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13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Security First review, June 15, 2007
Amitai Etzioni argues that our international problems are largely self-inflicted. And he sees good news in this finding, to the extent that many of our problems admit of a solution. We are suffering, he argues, from a severe form of realism deficiency disorder. Etzioni uses the term "realism" not in a Freudian sense, nor in a Realpolitik sense. Given that it is much easier (albeit far from easy) to learn to face reality than to change reality--Etzioni shows that there is cause for optimism for the post-Bush world.
First of all, despite multiple terrorist attacks, we are not involved in a clash of civilizations. Etzioni presents considerable evidence to show that most Muslims are moderate people who oppose violence. For those who are quick to argue that this may be true but only of non-Arabs, he presents data to show that most Palestinians, for example, also seek a peaceful solution with Israel. Many may have voted for Hamas, but they did so because of its attention to social services and its integrity, as opposed to the corrupt Fatah party. (He points to similar data for several other Arab nations.) That is, most Muslims are on our side of what Etzioni calls the "true fault line"--the divide between those who rely on violence and those who favor peaceful coexistence--in contrast to the way in which Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington divide the "West" and "the rest," a worldview that gained much following after 9/11.
One major reason many believe the Muslim world is so problematic is that we have bought lock, stock, and barrel into another unrealistic theory, namely, that we ought to make the world safe by promoting democracy. Such a theory argues that the world is trending towards democracy and that we should give history a helping hand; after all, this theory holds, many of our most reliable allies are liberal democracies.
Etzioni shows that genuine liberals are in reality few and far between in most of the world. Hence if we approach the world seeking only liberals as allies, we shall find few. On the other hand, if we set out in search of moderates, we shall find many more partners. He uses the spat over the Danish cartoons to illustrate his point. Most Muslims were offended by the cartoons and--given half a chance--would ban them, and generally limit free speech, a key liberal tenet. However, at the same time, most Muslims opposed violent reactions to the publication. Similarly, the U.S.'s efforts to get Afghanistan and Iraq to introduce the separation of mosque and state and to grant full-blown women's rights in their constitutions are unrealistic, and delayed what must be done: providing security first. Etzioni draws from this analysis one of his major policy recommendations: in places like Iraq and Afghanistan we should help provide law and order, but otherwise leave it to the people of these nations to hammer out the details of their political systems.
Etzioni applies the same "Security First" thesis to international relations. He sees Libya as a test case for such a foreign policy. Libya turned moderate in security terms when it disgorged its WMD program and ceased supporting terrorism. However, it continues to be a highly illiberal nation. Surely one would prefer for Libya to become a liberal democracy. However for now it is viewed as satisfying first-order international needs. Instead of condemning Libya, as human rights groups demand, we should hold it up as a model for other hostile nations. Surely if North Korea and Iran followed the Libya model, we would be dancing in the streets. Democratization and liberalization should be considered as a Stage II development, following focus on security.
Another aspect of the current, unrealistic U.S. worldview is the often-implicit but widely held belief in the West that the world is increasingly secularizing as it modernizes, and that the U.S. should only support secular leaders, programs, and initiatives abroad. Etzioni cites a court case that bans USAID from spending money on religious education programs abroad, and he describes conversations with State Department officials who are very wary about working with religious groups overseas. Etzioni, in contrast, sees moderate but religious Muslims (and other believers) as the best antidotes to radical ones. He compares the situation to the Cold War, in which the U.S. found that the best antidote to communists were other social democrats, and not necessarily conservatives. He provides a list of specific measures that can be undertaken in this regard, including bringing moderate mullahs from Indonesia and Bangladesh to places such as Afghanistan and southern Iraq.
The lack of realism in U.S. foreign policy is particularly evident in the ways we grossly misjudged our capacity to engage in social engineering and post-war reconstruction abroad. Etzioni draws on his sociological training and research to show that a foreign policy that presumes we can turn nation after nation into "shining, prosperous democracies" is as unrealistic as the presumption that we can "reconstruct" post-conflict nations such as Afghanistan and Iraq if we just turned that mission over to civilians or had such missions handled by the State Department rather than the Pentagon. Etzioni, to the contrary, argues that we must realize that democracy is a delicate plant that grows slowly, only after the ground is well prepared, and best prepared by those in whose garden it is being grown.
The U.S. can help prepare the ground for democratization but not deliver it ready made or rush it along. Among the steps that he calls for is to engage, rather than isolate, totalitarian regimes (compare, for example, U.S. policy towards Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Saddam's Iraq, to U.S. policy towards China and the USSR). He shows that when societies open up to U.S. travel, investment, and international communication, these all erode the power of totalitarian regimes and eventually open the door to democratization.
