Customer Reviews

The Second World War In The East (Cassell History of Warfare)

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Right at the beginning, the author states that there are many other books written about WWII. Hence, he is trying to write this book from a different perspective, by analysing the reasons for the way the Pacific War unfolded rather than to give a straightforward chronological account.
The end result is the same - a chronological account of events as they unfolded.
The analysis is partially successful. Willmott has a rather engaging style of writing and claims to write from an objective perspective with hindsight. The problem here is that he selects his own objectivity.
An example is the following. Nothing about the WWII Pacific campaign was straightforward, even its beginnings. The WWII European campaign's was - the invasion of Poland. Period. The author grudgingly admits that we may trace its roots politically back to the Versailles Treaty. However for the Pacific campaign, he thinks that it started at the Sino-Japanese war 1937, or better still, it started at the Japanese Manchurian war 1931 or even when Japan first emerged as a modern industrialised power.
Furthermore, he would propose a viewpoint and raise a few facts in defending it. The problem is that he sometimes does not state his facts clearly.
There are also a few brouhahas as per the following examples:
Willmott thinks that the Japanese sense of superiority was due to their "mandate from heaven". This concept and term is only associated with Chinese dynastic history and is out of context here.
He believes that many accounts of WWII focus too much on the little things. One example cited was that he thinks that ULTRA's contribution to the Allied success in the Atlantic campaign has been over exaggerated in far too many books. Thus, he completely fails to mention here that breaking the Japanese code led largely to success at Midway as well as other Allied campaigns. In an about twist, he credits the minor contribution of the Allies in Burma as being important to the whole Pacific campaign. The bombing of Pearl Harbour was insignificant militarily, except in propaganda value and in delaying the American naval build up by a few months. Yet the book devotes two large map spreads on four pages, one for each wave of Japanese aircraft.
He spells the town names Selangor as Segolar and the Kokoda Trail is perverted thruout as the Kakoda Trail.
Some of the accompanying maps are oversimplified. Some are beautiful. Therein lies the problem - these series of books attempt too much - a structured text with numerous illustrations to appeal to the general public. The problem is that there is a perceived imbalance between text and illustrations.
There is no space for thoughtful analysis nor revisionist thinking which might be better served elsewhere.

Besides being a visual treasure with numerous black and white photos, the book is complemented with many maps and diagrams along with a few color photos. Even the pages are made of thick high-quality stock. The very high production values are what initially attracted me to this book. But, I was surprised to find that even the writing was of an unexpected caliber, full of thoughtful analysis on why Japan went to war with China, the US, and almost every other major power during World War II.

Beyond that the author, H.P. Willmot, goes into real depth in explaining Japan's apparent invincibility during the opening months of the war only to face total, utter defeat by August 1945. The most crucial Japanese mistake was an underestimation of wrathful American vengeance unleashed at Pearl Harbor. Unlike what the Japanese planners had imagined, this desire for vengeance would not fade and disappear after 18 months of attritional warfare. Instead the US would not cease until Japan was soundly defeated and militarily occupied.

Willmott goes on to examine Japan's precarious position regarding its industrial base versus the US. Whereas great losses in American naval and merchant shipping could be rapidly and easily replaced, each Japanese vessel lost could never be totally replaced. As Japan's shipping losses mounted with increased American submarine campaigns and carrier raids, the raw materials needed for its war machine were left permanently stranded in far-off Southeast Asian ports.

The author does an excellent job of investigating both the material and doctrinal weaknesses of the Japanese versus the US. What the Japanese had envisaged as a limited war turned into a nightmare of total war with the world's first superpower. The US's resources were so great that even though it didn't give the Pacific Campaign top priority it still produced an overwhelming and convincing victory against smaller, less technologically advanced Japanese forces. Indeed, had the military regime in Tokyo been realistic and morally capable of suing for peace it probably should have done so after the Midway battle before American predominance began to convincingly assert itself.

Finally, the book has data on naval battle losses, new ship commissionings, combined shipping losses, and short biographies of the leading personalities in the campaign. I enjoyed both the pictures and the text and had the book read in just a few short days. I highly recommend it.