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Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway

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. Don't be misled by the title, this is not just another telling of the entire Battle of Midway story. Instead it's an exhaustively detailed new account of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) at Midway, accomplished with a depth of research and analysis not previously seen. The book is crammed with a dazzling set of graphics, including brilliant computer-generated charts and diagrams that very signficantly aid the text.
. Of course, anyone attempting to rewrite the history of the IJN at Midway needs to convince potential readers that the new book offers something signficant over the time-honored resource for that subject, Fuchida and Okumiya's "Midway, the Battle That Doomed Japan." The authors of "Shattered Sword" not only accepted that challenge, but they convincingly demonstrate that Fuchida was very loose with certain key facts in his Midway book, done in order to serve personal aims that didn't necessarily require telling the truth. The result has been a number of deeply-entrenched myths that permeate the popular history of the battle. "Shattered Sword" ably exposes those myths and convincingly demonstrates in each case what really happened and why.
. This reviewer frequently has occasion to recommend references on the Battle of Midway to students and others beginning a study of that epic clash. In such cases I always recommnend Robert Cressman's "A Glorious Page In Our History" as the best overall account of the battle. I now need to add "Shattered Sword" to the short list of works that those doing serious research on Midway really must have. In particular, anyone who has read Fuchida's "Midway" and puts significant stock in it really ought to read "Shattered Sword" to learn what the earlier work either omitted or got quite wrong.

Very few histories can be considered groundbreaking treatments of an event more than 60 years afterward, but "Shattered Sword" meets that exceptional standard. As the authors conclusively prove, much of what has been written about the most important naval battle of the 20th century was incomplete, inaccurate, or simply fabricated. No future account of Midway will be worthwhile without reference to "Shattered Sword".

Parshall and Tully delve far beyond their unmatched mastery of the technical aspects (some more detailed than accounts of US Navy operations!) to explain why Japan lost the battle. The reasons are many and varied, extending from procedural, operational, and strategic concerns to the very culture that produced the Imperial Navy. In the process, the authors not only provide rare clarity to their analysis, but they raise the bar for naval histories of the Second World War. Readers yet unborn will be grateful to them. I know that I am.

Barrett Tillman, "Clash of the Carriers"

This piece is essentially a modern analysis of the causes of the Japanese defeat in the great Battle of Midway. It is more an analysis of Japanese defeat than American victory which, while fascinating, only tells part of the story of the greatest naval battle in American history, and one of the great battles of all time.

The main thrust of this work is to refute the common wisdom that a major cause of the Japanese defeat was that American dive bombers hit three Japanese aircraft carriers while these vessels were in the process of loading bombs onto their own dive bombers and torpedo planes on their flight decks. Here, the authors are persuasive. They give detailed accounts which convince the reader that Japanese doctrine would have had the planes being refit below decks. Further, the authors claim with convincing evidence that the incessant American attacks throughout the morning kept the Japanese fleet largely on the defensive, as it tried to augment its Combat Air Patrol with additional launchings of fighter aircraft. This is a new perspective on the battle, and this appears to be the major finding of this book.

Beyond these tactical considerations, the authors further argue that Japan lost the battle for other more strategic reasons. The authors argue that Yamamoto's Midway strategy lost sight of the principles of Mass and Objective. The principle of Massing of Forces (Mass) was violated as the Japanese dropped one aircraft carrier from the battle due to moderate damage that it suffered at the Battle of Coral Sea (first) and, even more importantly, diverted one carrier group to support a simultaneous sideshow in the Aleutians, which diverted a considerable number of planes from the main battle which was to take place at Midway. These planes could have been decisive in the great battle that was to occur. Further, the Japanese lost sight of the principle of the Objective--were they there to defeat the American fleet or invade Midway and the Aleutians, or both? The Japanese strategy was a hodgepodge of conflicting objectives, and indeed the conflict as to whether they should strike Midway or turn to engage the American fleet that seemed to lurk on their flank plagued the Japanese fleet at a decisive moment.

By contrast, the Americans, as the authors point out, "moved heaven and earth" to put the Yorktown back into the battle, after that carrier was heavily damaged after the Coral Sea battle. So badly damaged was Yorktown that the Japanese never dreamed that the US Navy could produce her at the Midway showdown. As the authors put it, the US Navy simply "wanted the win" more desperately than did the Japanese. The Japanese, argue the authors, where overconfident after years of victories over both Asian and Western adversaries, and had contempt for their American foe.