Etzioni's most unusual and compelling argument is that U.S. foreign policy is based on a misunderstanding of the basic elements that make up a good society. A good society is not one merely centered on individual liberty, rights, democracy, and free markets--all individualizing elements. A good society also nurtures a strong social order by drawing primarily on a shared moral culture and informal social controls. He finds that the reason practically all newly liberated societies, from Russia to Iraq, exhibit high levels of antisocial behavior (including drastic increases in crime and drug use), is that they need help not so much in liberalizing as in replacing their former police states with the kind of social order that plays a key (albeit often invisible) moralizing role in free societies.
When moral culture and informal social controls collapse, radicalism rises. It is unrealistic to treat radicalism as a childhood disease of modernization, as Francis Fukuyama has suggested. If a moral vacuum persists, so will radicalism. Here Etzioni returns to his theme about the importance of religion in our foreign policy, as it can serve as a major source of moral culture for failing and newly liberated states.
All said and done, the more we realize that our major international challenges are smaller in scope than widely held, that we have many more potential allies than we sometimes presume, and that it is foolish to try to democratize the world on the run, the sounder our foreign policy will be.
Although many see realism as counter to a moral stand, Etzioni argues that the realistic approach he promotes both contains values in its own right and champions still others. His realism aims to avoid the cynicism and distrust that result when nation after nation is promised democratization and economic development to no avail. Moreover his realism allows us to see that the people of the world have other yearnings and commitments than the various liberties cherished by the West. They seek to nurture interpersonal and communal bonds, and spiritual and religious values.
The book reflects that Etzioni is a social scientist and hence his book is more evidence-driven than based on theories of international relations (which are at the root of several other books on the world after Bush). His book is also more future-oriented than some others. Most importantly, in contrast to several books that reflect the good wishes and daydreams of their authors, Etzioni's work is grounded in the reality which cannot be ignored as we seek to advance values dear to all of us.
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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
An interesting book, June 10, 2007
One line Professor Etzioni used, during a lecture about his new book, Security First, stayed with me. He compared the Bush Administration approach to rogue states, demanding regime change, to someone who approaches the White House and tells the President to "turn over the keys to the White House to Gore, go and campaign for gay marriage and abortion rights, and then we can talk about the rest." He added wryly "that such statements do not make much of a conversation starter." His made this observations to highlight the difference between his view and that of the Neo Cons who argue that only democratic regimes can be reliable partners in promoting global security. Hence starting with regime change is essential.
Etzioni faces the problems that result from writing about foreign policy in a rapidly changing world. Although his new book has just been published, his thesis is already facing a very concrete and telling test. Etzioni holds that the U.S. and its allies should follow the opposite course the Bush Administration has: instead of asking rogue states to agree to change their regimes--promise them that the U.S. will not use its force to topple their government if they give up their nuclear-military ambitions. He claims that this is not a bad bargain as the U.S. cannot realistically invade Iran and North Korea anyhow, or otherwise force regime change on them. Moreover, these regimes are being challenged (especially in Iran) by their own people. Above all that these nations may be willing to trade their nuclear plans for a non aggression treaty with the U.S., as they have indicated in the past. Well, we shall see soon enough whether this thesis will hold, because as of late, this is the deal the U.S. and its partners in the six nation talks have offered to North Korea. The negotiations with Iran may soon provide a similar test for Etzioni's Security First foreign policy. If these tests fail, Etzioni may well wish that he written his book on ice.
Still even if these rogue nations in the end do not trust the Bush Administration sufficiently to make a deal, one wishes that some of the other ideas of the book (some less original than others, but a truly long list) would be put to the test. I would start with Gelb-Biden idea, which Etzioni develops some, to turn Iraqi security over to the local militias. That is, to allow the Shias to control the south of Iraq and parts of Baghdad; the Kurds already control segments of the north; and the rest will be up to the Sunnis to maintain law and order.
The most interesting test--I can hardly wait--would be checking out Etzioni's claim that most Muslims are moderates (which he defines as opposed to suicide bombers, car bombs, and more generally to terrorism) but do not necessarily favor a Western style democracy or several key human rights. That if the U.S. insists that it can ally itself only with those who seek its kind of regime, we will find few soulmates in the Muslim world. However, if the U.S. would agree to work with all those who seek peace and security, it will find that most people--including in the largest Muslims nations such as Indonesia and Bangladesh--are our potential allies.
Whether one agrees with Professor Etzioni or holds that human rights should not be subject to such political considerations, one may well agree that his book provides a series of testable propositions for the next Administration's foreign policy, whether Democratic or Republican. This is more than can be said about many other books today.
Offer Alony
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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Realism with a Heart?, May 31, 2008
The apparent failure of the Neo-Conservatives to transform Iraq from a brutal Baathist dictatorship into a liberal democracy led to what Amitai Etzioni calls a "Backlash against Democracy" - the sense that US Foreign policy (especially in the Middle East) should be focused on maintaining stability, not promoting democracy. Promoting democracy from abroad does not lead to stable, peace-loving regimes as it did in Germany and Japan, but to ethnic conflict and tensions generally (Amy Chua's World on Fire) and in the Middle East, to the rise of extreme Islamists (see my review of The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror). Consequentially, democratization is losing stock, and an unattractive alternative is popping its head: a diplomacy of stability, interests and balance-of-power - Realism.
