8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A book of invaluable information, March 31, 2009
This review is from: The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare) (Hardcover)
As someone who has written my master thesis on inteligence and counterterrorism in Israel between 1967 and 1979, I'd wish I had this book when i wrote my thesis. It would have made my quest for sources and material so much easier. An excellent source for people interested in intelligence and how intelligence effects counterterrorist strategies.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An excellent book, February 10, 2010
This review is from: The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare) (Hardcover)
This is an excellent book, because in a mere 149 pages we learn the complete history of the Israeli experience fighting terrorism from the pre-state days of 1918 to the present. Author, Ami Pedahzur, is not just another cheerleader who chants that "the IDF/Mossad are the best," instead he shows the Israeli experiences, lessons learned, warts and all. He reminds the reader that terrorism is not a major threat to the national security of the state of Israel. He argues that Israel has relied too heavily and to it's detriment on reprisals which have led to an escalating cycle of terrorism. He writes that instead Israel should expend more resources hardening itself as a target of terrorism. He concludes that Israel should spend more of it's military and intelligence resources protecting itself from real threats to its national security such as Iran and the rise of radical regimes. If I can find fault with the author, it is that he did little to discuss the underlying cause that fueled terrorism against Israel, namely that for nearly fifty years the Palestinians were a state-less people. And that by the time Israel finally deigned to negotiate with the PLO, the conflict had already given birth to even more blood thirsty terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
Maybe the greatest lesson to be learned by the US from the Israeli experience is that Hamas besides being a terrorist organization is "first and foremost a social movement that runs a ramified system of charity and relief institutions." And that because of this Hamas was able to win 76 out of 132 seats in the 2006 elections. If the US continues to lose this 'Jihad of the hearts and minds,' as some have called it in impoverished Muslim countries that we may intervene in militarily in the future, even invade. We may find ourselves wading into even more quagmires from the "Stan," countries of the former Soviet Union to as far away as Indonesia.
Finally, for those whose appetite for more on the subject has been whetted by this slim volume I would heartily recommend the title, Israel's Secret Wars by Ian Black, which covers much of the same material, but goes into much greater detail.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Intersection of Politics and Violence, January 14, 2010
This review is from: The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare) (Hardcover)
Modern governments, by their very nature and complexity, are fragmented into numerous agencies, sub-agencies, divisions, subdivisions, groups and sub-groups. As a result, governmental responses to emergencies tend to be slow and subject to internecine disputes, especially when called upon to deal with high-profile events such as terrorist attacks. Each counter-terrorism (CT) agency or military unit has its own specific jurisdiction and incentive to leverage its power by controlling the flow of information and by demanding or angling for preferential designation of responsibilities. To maintain perspective, be aware that the lack of coordination among CT agencies is an old problem that dates back well before 9/11/2001. The CT issue is further compounded by citizen pressure on politicians and the need to "do something": witness the reactive and ineffectual nature of the US TSA to "shoe" and "underwear" bombing attempts. These and related topics are examined in detail in this book. The success of the "military model" of CT is contrasted with the "defensive" and "reconciliation" models. Israel has chosen the military model and the author, Ami Pedahzur from the University of Texas, contends this approach is a failure.
The book begins, appropriately enough, at the beginning: pre-Israel 1936 in the "Arab Revolt". The evolution of Israel's CT doctrine is then traced chronologically to the near-term present. Abundant examples, some of which have appeared elsewhere (e.g., Black and Morris in "Israel's Secret Wars") comprise the majority of the text. Each "vignette" serves to illustrate the author's theses, which are: 1). "Institutionalization means cumbersome bureaucracy and lengthy response time", 2). The "culture" of military units operates against nimble adaptation to the protean manifestations of terrorism, 3). Present organizations are ill-equipped to deal with the "sub-state actors" who currently dominate the "microwarfare" environment, 4). The military model has been manifestly unsuccessful as a CT response and 5). Terrorism "does not pose a threat to national security...although it has psychological impact." The entire argument is nicely diagrammed in Figure 1.4 in the "introduction" and salient issues are addressed in the conclusion.
Overall, this is a cogently argued and concisely written book. It is a worthy addition to the Columbia "Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare" series. There is, however, one point that this and other similar books fail to make: that is, under the constraints (if you choose to call them that) imposed by current civil and democratic societies, a genuinely draconian, ruthless policy of eradication (always one CT option) cannot be effected. Take, for example, the destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria lead by Rif'at al-Assad, the late President's brother. First, on 7 July 1980, the Assad government passed a law making membership in the Brotherhood punishable by death. Next, the regime practiced indiscriminate, collective punishment: after an attack on soldiers stationed in Aleppo, the Syrian security services executed 80 residents of a nearby and convenient residential block. In April 1981, after a failed terrorist attack on an Alawite village near the city of Hama (the Alawites being the ruling religious sect), the Syrian military executed about 400 of Hama's inhabitants, chosen randomly among the male population over 14 years old. Finally, to deliver a message that could not fail to be understood, entire neighborhoods of Hama, the Brotherhood's base, were leveled by Syrian artillery and the ruins bulldozed. Supposedly, the death toll from the campaign against the Brotherhood took between 150-200,000 Syrian civilian and Brotherhood lives...but the Muslim Brotherhood ceased to be a threat to the regime. "Hama Rules", as this draconian approach is neatly phrased in Israel.
So, leaving aside the patently unacceptable "Hama Rules" approach, what can be done? Pedahzur advocates a combination of the reconciliation and defensive approaches and, when a "police action" is needed, it should be done by the police, not by elite military units whose expertise and training are fashioned to other ends. Is he right? There are various ongoing laboratory tests to prove or disprove his ideas...the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and others will all serve as the basis for further monographs and manuals. Only time and geopolitics will tell. However, Pedahzur makes one point which modern secular publics will never accept. That is terrorism is not a strategic national threat. Bruce Hoffman makes the point that, "Terrorism is where politics and violence intersect in the hope of delivering power." Thus, there will always be aggrieved groups who choose this approach to achieving control. Once the public has accepted the notion that terrorism, by its very nature, may be minimized but not eradicated, perhaps a more rational approach can be adopted, here, in Israel and elsewhere. The combination of reasonable defensive measures with some effort to effect a modus vivendi (reconciliation, in other words) and appropriate police action might be, as the author suggests, the sophisticated approach to dealing with this pernicious problem
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