I found the authors' arguments largely persuasive, but also incomplete. This book is told almost entirely from the Japanese perspective in that it focuses mainly on what the Japanese did wrong. It tells the reader much less about what the US Navy did right. The American victory at Midway largely turned on the decisions of one man, the great Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance. Spruances' decision to launch early, at long range, to get in the first blows against the Japanese was decisive, especially if we apply and accept the authors' analysis. Even though, at this early stage of the war, the American torpedo bombers were not very competent (none of them struck Japanese targets and they were slaughtered by Japanese fighers) and the launchings of the coordinated attacks did not come off well, this early strike that Spruance ordered kept the Japanese on the defensive after the first Japanese strike against Midway. This set the stage for the deadly-competent American dive bombers to strike. This is the very point that the authors make, but this was not due to Japanese incompetence, but rather to a carefully thought-out strategy by Admiral Spruance. Spruance then wisely protected the fleet, avoided exposing it, and kept it in position to protect Midway if necessary. He came in for savage insider's criticism even during the battle as well as thereafter. This criticism was incorrect, as history has judged. Unlike the Japanese, Spruance never forgot his objective (protect the fleet, defend Midway), and always applied the principal of Mass as he struck a lethal blow at the heart of the Japanese Navy with everything he had. While the American Navy at the Battle of Midway had not yet shook off all of the peacetime inertia, it executed its well thought-out doctrine against the Japanese under Spruance's leadership, and won a great victory. Victory was won by the US Navy at Midway, not lost by the Japanese.

"Shattered Sword" is an excellent analysis of the Battle of Midway which all readers with an interest in this great battle will want to read. Its main strength is its analysis of the Japanese side and its command of detail in this regard. Recommended

Shattered Sword is an outstanding new analysis and history of the Battle of Midway as seen primarily from the Japanese perspective. The foreboding of doom is evident from the overconfident getting underway of the Japanese fleet in Imperial home waters to the moment American SBDs nose over above the condemned carriers. But unlike many narratives, the story does not end there. The reader is aboard those blazing infernos as desperate and heroic actions prove futile. This is history that relives events as the story moves along. We are plane handlers positioning torpedo bombers on the hanger deck or a Japanese damage control boss on June 4, 1942. It is an analysis in that the authors closely examine conflicting or uncertain aspects of events to redefine and clarify those conflicts, probably as well as the fading details allow. Along that line of examination, we discover fresh and fascinating aspects of Japanese aircraft carrier design features, operations, and doctrine. We also look down on the battle with new understanding and perspective. The events themselves are unchanged, but the interpretation of causes and the resulting options available are newly presented due primarily to the determination of the authors to run loose ends to ground with sources not previously available or closely examined. Although some of the conclusions are speculative, and always will be, the surrounding investigation provides additional constraints that lead to a more likely scenario. The illustrations are first rate as are the notes and appendices, which offer further insight for those so inclined. I was fortunate to receive an advanced copy, and, while this has not influenced my opinion of this excellent book, I am grateful to the authors for that opportunity. The book is insightful, absorbing, and a must read for those interested in the naval war in the Pacific and the wheels down, hook down, flaps down adventures of carrier aviation.

I first read about the Battle of Midway a long time ago and decided to revisit this history. "Shattered Sword" has to rank as one of the best ever books that I have read about this conflict.

The book, through careful research of Japanese and American naval records ends up shattering a number of long standing myths (both American and Japanese) about this battle.

(Another book "The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons" should be read as a companion piece to "Shattered Sword" - it gives an in-depth account of the failings of American naval aviation at the Battle of Midway).

There is a reason that it has taken over sixty years for such a book to be written about this battle. It has taken that long to finally get a dispassionate look at the events as they really happened.

Almost all the major participants who contributed to the original story of the battle are now dead. American pride about her victories in WWII and the need for myth-making about the heroics of the Greatest Generation have faded. The result is a greater emphasis on examination of the written record of naval operations to recreate what happened, rather than relying on the spin put out by the original participants of the time.

Japan has also gone through some major societal changes, and is now finally beginning to re-examine her conduct during WWII. Much of what is new in this book comes from the Japanese record, and the authors were assisted along the way by a number of Japanese historians.

While eyewitness accounts are normally critical for historians, "Shattered Sword" makes clear that, for this battle, certain participants had motives for not telling the truth.

One of the major fabricators of history singled out by this book is Mitsuo Fuchida, the Japanese pilot-author who single-handedly created the myth (with his book "Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan") that the Japanese carriers were only five minutes away from launching their attack on the American carriers, and that the Enterprise dive bombers came down on carriers fully laden with planes ready to launch (not true - the Japanese carriers were caught totally unprepared with empty decks).

