Customer Reviews

In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served--From JFK to George W. Bush

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

In the Shadow of the Oval Office is an impressive summary of the duties, inner-workings, and conflicts inherit in the role of National Security Adivsor. The authors, Ivo Daalder and I.m Destler write with a brillant command of the subject matter and without political agenda. The narrative is remarkably consistent in style; one would think there was a single author, not two.

What impressed, and somewhat frightened, this reviewer is how much the effectiveness, or lack there of, the National Security Advisor is based upon personality of the NSA and the presonality of the President he or she serves. If there is a single thesis in this book, it would be that the country is well-served when there is good match between NSA and the President, and the country, if not the world, is poorly served if there is poor match.

But Daadler and Destler are primarily not interested in advancing an academic theory, rather they are more interested in just telling the story correctly. The reader sees how national policies are developed in the context of management styles and inter-personal dynamics involved as well as the relevant historical perspective.

In short, In the Shadow of the Oval Office is a triumphant combination of polictical analysis, historical re-telling, and character study.

Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler have written an impressive book that readers of all backgrounds and levels of expertise will find engaging. They examine the role of the National Security Advisor in the making of U.S. foreign policy. They start their account with the tenure of McGeorge Bundy in the Kennedy White House. There is some historical background about the role of the National Security Council and the role of the men filling the position under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, but it was Bundy who pioneered the role. This focus slights the achievements of four men that served under Eisenhower, but there is no getting around the fact that the office was weaker then.

Daalder and Destler's thesis that the National Security Advisor's role is a function of his relationship with the President--or to be more accurate, the President's relationship with the advisor-and that this is the source of their influence and power seems fairly straight forward. Bundy is living proof of this argument. He was a key player in Washington under Kennedy, but never had a good relationship with Lyndon Johnson and left the White House in 1966.

There are numerous strengths to this book. The most important is that Daalder and Destler are gifted writers. Too many other scholars would have turned their text into something ponderous, but these two make it an interesting, compelling read that is gripping. In this sense, they have skills similar to those of a novelist. Their research is impressive--they found obscure material on topics that this reviewer has written about but never knew existed--yet they avoid getting caught up in the details of it all. Neither author is an historian and they seem to prefer discussing the more recent administrations. Their analysis is only adequate in the beginning, but gets much stronger as they move forward in time.

If you liked "The West Wing," you will like this book.

Well, this non-Cabinet specified, but Cabinet-powerful official, may do just about anything in foreign policy, defense policy or intelligence issues, depending on his or her relationship with the president, bureaucratic skills and more.

The authors of this book detail that by looking at the various national security advisors of each modern presidency, not just in light of their own strengths, weaknesses and styles, but those factors, in turn, seen in light of presidential strengths and weaknesses of their respective bosses.

This is a great book for anybody wanting to see how the "sausage" of various specific foreign policy decisions is made in Washington.

INTRO
The book is like a reminiscent of US history from Kennedy to Bush II. Using the National Security Adviser as a key context, it nicely summarizes various articles and books that touched on main US policies by each president and his teams.

On that note, the policies conducted by each administration could have been a book by itself. Therefore given the estate limitation, this book can only provide a review on the more important events and interactions among the key players of each administration, which it has neatly capture the essence.



ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
In discussing the National Security Advisor role, the book seeks to establish via examples on the various administrations application of the Advisor's role. The focus could be more on the operational aspects or act as a central coordination point among the various agencies. It has also highlighted the Advisor's need to push the president's core visions and policies among the agencies and the need to ensure that the information the president received is accurate.

The National Security Advisor is probably the person the president trusted to ensure that are no gaps in the policies of his administration which will impact national security. Therefore the understanding that this book conveys is that other than being a good coordinator, the National Security Advisor must possess the keen initiative to push and probe policies and information, so as to connect-the-dots, which may not have been noted in individual agencies/departments review.



CASE STUDY 1 (OPTIONAL TO READ)
The book clearly illustrates the importance of the Advisor's role in ensuring the direction and success of the foreign policies within the administration. It neatly contrasted the administrative style of Bush Elder and Bush Junior's presidencies on the direction of national security policies.

Bush Elder himself has vast experience on foreign policies and national governance. With that, he chose the experience Brent Scowcroft as his National Security Advisor. Major issues are discussed and coordinated between Bush Elder, Brent and James Baker (Bush Elder's good friend and Sectary of State). When the need arose, Colin Powell and Dick Cheney were tapped to offer additional advice to the key triangle of stakeholders (Bush Elder, Brent and James Baker). Information and policies settings were transparently discussed with consensus forged among the key Principals to ensure that everyone is on board and follow through.

Fast forward this to the first Bush Junior administration. As Bush Junior had no vast experience in foreign polices and governance, he turned to his foreign policies tutor Condoleezza Rice as the National Security Advisor. Rice herself had only a short stint of 3 years in government service prior to her appointment, 2 of which were under Scowcroft.

