Customer Reviews

The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare)

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As someone who has written my master thesis on inteligence and counterterrorism in Israel between 1967 and 1979, I'd wish I had this book when i wrote my thesis. It would have made my quest for sources and material so much easier. An excellent source for people interested in intelligence and how intelligence effects counterterrorist strategies.

This is an excellent book, because in a mere 149 pages we learn the complete history of the Israeli experience fighting terrorism from the pre-state days of 1918 to the present. Author, Ami Pedahzur, is not just another cheerleader who chants that "the IDF/Mossad are the best," instead he shows the Israeli experiences, lessons learned, warts and all. He reminds the reader that terrorism is not a major threat to the national security of the state of Israel. He argues that Israel has relied too heavily and to it's detriment on reprisals which have led to an escalating cycle of terrorism. He writes that instead Israel should expend more resources hardening itself as a target of terrorism. He concludes that Israel should spend more of it's military and intelligence resources protecting itself from real threats to its national security such as Iran and the rise of radical regimes. If I can find fault with the author, it is that he did little to discuss the underlying cause that fueled terrorism against Israel, namely that for nearly fifty years the Palestinians were a state-less people. And that by the time Israel finally deigned to negotiate with the PLO, the conflict had already given birth to even more blood thirsty terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

Maybe the greatest lesson to be learned by the US from the Israeli experience is that Hamas besides being a terrorist organization is "first and foremost a social movement that runs a ramified system of charity and relief institutions." And that because of this Hamas was able to win 76 out of 132 seats in the 2006 elections. If the US continues to lose this 'Jihad of the hearts and minds,' as some have called it in impoverished Muslim countries that we may intervene in militarily in the future, even invade. We may find ourselves wading into even more quagmires from the "Stan," countries of the former Soviet Union to as far away as Indonesia.

Finally, for those whose appetite for more on the subject has been whetted by this slim volume I would heartily recommend the title, Israel's Secret Wars by Ian Black, which covers much of the same material, but goes into much greater detail.

Modern governments, by their very nature and complexity, are fragmented into numerous agencies, sub-agencies, divisions, subdivisions, groups and sub-groups. As a result, governmental responses to emergencies tend to be slow and subject to internecine disputes, especially when called upon to deal with high-profile events such as terrorist attacks. Each counter-terrorism (CT) agency or military unit has its own specific jurisdiction and incentive to leverage its power by controlling the flow of information and by demanding or angling for preferential designation of responsibilities. To maintain perspective, be aware that the lack of coordination among CT agencies is an old problem that dates back well before 9/11/2001. The CT issue is further compounded by citizen pressure on politicians and the need to "do something": witness the reactive and ineffectual nature of the US TSA to "shoe" and "underwear" bombing attempts. These and related topics are examined in detail in this book. The success of the "military model" of CT is contrasted with the "defensive" and "reconciliation" models. Israel has chosen the military model and the author, Ami Pedahzur from the University of Texas, contends this approach is a failure.

The book begins, appropriately enough, at the beginning: pre-Israel 1936 in the "Arab Revolt". The evolution of Israel's CT doctrine is then traced chronologically to the near-term present. Abundant examples, some of which have appeared elsewhere (e.g., Black and Morris in "Israel's Secret Wars") comprise the majority of the text. Each "vignette" serves to illustrate the author's theses, which are: 1). "Institutionalization means cumbersome bureaucracy and lengthy response time", 2). The "culture" of military units operates against nimble adaptation to the protean manifestations of terrorism, 3). Present organizations are ill-equipped to deal with the "sub-state actors" who currently dominate the "microwarfare" environment, 4). The military model has been manifestly unsuccessful as a CT response and 5). Terrorism "does not pose a threat to national security...although it has psychological impact." The entire argument is nicely diagrammed in Figure 1.4 in the "introduction" and salient issues are addressed in the conclusion.