Another contributor to fabricated history was Air Commander Stanhope Ring, whose gross incompetence made the Hornet almost useless in this battle, and contributed to the destruction of Hornet's VT-8 torpedo squadron. The subsequent US Navy cover-up of Ring's failures (he was even awarded a Navy Cross) started the myth that the sacrifice of VT-8 was not in vain, that the result of having the entire torpedo squadron shot down was that the covering Zeros were pulled down to sea level, away from the oncoming Enterprise dive bombers. The authors show how this could not have been the real reason - after the destruction of VT-8, there was plenty of time for the Japanese fighters to regain altitude and their original covering positions before the Enterprise dive bombers arrived, but this simply did not happen, and poor Japanese fighter coordination was to blame.

The best parts of the book are the conclusions at the end. What caused the battle of Midway to play out as it did? What would have happened had the American naval force lost? Parshall and Tully come up with some fascinating insights, which I will summarize and make additional comments upon as follows:

1. Japanese Naval thinking and the entire Japanese war strategy against the US was dominated by the success of their last war against a major power - the Russo-Japan conflict of 1904-1905 (following the axiom that generals always fight their last war again). The Battle of Tsushima was the model for the Decisive Fleet Battle that the Japanese sought (and never could quite win) throughout WWII against the US. (I did some additional reading on this war, and discovered other striking parallels. It was almost frightening how the Japanese Navy, especially Yamamoto, tried to duplicate the success of Admiral Togo from that war - Togo had even started the war with a sneak attack, before war was formally declared, on the Russian Pacific Fleet berthed at Port Arthur in Manchuria. Thus, the strategy behind the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor becomes crystal clear - previously, Japan had been able to get its way and win favorable terms in a limited war against a much larger power by destroying almost the entire fleet of its opponent, starting with a sneak attack. Japan obviously made a huge miscalculation. Russia was a seriously dysfunctional nation at the time of the Russo-Japan war. America was far from that, and instead, like Rome at Cannae, would be energized by her military disaster to become the world's dominant superpower. Thus the attack on Pearl Harbor expanded into a total war of annihilation). Much of the persistent tendency throughout WWII of Japanese naval commanders to disengage and turn away from their original objectives after the first battle was probably also related to this underlying theme of preserving the ships for the Decisive Fleet Battle.

2. American victory at Midway did not hinge totally on the success of naval code breaking (another myth). Because the naval air forces were so evenly balanced in this battle, success depended ultimately on which fleet could find and attack the other fleet first. At Midway, it was the superior search patterns used by the US, and some lucky guessing by individual aviators, that allowed the US fleet to find and attack the Japanese fleet first. For much of the rest of 1942, the US Navy would not be so lucky.

3. Japanese failure to learn from their mistakes, or to anticipate possible failure was a cultural phenomenon that contributed greatly to their disaster at Midway. I want to add a point here that Parshall and Tully did not come out and say in their book. The name of this cultural phenomenon was bushido, the rigid samurai code of discipline and behavior that dominated Japanese military thinking at the time. Bushido was what allowed Japanese commanders to make suicidal demands of their subordinates, bushido was what prevented lower level underlings from refusing such assignments, bushido meant that the mistaken decisions of one's superiors had to be atoned for with the suicide of the person supposed to carry out the order if he failed, thus shielding that superior for an unnecessarily prolonged period of time until the mistakes and bodies piled up, and bushido was what prevented rapid implementation of ideas coming from underlings, indeed bushido probably discouraged independent, innovative thinking altogether from the lower ranks. I have always regarded the Japanese bushido coda of committing suicide to atone for failure in battle, rather than to survive, learn from the mistake, and continue to fight, as the ultimate in wasteful ceremonial stupidity, something that could only evolve on an isolated island, much like pigmy mammoths and dodo birds.

4. Parshall and Tully conclude that, even if the American carriers had lost the naval battle, a subsequent Japanese land invasion of Midway would have been a bloodbath for the Japanese. As a comparison, they point out the ultimate slaughter of Colonel Ichiki (the man supposed to lead the invasion of Midway) and his men at Guadalcanal. It is likely that had the American carriers been defeated decisively, Midway, not Guadalcanal, would have become the next major bloody ground battle of the Pacific war. (An excellent companion reader here is "Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle" - compared to Midway, the Japanese Navy did a much better tactical job at Guadalcanal, sinking a great many US ships, while continuing to remain befuddled strategically, and so many of Parshall and Tully's conclusions are re-emphasized by the re-analysis of Guadalcanal in this book).

