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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Narrow Focus and Krick Uses Canister on Longstreet, January 21, 2003
This review is from: The Second Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership (Paperback)
This book is the third in a series of essays on the Gettysburg battle and as much as I thoroughly enjoyed the First day and the Third, this book is my least favorite. Although, Gallagher as usual writes a very fair and well researched essay on REL and his reasoning and actions at Gettysburg, the remaining three authors are a little too narrow in scope on their topic or in the case of Krick to eager to harpoon the great white whale. Gallagher has the best essay as he explains Lee's position, options and reasoning in a very logical format. He also underlines well Lee's interactions with his generals. It was very disappointing that Krick who is a tremendously well researched writer on Jackson and who adores him writes the critical essay on Longstreet who Krick has a long history of open disgust. Krick starts off his essay with a collection of everything ugly that was ever said about Longstreet to incredulous proportions that he even includes the relatively few comments made by Longstreet's trusted subordinates. Often quoting McLaws who called Longstreet a "great big humbug", in contrast it was noted in Jeffery Wertz's more recent book that recently discovered documentation between Longstreet and McLaws indicated that Lee wanted Longstreet to either ride McLaws hard to keep him from being lethargic or lose him, which may explain the strains in their relationship. It's no secret that Longstreet was not motivated for a frontal assault and he is taken to task for trying to conceal moving 20,000 men from an open field although I would agree he could have done it more effectively. Krick roasts Longstreet every which way, he criticizes him for not embracing Lee's attack plan and arguing but then beats him up for refusing Hood's last minute desire to flank the round tops. By this time, Longstreet played Lee too long for the same request thus he ordered the attack a fact Longstreet never hid even in his writings; however, poorly written. Krick in effect makes Longstreet look like such a dolt that it reflects negatively on Lee, as if he was incapable of either command or command changes. Looking at the number of officers that Lee moved out after the Seven days and at Antietam, Lee could and did reassign anyone that displeased him. The second day was the heaviest fighting on the field and in spite of the Union position; the First Corp almost breaks through. This should have been the best and most critical essay in the book and I think more even handed in the analysis. The remaining two essays maintain a more narrow scope. Greene expertly explains the bewildering day of Slocum and the 12th Corp. Slocum inexplicitly does not march to the sound of the guns embracing orders that are out of date and when he pulls into Culps Hill to become the senior commander he seems to lose control of his corps not even knowing the whereabouts of his divisions. Fortunately for the Union, no great attack occurred while 2/3's to the division marched away from their positions to assist the Union Center and left flank and while Geary inexplicitly marched from Culps Hill away from the battle essentially getting lost. Only Greene's division hang's on beating Johnson's dramatic attack in which he out numbered Greene 3 to 1. Slocum's units return at the end of the day. The one piece that would have added an interesting aspect to the essay was how the Confederates just missed out on having over whelming numbers in the attack phase to the point of success. Part of it is explained in that the Stonewall Brigade had to watch a threat from the east but a little more detail would have been wonderful. It sounds that this was the great possibility for a breakthrough while the maligned Longstreet's attack took much of the focus of the Union's attention away. The last essay by Hartwig is a detailed study of General Caldwell's division filling the breach at the Wheatfield stemming the attack by the First Corp led by Kershaw, Anderson and Semmes. Plugging the hole expertly and timely without any leadership from either Corp commanders on the field. He borrows commands to fill holes in his line and he stymies the Confederate attack until Barksdale and Wofford's brigade ruptures Sickles line collapsing Caldwell's exposed right flank. In spite of high casualties and expert service, Caldwell is castigated by his superiors and eventually loses his command. He's never properly appreciated and perhaps is made inappropriately culpable by his inept Corp commander whose ruthless critique may have been the cover for his own limited performance. Another essay was needed, what was A. P. Hill doing?
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Leadership: Decisions....decisions..., August 5, 2002
This review is from: The Second Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership (Paperback)
Gary Gallagher has brought together the 2nd Day at Gettysburg in a format similar to his 1st Day book in regards to Union and Confederate leadership. This 2nd Day book offers insight to popular questions and accusations made towards officers involved in various battles during the second day of events. As with other publications by Gallagher, Gallagher teams up with other noted historians in a series of chapters that offer their viewpoints to popular battles during the 2nd Day. Gary Gallagher takes on the tough task of questions that arise to Lees decisions to attack in the early morning of July 2nd, 1863 while William Glenn Robertson tries to answer questions in regards to Daniel Sickles 3rd Corps movements. Robertson defines Sickles with great biography to paint a picture of a man whose military leadership is often backed by political tension and propaganda. Robertson does a fine job in looking at Sickles reasons for moving the 3rd Corps and also Meades reaction to such positioning. As the book continues Robert Krick looks at General James Longstreet and tries to answer questions as to why this general was slow to react to Lees orders on the 2nd how others around the man were upset with his sluggish approach to handling the 2nd day affairs. Krick points out key elements to Longstreets decision making as it was typical of the commander to be defensive and stubborn throughout the Civil War. It was interesting to read Kricks views on Longstreets career and how Longstreet handled southern verbal attacks made against him for years after the war. Wilson Greene brought on his chapter in regards to Howard Slocums defense of Culps Hill. Greene initially captured the flavor of Slocum though soon ran into a lengthy discussion of Culps Hill deployment and battle which did not seem to compliment this chapters basis of discussion. I felt it painted a good picture of the events though didnt associate with enough impact to Slocum. Slocum I felt became a less-than central figure in the discussion which seemed to lessen the importance of titling the chapter Henry J. Slocum and the Twelfth Corps on July 1-2, 1863. I was disappointed with this chapter. Scott Hartwig brought on a very intriguing and worthwhile chapter in regards to the Wheatfield which centered on General Caldwell and his command. This was a very refreshing chapter after being bored with Greens Slocum chapter. Hartwig wanted to show that Sickles blunder had brought about chaos and confusion for other commanders such as Caldwell. Over years Caldwell has taken much blame for his rigid task at hand at the Wheatfield conflict in the 2nd. Hartwig defines the movments and executions carefully with maps and thorough research making this chapter probably the best written of all. It reads well and also shows that Caldwell had a huge undertaking thrust upon him that afternoon on the 2nd and respectively handled a burdensome task. This book is a great read for those looking to deepen their Gettysburg research. For the novice I would not recommend this book as it does not bring forth the entire 2nd Day battle, it only answers questions popular to 2nd Day events. For the student looking for further insight, I highly recommend this book. Its a must read!!