Overall, this is a cogently argued and concisely written book. It is a worthy addition to the Columbia "Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare" series. There is, however, one point that this and other similar books fail to make: that is, under the constraints (if you choose to call them that) imposed by current civil and democratic societies, a genuinely draconian, ruthless policy of eradication (always one CT option) cannot be effected. Take, for example, the destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria lead by Rif'at al-Assad, the late President's brother. First, on 7 July 1980, the Assad government passed a law making membership in the Brotherhood punishable by death. Next, the regime practiced indiscriminate, collective punishment: after an attack on soldiers stationed in Aleppo, the Syrian security services executed 80 residents of a nearby and convenient residential block. In April 1981, after a failed terrorist attack on an Alawite village near the city of Hama (the Alawites being the ruling religious sect), the Syrian military executed about 400 of Hama's inhabitants, chosen randomly among the male population over 14 years old. Finally, to deliver a message that could not fail to be understood, entire neighborhoods of Hama, the Brotherhood's base, were leveled by Syrian artillery and the ruins bulldozed. Supposedly, the death toll from the campaign against the Brotherhood took between 150-200,000 Syrian civilian and Brotherhood lives...but the Muslim Brotherhood ceased to be a threat to the regime. "Hama Rules", as this draconian approach is neatly phrased in Israel.

So, leaving aside the patently unacceptable "Hama Rules" approach, what can be done? Pedahzur advocates a combination of the reconciliation and defensive approaches and, when a "police action" is needed, it should be done by the police, not by elite military units whose expertise and training are fashioned to other ends. Is he right? There are various ongoing laboratory tests to prove or disprove his ideas...the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and others will all serve as the basis for further monographs and manuals. Only time and geopolitics will tell. However, Pedahzur makes one point which modern secular publics will never accept. That is terrorism is not a strategic national threat. Bruce Hoffman makes the point that, "Terrorism is where politics and violence intersect in the hope of delivering power." Thus, there will always be aggrieved groups who choose this approach to achieving control. Once the public has accepted the notion that terrorism, by its very nature, may be minimized but not eradicated, perhaps a more rational approach can be adopted, here, in Israel and elsewhere. The combination of reasonable defensive measures with some effort to effect a modus vivendi (reconciliation, in other words) and appropriate police action might be, as the author suggests, the sophisticated approach to dealing with this pernicious problem

A really great read that examines the Israeli response to security threats from the PLO, Black October and Hamas. The author emphasizes the lack of communication and aggressive competition between branches of the Israeli security services resulting in unsuccessful operations. The book follows the Israeli policy of assasinatons, clearly maping out the deaths of random Black October and PLO members, and addressing the failed attempt to assasinate Khaled Mishal. Despite the author being Israeli, and the title using "terrorists" I was pleasantly suprised that there is absolutly no bias, and in fact the author is highly critical of Israeli policy. The major flaw of the book is that the final chapter attempts to remedy the terrorist threat by recommending the implemention of a new structural organization of the Israeli intellegience and secret service operations. It would have been nice for the author to instead address the underlying problem, that the Palestinians need a homeland so that they no longer find it necessary to struggle, resist and attack Israeli targets. Instead the author suggests a 'band-aid' solution, which left me shaking my head.

I really enjoyed this book and would highly recommend it.

I will not reveal the info in those readings; I just said that the author, a political extremism and terrorism scholar from Israel and a former IDF soldier has found a great correlation in the Israeli counterterrorism doctrine that you will need to fine by yourself in the book. While making his point he reveals so much valuable information about the Palestinian/Israeli/Hezbollah conflict that the book is turn into a handbook by accident.

Military might alone is not what's needed to win the war on Terror. "The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle Against Terrorism" discusses the reliance of Israel on its elite military units to counter terror throughout Israel and the chaotic middle East. Often, this force has been used wrongly or excessively, and Ami Pedahzur speaks out against this misdirected use, and provides a thoughtful and detailed analysis. "The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle Against Terrorism" is a fine read and solidly recommended.