Thus, in conclusion, Midway was not a climactic battle, nor even the turning point of the war. It was only one lucky break for the US Navy in what was a long series of battles of attrition in the Pacific during 1942, a time that both sides would make plenty of mistakes and lose almost equal numbers of men, ships, and aircraft. As Parshall and Tully point out, the real turning points would come in 1943, when the first of the more than 100 new American carriers built during WWII became operational, and when the superior F6F became operational. Japan had nothing that could come close to matching such forces, and the original plans of her warlords to win a limited regional war by way of a sneak attack and a Decisive Fleet Battle, a la the earlier Russo-Japan war, failed completely. By 1944, the US Navy would be operating and attacking at will in the Pacific and fully engaged in finishing out a total war of annihilation.

When I first picked up this book I almost put it back down, after all what could possibly be 'untold' about the story of the Battle of Midway. Upon reading the third page of the introduction the authors promise to lay aside some eight myths of the conventional history.

. The American Dauntlesses hurtling down from the heavens to drop their bombs on helpless Japanese carriers, their decks packed with aircraft just moments away from taking off.

. The Ameiricans triumphed against overwhelming odds at the battle.

. The Aleutians Operation was a diversion designed to lure the American fleet out of Pearl Harbour.

. Admiral Yamamoto withheld important intelligence information from Admiral Nagumo, so Nagumo was operating in the dark.

. Had the Japanese implemented a two-phase recon on 4 June, they would have found the Americans in time to win.

. The late launch of cruiser Tone's No. 4 scout plane doomed Admiral Nagumo to defeat.

. Had Admiral Nagumo not decided to rearm his aircraft with land-attack weapons he would have been in a position to attack the Americans as soon as they were discovered.

. USS Hornet's Torpedo Squadron 8 pulled the Japanese combat air patrol fighters down to sea level clearing the sky for the dive bombers.

. Japan's elite carrier aviators were all but wiped out during the battle.

How could these be myths? How could one book possibly counter so many myths? But counter them it did. More than counter them, it demolished them.

Put this book on your shelf right next to Walter Lord's 'Incredible Victory' and Gordon Prange's 'Miracle at Midway.' If, of course you ever get it back from your friends who you'll have to convince to read it.

I have anticipated this book for some time, as its authors are also the creators of the best English-language site on the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) to be found. I knew in advance of my receiving a copy that this book was going to be extensive in its use of Japanese sources and would focus on analyzing not the American choices and thinking that shaped the battle, but on those of our enemy.

Parshall and Tully have long voiced an appreciation for the men and ships of the IJN when viewed apart from the political agenda it was tasked with serving. Even in a war whose animosities were heightened by racism on both sides and with a new blitheness of killing by firebombing and flamethrowers or sacrifice through banzai charges and kamikaze raids, few American sailors would discount the professionalism and skill of their enemies in battle. But one figure above all others in the Japanese military received a gentle and respectful "pass" from American criticism -- Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku.

And so Parshall and Tully have all the more credibility when they voice scathing criticisms of Admiral Yamamoto. Their fundamental criticisms are several. Yamamoto was the author of a plan which lacked a fundamentally sound or sustainable strategic purpose. He presided over rubber-stamp wargaming exercises where innovative officers playing the part of Americans visited misfortune upon the Japanese strike force, deftly fixing the result to ignore this unsettling coup. He stood mutely by as the plan's execution unfolded without modification after the Japanese carrier force was reduced from 6 to 4 ships by losses sustained at the Battle of the Coral Sea. And lastly, his plan had been made overly complex and failed signally to concentrate the vastly superior overall forces available to him such that local superiority at the point of encounter could be assured.

On a grand-tactical note, one element that seemed apparent to me was that the Japanese had failed to learn the lesson of their fantastic raid on Pearl Harbor: that the battle fleets were now subordinate to the carrier forces. The dispersal of Yamamoto's many task forces was aimed at denying the Americans a glimpse of the battleships in his "Main Body", in light of the apparent belief that the Americans would not venture to fight if they knew these behemoths were in company. This is a quaint view of the battle he was authoring, and one the Americans would never subscribe to.

By highlighting the internal squabbles and intrigue of the Japanese, the authors make it abundantly clear that the mistakes were larger than those attributable to Admiral Yamamoto, but they deliver an extensive list of reasons to invite a reappraisal of this legendary leader. The larger shock to readers should be, "Why has Yamamoto received such a free ride for so long?"

A fundamental value in the approach taken in this book is to bring the West "up to speed" on the Japanese understanding of the battle. Formerly, almost the entire Western glimpse of the Japanese side of the coin came in the writing of air commander Fuchida, but Shattered Sword is the first western book to explain to the West that Fuchida's book has several important inaccuracies long known to the Japanese but somehow lost in mid-Pacific in the past 4 decades.