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Studies of the Second Day at Gettysburg, July 21, 2004
This review is from: The Second Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership (Paperback)
This book is the second of a three-volume collection of essays edited and introduced by Gary Gallagher that explore leadership and other critical issues during each of the three days of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863. On the first day of the Battle, elements of the Union and Confederate armies collided to the North and West of Gettysburg with the result that the Union Army was pushed back to a strong position on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge to the South and East of the town. The five essays in this volume explore important and controversial actions in the following second day of the Battle.
The first essay in the volume is by Professor Gallagher himself, "If the Enemy is There, we must attack him." This essay explores an underlying issue of the entire battle -- Confederate commander Robert E. Lee's decision to assume the offensive on July 2 and to attack the powerful Union position. General Lee's decision was opposed at the time and for many years thereafter by General James Longstree, Lee's primary subordinate. Longstreet favored a movement around the right of the Union army. Other options that Lee might have considered include assuming a defensive posture and awaiting a Union attack. Professor Gallagher explores each of these options and comes to a measured assessment of Lee's decision.
The second essay "The Peach Orchard Revisited: Daniel E. Sickles and the Third Corps on July 2, 1863" is by William Robertson, Professor at the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army. Professor Robertson examines the decision of Union General Dan Sickles, commander of the Third Corps of the Army, to move his Corps from the position that Union Commander George Meade assigned to it on Cemetery Ridge to a salient about 3/4 mile in front of the Union line. Controversy has raged over the years over the wisdom and effect of Sickles's unauthorized move on the result of the Battle. Professor Robertson makes an excellent attempt to examine this issue afresh. He concludes, probably contrary to the opinion of most students of the Battle, that Sickle's move had a great deal to commend it, even though Professor Robertson is highly critical of Sickles's failure to coordinate his action with Meade.
The third essay, "If Longstreet Says so it is most likely not true" by Robert Krick, a biographer of Stonewall Jackson, is polemical in character. It is highly critical of the role Longstreet played in the events of Gettysburg, particularly on the second day. Most of this essay is a discussion of various statements of other Southern leaders critical of Longstreet and a criticism of Longstreet's actions at places other than Gettysburg. A more careful examination of Longstreet's actions during the second day of the Battle itself would have been welcome.
The fourth essay, " A Step All-Important and Essential to Victory": Henry W. Slocum and the Twelfth Corps on July 1-2, 1863" is by A. Wilson Greene, executive director of the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites. It discusses and assesses the leadership of the Commander of the Union Twelfth Corps, General Slocum, during his tardy march to the Battlefield on July 1 and during the defense of Culp's Hill on the extreme Union right on July 2. Culp's Hill remains a relatively little-known part of the Battle, but it was the scene of furious fighting. The climax of the action on Culp's Hill was General "Pap" Greene's holding of the position with only a single brigade against a force that outnumbered him 3-1 during the evening of July 2. Wilson Greene's essay argues that this aspect of the Battle was, indeed, not of the greatest significance to the ultimate result. He is also critical of Slocum's performance throughout the Battle.
The final essay in this collection is by Scott Hartwig, a ranger and historian with the National Park Service at Gettysburg, titled "No troops had done better": John Caldwell's Division in the Wheatfield, July 2, 1863". This essay is unique in the collection in that it examines command at the Division rather than the Corps or Army level. It focuses on the bloody fighting in the Wheatfield which resulted from the position assumed by General Sickles (essay 2). Caldwell's Division was sent to reinforce the position and fought heroically, if ultimately unsuccessfully to hold the Wheatfield. This essay does an excellent job in exploring command under combat conditions featuring lack of knowledge of the position, lack of coordination, and difficulties of communication among the troops. I recently attended an anniversary battle walk at Gettysburg which covered the fighting in the Wheatfield, and Caldwell's role, in great detail. I learned a great deal by following-up with Hartwig's essay.
This book presupposes a basic familiarity with the Battle of Gettysburg and with the chief areas of controversy resulting from this great Battle. These essays are thoughtful and provocative and will enhance the student's understanding.
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