"This is one of the most exciting books I've read in years. Friedberg is putting forth a sweeping and fundamental reassessment of the American military-industrial complex during the Cold War. It is historical revisionism in its very best sense: clearly written, thoroughly documented, and overwhelmingly convincing. Aaron Friedberg will emerge, with this book, as one of those rare scholars whose work redefines an entire field."--John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University
"Friedberg offers an important corrective to our tendency to assume that events had to turn out as they did by analyzing why the United States did not turn into a 'garrison state,' as many feared at the start of the Cold War. The research is meticulous, the story fascinating, and Friedberg's explanation in terms of the power of anti-state actors and ideology is convincing."--Robert Jervis, Columbia University
"This book will be a major contribution to a number of different literatures: it speaks to the extensive literature on war and state formation by exploring how different state mobilization strategies produce different outcomes. It contributes to the growing history of the Cold War by focusing attention on the important issue of the comparative political economy of defense mobilization.... It engages a number of current debates about the impact of domestic ideas, institutions, and regime types upon state behavior."--Michael Desch, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.