There are a number of interesting aspects to this book. While the author eschews discussion of the moral context of its anti-terrorism efforts, their amoral character is revealed by the vignettes he recounts of individual attacks/responses. The author provides unintended revelations of Israeli indifference to Palestinian life. Notably missing in this book is any recognition that Israel is an occupying power. The utility of these Israeli "lessons" are mostly limited to those intending to retain control over subject populations. I imagine similar thinking took place under the apartheid regime in South Africa.

For a book discussing the struggle against terrorism it is odd that the author waits until the final chapter to define the terrorist threat. At this point, he does state that the threat Israel faces "... can rarely be considered a threat to national security. In most cases, its main effect is a sense of insecurity within the civilian population." If actions to instill insecurity are terrorism then Israel's policies toward the Palestinians certainly meet that definition. Its actions in Gaza show this policy is continuing and accepted as legitimate by the Israeli people.

In terms of its organization, the author begins by briefly describing the three basic "approaches" to dealing with terrorism: war, criminal justice, and reconciliatory. He then uses a series of case studies to examine the effectiveness of Israeli actions. He chronologically organizes his case studies. The author describes Palestinian attacks while scrupulously avoiding addressing any precipitating Israeli actions nor does he address the context of the Occupation. He skips over significant issues like the use of terrorism by Jewish terrorist groups both before and after the establishment of the state. In fact, Israeli terrorist leaders (e.g. Begin and Shamir) were elected as Prime Ministers. Also absent are the 1956 Suez War, the twenty-year Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the continuous efforts by Israel to suppress Palestinian political expression.

While the author describes (in the context of terrorist attacks) how Israeli actions have led the Palestinians to adapt, he ignores how Israel has consistently undermined the development of legitimate Palestinian political leadership. The Israelis have kidnapped, imprisoned and killed Palestinian leaders. Israeli policies of settlement, blockade and economic subjugation coupled with the treatment of Palestinian leadership as irrelevant, have played a large role undermining the legitimacy of these leaders.

My problem with the book is basically its obliviousness to moral issues. The protection of its citizens is a legitimate role for any state. Treating a subject people as an enemy is not. The author implicitly accepts the continuing Occupation as an Israeli necessity. He explicitly accepts torture as a tool; he views criticism of it as a "hobbling" (see page 103).

I found a number of his characterizations of Israel actions to be troubling. Two of the more egregious examples are the acceptance of the excuse of "hurrying" for the deaths of 69 Palestinians in an attack by Israel's Unit 101 (led by future PM Sharon) and the assertion that "an Israeli shell" killed 102 Lebanese civilian refugees at a U.N. compound in Qana. As usual, it is inconceivable to him that Israelis would kill innocents except by mistake.

As his case studies are based on interviews with Israeli policy makers, former intelligence community members and senior military officials they are presented from an exclusively Israeli point of view. Many of the descriptions read like after action reports. Israelis are noble defenders of democracy and the Jewish people; Palestinians are murderous ciphers. But I forget, it is not politically correct to judge Israelis as if they were citizens of a normal state. His deference to the Israeli security apparatus is evident throughout the book. In addition to the aforementioned support for torturers, he also explicitly states his sympathy for the "feelings and fears" of the members of the covert agencies.

Is there merit to the book? Like the work of some of the modern Israeli historians he provides rich detail but can only see the events through Israeli eyes. A critical examination of the events he describes reveals a callousness toward Palestinian life.

I give the book three stars because it provides facts about certain Israeli actions. It also provides insight into the attitudes of those involved in the "security services." Through the case studies we see that Israeli leaders, aware of the state's overwhelming strength, choose to use military power over other options even when they might be more effective. Evidently the author considers Palestinian resistance to be motivated by simple unthinking hatred for Israel. The occupation and the methods used by Israel to subjugate the occupied are irrelevant. This is the problem with Israeli thinking. The continuing demonization of the Palestinian people makes reconciliation ever less likely.