He chases the Japanese carriers, leaving a small force of baby aircraft carriers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts behind to support the ground forces that were in the process of continuing the invasion and recapture of the Philipines. A powerful Japanese unit of several battleships (including the world's biggest, the Yamato) and heavy cruisers under Admiral Kurita came through where Halsey's battleships should have been and had an opportunity to wipe out the small naval force and wreak havoc on the transports and ground units.

I found his analysis of Halsey's decision to chase the Japanese carriers - going for a knockout blow - rather than staying put and defending the landing areas, to be overly harsh. Halsey made an aggressive tactical decision. He was wrong, but hindsight is 20/20. Thomas' view is that Halsey made the decision for the greater glory of Bull Halsey - but that is a very speculative interpretation.

So off Samar there is a three hour running battle - one of the most celebrated showcases of American naval valor in history. This is where Commander Evans, captain of the destroyer Johnston earns his Medal of Honor (posthumous). Mysteriously, Kurita then turns his ships around and heads back to safety. Why he did it, when he could have continued the battle and ultimately done great damage to the American landing force is one of the mysteries of the War.

The reasoning today seems to be that Kurita realized that he could have sunk empty transport ships and shot up the shore troops. However ultimately his battle force would be cut to pieces by Halsey's other units, and he was not prepared to sacrifice the 30,000 sailors under his command. The Japanese Naval Command knew that their days were numbered and they were reduced to fighting for honor, and that may not have been a good enough rationale for Kurita to sacrifice his fleet. Kurita's force was the only Japanese fleet that was not completely devastated during the battle.

So the book is very worth reading, with the caveat that Thomas does not take a phenomenological approach in his portrayals - he doesn't allow the four characters to present themselves; he presents them through his own prism of progressive morality.

Nevertheless, Sea of Thunder is a page-turner.

The back cover of "Sea of Thunder" is littered with glowing praise on the book's "jaw dropping psychological insights," "impressive scholarship," and "brilliant penetrating studies." Perhaps I'm just a cranky old amateur naval historians, but nowhere in the previous 415 pages did I find much approaching this level of hype. Mostly, I was reminded of older, better books that weren't quite as readable but at least gave me a whole lot more to chew on.

To be fair, Evan Thomas does provide some interesting insights into the Fog of War and the problems of divided command. If you find serious naval history intimidating, you'll probably enjoy Thomas's easygoing writing style and general avoidance of complex technical and strategic factors.

Unfortunately, I found "Sea of Thunder" to be largely uninspiring and milquetoast. Just about everything it describes - the battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese warrior mentality, the racist attitudes of both sides, Halsey's command failures, and so on - has been done before and done better as well. Thomas's character depictions range from being insightful to large cliche. Halsey is largely idolized for the first third and harshly criticized for the remainder. Ernest Evans, the commander of a destroyer at Leyte Gulf who was killed while fighting a superior Japanese force, is attacked, with 63 years of hindsight, for being "foolhardy." Vice Admirals Matome Ugaki and Takeo Kurita are portrayed in a sympathetic light, but Thomas seems intent on reducing the entire Japanese military establishment to brutish war criminals and noble zen warriors. How very simplistic!

Sea Of Thunder isn't a bad book. It would probably make a decent introduction to the naval side of the Pacific War. Still, it's Military History Lite at it's most obvious, riddled with technical errors and written with too much modern-day politically correct hindsight for it's own good.