She was expected to coordinate among experience players like Cheney, Rumsfeld and Powell who each has decades of experience in serving senior levels of government and various branches. With Bush Junior effectively not trusting (American hero) Powell, and having Cheney and Rumsfeld aligning with Busn Junior's earlier policies visions, Rice roles in coordination became redundant.

Rice's pushing of the President's policies effectively became a parrot of what Cheney and Rumsfeld voiced. Having the major departments' staffed with Cheney's people, the outreach of the VP's outweigh anyone, especially Rice's during the 1st term. The Advisor's role of giving the President alternative and independent advice to the President is not completely fulfilled by Rice.

Most important, readers should be drawn to the behaviour of Cheney in the 2 different Bush administrations. Granted that in the Bush Junior administration he had a higher title (that of the Vice President), effectively it should be a less operational role as compare to his lesser title (that of Defense Secretary) under Bush Elder.

While hindsight review has the advantage of being prescient, Rice as the National Security Advisor clearly cannot stamp her authority over him, the way Brent Scowcroft put the house in order. That resulted in the chaos of the Iraq II invasion and also how the deliberations for other national priorities were made.

Of course Rice cannot be held responsible for the overall mess where she failed to coordinate with such a heavyweight team sitting on the National Security Council. It only illustrates the importance of having the right occupant in the White House, who can select the right people (and Advisor) to the job and set the right tone for the team as President.



CASE STUDY 2 (OPTIONAL TO READ)
The importance of having the right occupant in the White House is nicely presented again in the contrast between JFK and LBJ. The authors highlighted trivial aspects like how JFK flatter structure of management. How he may call the Desk Clerk in charge of East Asia to obtain first-hand information/assessments, rather than going through the chains. He may on ad-hoc basis request his team (Secretary of State, National Security Advisor) for answers that may not be in their direct scope.

In the short years as President, how he adapted from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion to handle the Cuban Missile Crisis successfully where the high stakes were much higher. How the President took pains to ensure that multiple options are considered and various communications channels remain opened to ensure a peaceful outcome.

This is contrast with LBJ, who may have inherited the Vietnam escalation. Though he used JFK key team, the results are different with an apparent insufficient intellectual curiosity to determine the proper result for Vietnam, other than via blind escalation of the war without thoughtful planning. It gave the feel that the war is more like an additional task/distraction inherited to take on, as compared to the domestic Great Society program where LBJ is more interested on.

While its open to interpretation whether JFK may have escalated Vietnam like LBJ did, JFK would probably have been "smarter" in working a way wind down the war or obtain more favourable outcome from the interpretation obtain from the book. Compare to LBJ, JFK had a more hands-on, intellectually curious presence that not only focused on result, but on the various channels of processes leading to it.



CONCLUSION
All in all, the authors have presented complex foreign issues in a summarise and easy to read manner. Therefore, the readers can spent lazy Sunday afternoons to go over a time-ride with history and enjoy the ups-and-downs of US foreign policies and the contributions by the key actors. Of course, it covers the review on the functional usefulness of each National Security Advisor in shaping these events.

One small shortcoming of this book is that it does not covered as extensively for the period when Presidents took over from their predecessor who had been assassinated or resigned. As such, it felt like the period when LBJ and Gerald Ford (where they took over) are only mention in passing.

This book is useful for those working on the foreign policy establishments, and also business owner and management personnel. It offers a glimpse on how policies can be coordinated, executed and how information can flow at the apex level of the complex government structure.

I have revised the rating to a 5 stars for students who are new to reading the subjects. The high review points is for the fluid way the authors presented the well-researched contents and highlighting key events in helping new students quickly understanding how those events developed and the personalities shaping them.

However, for mature readers on the subjects, I can give it a 3 stars, not for it being inferior but for the vastness of topics it tries to cover, it can only cover so much within the limited space and its nicely done.

The executive staff of the President is a surprisingly monolithic organization, currently employing over 1800 people. Within this grouping resides the National Security Council headed by the National Security Advisor who, along with having many other diverse and sundry functions, serves as the White House foreign policy advisor, balancing White House foreign policy advice with that from the State Department. As with many of the executive staff positions at the White House, the NSA is a strict confidant of the president and thus must mold his role to that which best serves the president. A study of the vastly underrated people who have served in this position since it has been defined as we know it today is the focus of this scholarly work by Daalder and Destler.

The National Security Council, which was signed into law under Truman in 1947, has had various leaders and figureheads in it's history, but it wasn't until McGeorge Bundy in 1961, who was appointed by JFK as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, did it assume the distinction that it holds today and it's here that Daalder and Destler begin their analysis of it's occupants. Bundy, we learn, meshes well with JFK as both are alums of Harvard, but following JFK's assassination in 1963, we learn how the NSA necessarily must become a substantially more flexible position as Bundy and LBJ clash personally and intellectually. The substantive point made here by Daalder and Destler is that the NSA must now define his own role based on the whims and needs of the president while directing White House foreign policy, coordinating State Dept foreign policy conflicts and discerning then what gets presented to the president for policy consideration.

