Customer Reviews

In the Shadow of the Ayatollah: A CIA Hostage in Iran

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Daugherty was one of three Case Officers of the C.I.A. in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was seized by Iranian militants in 1979. Daugherty describes his captivity at the hands of the Iranians and gives a short history of Iran-USA relations proceeding the crisis. This is a very informative read, and I think very balanced at least in the view of internal American politics. The author is very forthcoming on how he views his Iranian captors. He concludes and I agree that they were ignorant and naive in their beliefs. Tehran Mary is portrayed at the height of her ignorance when she didn't even know that Japan had bombed Pearl Harbor. She is now a high official in the Iranian government. Daugherty describes his views on his Iranian captors, and it is not a pretty picture. No wonder the U.S. opposes Iran having nuclear weapons.
The author does a great job of describing his introgation, and internment by the Iranian radicals He successfully opposed them for 444 days. I rated this only four stars, because of the slow start of the book. Otherwise a great book.

Author William Daugherty provides the reader with a review of the incidents leading up to the 1979 taking of American hostages from the American embassy in Iran. The first nine chapters provide you with background information regarding the shah and relations between the the United States and Iran. The author then provides us with details regarding the taking of the embassy by the Iranians, their unskilled attempts at questioning him, the food they were provided to eat, and their movement from one place to another. Author Daugherty believes the embassy would not have been taken over by the Iranians if the shah had come directly to the U.S. from Iran in 1979 for medican treatment. However, it was a mistake to let the shah "roam the world for ten months" before entering the U.S. that led the embassy to be taken over by the Iranians. Bitterness towards then President Carter was in the minds of the former hostages when released. Carter addressed the former hostages and took a few polite questions until a State Department officer commented that the embassy had provided plenty of advance warning of what would happen if the shah entered the United States. Mr. Carter then looked to the floor, raised his head and smiled, and said he wanted his picture taken with each of them. Thus ended the meeting. The author does, however, praise Mr. Carter for his volunteer work since leaving office. The author also does a great job in providing examples of discussions with the Iranian guards and the futility of dealing with people who have closed minds. The Iranians somehow believed that the removal of President Carter in favor of Ronald Reagan would help their cause. They assumed that anyone who was Carter's opponent would be their friend. This despite the fact they were holding Americans against their will, claiming America was their enemy, and desecrating the American flag. I don't have time to list any additional examples here, but page 163 provides an outstanding example of the logic of their reasoning regarding stopping for a traffic light at 2:00 a.m.

How can I most effectively resist my captors without being self destructive? This seminal question was answered by Stockdale in Hanoi, taught by Hegdahl in Navy Survival School, and practiced by Daugherty in Tehran. The lessons are all the more important today in our campaign against world terrorists. Once a master of resistance, Daugherty had become a master story teller and his book rings true.This is a must read for anyone going into combat and those who support them.

My review is based on 2,221 days experience as a prisoner of the Communist North Vietnamese and 5,475 days as a clinical social worker working mostly with veterans and active duty personnel.

This was one of those books that managed to slip through the cracks for me and I didn't even know it existed until I found it in a secondhand book store. When I realized what it was, I was really excited to start reading. What you'll get here is mostly a history of 20th century U.S.-Iranian relations with probably about 15-20% or so of the author's actual experience. I found the most interesting parts to be the descriptions of what the author experienced while in captivity, but the straightforward history of the relationship is a refreshing take on how one of the U.S.'s greatest allies in the Middle East turned into one of its principal foes.

What separates this book from the countless other books on the subject is the author's perspective on the matter. His experience not only as a CIA officer, but also as a hostage allows Daugherty to attack the topic from a unique angle. He challenges several aspects of conventional wisdom: namely that the U.S. somehow interrupted or impeded Iran's democratic development, and that the 1953 overthrow of Mossadeq was motivated primarily by oil. For the former, he points out that at no point did Iran have a democratic system of government before 1953 and that the most recent election before his overthrow, Mossadeq won by upwards of 90%. In short, he does not agree with the argument that Iran would be a democratic country today had the events of 1953 not happened. The second point is that Iran was of enormous strategic value during the Cold War. The Soviets had a demonstrated interest in a warm water port and tried repeatedly before 1953 and after, to exercise some sort of control over Iran. Daugherty acknowledges the U.S. role of 1953, but explains it with a nuance rarely found among those on the left that see only ill will on the part of the U.S. at the time.

Aside from the valuable voice the author adds to the overall discussion of U.S.-Iranian relations, the personal anecdotes also go a long way into describing the Iranian psyche. That Tehran Mary wasn't aware that Japan attacked the U.S. first speaks volumes. Daugherty also relays many conversations with his captors (some of whom went on to assume prominent government positions) that give valuable insights into how Iranians view the world. He describes how the taking of the embassy and the accusations that the U.S. was the 'Great Satan' emboldened Iraq to invade Iran (since they no longer could count of having the U.S. as an ally), or the misguided impression that Americans would actually support taking the embassy hostage displayed a fundamental lack of understanding on the part of the Iranians of how the world worked.

The fact that very few people could write a book like this makes it worth the read. Most people familiar with Middle Eastern history probably won't learn many new things here, but that's not the point. Daugherty provides a fresh perspective of these events; the result of a truly harrowing and consequential period of his life.