Etzioni's book can be seen as part of the backlash, but with a twist. He does call for "Security First" - a policy of promoting security rather than democracy. But for Etzioni this is not only a cold hearted necessity - although it is that, too. Etzioni sees "Security First" as a pragmatic and principled policy. "Security First" is thus realistic *and* idealistic - Henry Kissinger meets Woodrow Wilson.
How can that be achieved? Much of "Security First" is traditionally realistic - supporting dictators as long as they do not pose a threat to the world outside. Realism is summarized in Franklin Roosevelt's apocryphal description of Nicoraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza García as "a son of a b***h, but our son of a b***h". Accordingly, Etzioni calls on the US to lionize Qaddafi for his rejection of WMD and terrorism, and to offer Iran security against regime change for giving up its nuclear weapons program (pp. 9-14). Generally, we should support moderate autocrats like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Saudi's House of Saud.
The moral aspects of "Security First" are two: First, less problematically, Security First calls on the US and other powers to stop genocide, even when the intervention does not serve a vital interest. Second, after "Security First" comes "Democracy Second" - Etzioni argues that the US can build upon the security to promote freedom. Although Etzioni makes some interesting suggestions (particularly his discussion of public diplomacy pp. 164-169), I am ultimately unconvinced that fostering democracy is a viable project for the Middle East. And if it isn't, "Security First" is hardly an appetizing option.
Etzioni believes that the vast majority of Muslims are "Illiberal Moderates", that although they do not believe in democracy or human rights, they do believe in non-violence. In Etzioni's view, every civilization has a "warrior" faction and a "preacher" faction, and we should be able to negotiate with the majority of Muslims, who are "preachers", and thus potential allies.
If the great majority of Arab Muslims are against violence, why are the political manifestations of Islam in the Middle East (with the possible exception of non-Arab Turkey's Muslims) invariably pro-violence? Why are most orthodox Islamic political groups violent? In Egypt and in Iran, in Lebanon and Gaza, Muslims support radical, Islamists groups. Part of the reason may be that our secular allies tacitly support these groups (more on that later) but that can't be the only explanation. Etzioni argues that Hamas's victory in the Palestinian elections was due to its supply of social services and its perceived lack of corruption, not its radical ideology (pp. 55-56). That begs the question: why are the ideologues the ones supplying the social services and not the moderates? A moderate Muslim party should have an advantage because it would offer the people what they allegedly want (Social services) without what they allegedly don't want (the Islamist extremist politics). So where is it?
It's hard to credit the notion that Muslims vote for fanatics because they are uncorrupt. The personal corruption of PLO leaders are far less disastrous to Palestinian interests than Hamas's extremism. In most countries, both Left and Right are happy to tolerate a corrupt leadership as long as it maintains its interests: see Ariel Sharon's popularity in Israel, Tony Blair's in Britain, and Silvio Berlusconi's in Itlay. Nor is it likely that extremist religious groups would be less corrupt than secular ones: The religious right wing Shas party is arguably Israel's most corrupt, with little discernable effect on its popularity. I don't know about Hamas, but Al Qaeda has had its share of corruption, too (See Lawrence Wright's Brilliant The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (Vintage)).
The thesis that Muslims don't actually mean what they say is condescending. Occham's Razor tells us that the simplest explanation is probably true. If Arab Muslims support Radical Islamist parties, it is probably because they support radical Islam. Etzioni quotes many opinion polls reporting that ordinary Muslims oppose violence. I can't fully account for these polls (although I'm skeptical of polls generally), but I would suggest that we should focus on what economists call "revealed preferences" - look at what Muslims do, not at what they say.
Second, promoting Democracy is hard because our main allies in the region are unlikely to support developing democracy in their countries. Etzioni: "The authoritarian governments currently in place should be encouraged, cajoled, helped, and pressured to lay the groundwork for the greater participation of moderate groups in the government". This means asking them to dig their own graves. No wonder they refuse. But the caveat is even worse. They should do it "while keeping the Islamists at bay" (p.52).
Of course our friendly neighborhood autocrat would do nothing of sorts. Instead he would suppress the kind of opposition that we may like - moderate and liberal - and tacitly support the Islamists, allowing them a measure of freedom for qualified support of his regime. This has a double advantage - it relieves the pressure on his regime from the Islamists, and it makes him indispensable to the West, who fear the alternative - out and out Islamists - far more. Arab regimes perfected this strategy during the Cold War (See John Gaddis's We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (A Council on Foreign Relations Book) and The Cold War: A New History), and continue to play it today (Martin Kramer brilliantly blogged about this policy by a ruler of a typical Arab state "Gulfistan"). The West's allies, being local and having their regime depending on it, are likely to out manipulate us.
Thus my view of the world is considerably bleaker than Etzioni's: we can't appease the Middle East, we can't democratize it, and we can contain it only imperfectly. I guess that's why they call it "Realism".
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