In this light, we see subsequent NSA's with varying degrees of influence...Nixon had Kissinger who dominated foreign policy while covertly lobbying for the top State Dept post, Zbigniew Brzezinski becomes Carter's less liberal and more hawkish alter-ego, Reagan has multiple frustrations as Richard Allen, William Clark and notably John Poindexter and Bud McFarlane (protagonists for Iran-Contra) prove incapable of balancing White House and congressional issues. It's not until the onset of the Brent Scowcroft era who served twice (under Ford and Bush the elder) that we see stability and form start to permeate the position. His council during the first Gulf War and oversight during the denouement of the Cold War are templates for future holders of the NSA position...Daalder and Destler are adept at comparing and contrasting the foreign policy needs and domestic policies that Scowcroft balanced and conclude that the "ideal" NSA is one which keeps important issues in front of the president and doesn't allow inconsequential matters to affect his focus.

This "ideal" role becomes clearly realized during the Clinton administration as his first NSA, Tony Lake, is initially relegated to a secondary role. Clinton concentrates hard on domestic policy in this first term and it's not until the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts that Lake becomes effective...this job is then completed in his second term by Sandy Berger (who replaced Lake in 1996) as we now see a fully engaged Clinton on the foreign policy front. Daalder and Destler now compare the Clinton NSC with the Bush foreign policy apparatus...concluding that Condi Rice was too close to Bush to be totally effective and Stephen Hadley, although talented, was quickly overcome by events. Daalder and
Destler then close the book with important assessments of each NSA and the necessary components (based on the historical record) to be effective.

If one is looking for a unique perspective on presidential history, than you should add "In the Shadow of the Oval Office" to your reading list. Foreign policy and it's place in recent presidential administrations is analyzed and formed by a diverse set of individuals serving in the NSA role. Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler are expert at explaining this integration and provide a timely tome on the political worldview today. I'd recommend this book highly.

Ivo Daalder, now of the Brookings Institution and formerly a member of President Bill Clinton's NSC staff, and I.M. Destler, of the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy, have written an important but flawed study of the role of the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the Presidents they serve. I teach courses at the University of Oklahoma on US National Security so I am always looking for new books that I can use as advanced texts. I was excited to find In the Shadow of the Oval Office for this reason but, having read the book, I have rejected it for this purpose.

Although I generally agree with Daalder and Destler's conclusion about the role of the NSA, they have far too many errors of fact to support the use of this book as a primary classroom text. Moreover, the same factual errors detract greatly from both the seriousness of the analysis and the credibility of the authors. For example, on pages 174 and 184 the authors discuss the 3 October 1989 coup attempt in Panama against General Manuel Antonio Noriega. They assert that the Administration took no action to support a coup that the President had, himself, urged. These statements are simply wrong. At the time, I was Chief of Policy and Strategy in the Policy, Plans, and Strategy Directorate of US Southern Command and, therefore, in a position to know what happened first hand. I have also written and published on the subject as have such journalists as Frederick Kempe in his contemporaneous book, Divorcing the Dictator. Although US assistance to the coup plotters was limited, General Thurman, the CINC, was authorized by the Administration to do everything that the plotters asked him to do. Thus, while there was appropriate criticism to make of the Washington response under President Bush and NSA Skowcroft, it was not that they did nothing. A second example is found in the following:
"After repeated ad hoc efforts in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, the Clinton administration had developed a set of guidelines for such operations that was codified in a presidential directive in May 1997. But Bush had rescinded this and other Clinton NSC directives and his administration had yet to develop alternative guidelines when it faced the issue of what to do in Iraq." p. 284
The only problem with this analysis is that it is not true. The Clinton guidelines, PDD 56, were among the few Clinton era PDDs that were specifically NOT rescinded when the new administration came into office. PDD 56 was replaced by NSPD 44 in Dec 2005!(See Bush era NSPDs). This was nearly two years after the invasion of Iraq.

Aside from these, and similar factual errors, I have two other reservations about the work. First, there seems to be a sub-text that if the authors are in substantive agreement with the policies of a particular president and his NSA, they treat the process better than they do when dealing with administrations about whose policies they disagree. They are, for example, especially kind to Sandy Berger when commenting (correctly) on his criminal purloining of highly classified papers from the National Archives after he left office. The other issue I have is with the publisher, not the authors: The citation style is a hybrid endnote that fails to be as usable for serious students as a traditional system of endnotes.

Still, the authors have produced a serious work, one that any student of the Presidency and US National Security policy would do well to read.