The book is in many ways, a product of its time. Many footnotes refer to dated email correspondences with other American and Japanese experts. These, I feel, could have been better cemented as references if the correspondent so named had in turn provided a basis for the facts being footnoted. But the involvement and editorial review of the entire work by titans such as Lundstrom and Tillman keep a reader from feeling such references are drawn upon nothing of substance.

I highly recommend this book to those who want a view from the Japanese decks and is prepared to see comfortable depictions of this classic battle revisited -- for good cause.

Shattered Sword is now the standard by which any single-battle history will be measured. As such, it should be on each naval historian's shelf next to The First Team: it provides the same level of detail for the events at Midway that Lundstrom's book provided for Pacific war fighter combat.

The basic requirement for a history to tell who, what, when, and where. At the next level, better histories tell you how and why. Shattered Sword accomplishes all this and more. Not only is it an exquisitely-detailed narrative of the battle; authors Parshall and Tully also explain the technical options and limitations that affected the Japanese. And finally, they set the battle and its significance in context- of the overwhelming Japanese emphasis on offense, of the dysfunctional Japanese strategic command structure, of Japanese strategic abilities before and after the battle, and in terms of materiel and personnel.

The baleful effects of the grotesque Japanese command structure cannot be emphasized strongly enough. For all that the Midway operation involved most of the Imperial Navy, the Japanese brought only a small regiment-sized naval landing force to seize the islands. The Imperial Army wouldn't provide a larger, more suitable unit. In a fascinating appendix, Parshall and Tully examine what would likely have happened had the Japanese actually launched their invasion of the reinforced islands.

Reading Shattered Sword, I couldn't help but think of the movie Titanic. In both cases, you know that the ship(s) will sink; and yet the story unfolds with such riveting detail as to keep you in your seat. That is storytelling of the highest order. Parshall's and Tully's achievement is all the more remarkable in that theirs is a historical narrative, not a work of fiction.

I have been fascinated by the Battle of Midway since my teens when I first read about this amazing clash in the obscure but thrilling "Climax At Midway" by Thaddeus Tuleja. Over the last 50 years I have sampled most every book dealing with the Battle, from Morrison's popular, semi-official history; individual carrier histories such as Stafford's "The Big E" and Frank and Harrington's "Rendezvous at Midway"; to the standard books about the Battle from Fuchida, Lord, and Prange. Along the way I was also privileged to meet George Gay and read his account of Torpedo Eight in "Sole Survivor."

I certainly viewed John Lundstrom's "The First Team" as one of the best books deaking with Midway, despite its necessarily narrow focus on fighter operations.

Having read all this, I think that "Shattered Sword" finally gets the facts right as to what happened, when, and why. Although it is written from the Japanese perspective, for English readers that view has been lacking for far too long. The authors' deconstruction of Mitsuo Fuchida's iconic but erroneous Japanese account of the Battle is the freshest piece of historical analysis about it in five decades, and a major service to the truth.

The authors' examination of the timing and effects of the American aerial attacks prior to the famous SBD denouement is nothing less than brilliant. For the first time I clearly understand just how crucial the earlier "failed" assaults were, and why. Even more importantly, they score an historic first by showing the remarkable coordination Yorktown's carrier group achieved attacking Soryu and Hiryu. Their conclusion that VT-3's attack on Hiryu occurred DURING and not BEFORE the Yorktown SBD attack on Soryu is a revelation of the first order. They also show, in a way no one else has before, just how significant Jimmy Thach's introduction of the famous "Thach Weave" was not just to future fighter tactics but the the Battle itself. Finally, I applaud their highlighting the extraordinary significance of Dick Best's three SBD VB-6 attack on Akagi. If any one man made a difference between American victory and defeat that day, it was surely him.

I do find one curious blind spot in the book's assessment of Midway's historical significance. In their ardor to debunk what they see as the main Midway myth -- that it was an "incredible victory" and against-all-odds "miracle" -- the authors go overboard in downplaying the significance of the Battle to the course of the Pacific War. They are correct in stating that Japan never had a chance to defeat America once the Essex and Independence class carriers came on line in 1943-44. But in making this case I feel they downplay too much the morale factor that the victory brought both the American public and its fighting men. If the Doolittle Raid was important in showing America that the Japanese were not invulnerable, and Coral Sea was critical as the first painful standoff between two implacable enemies, Midway conclusively demonstrated the courage and skill of America's fighting men when they did not possess overwhelming materiel superiority. I am confident this victory immeasurably strengthened American determination and resolve at the time, in ways we cannot appreciate 60 years on. The win also forever prevents any latter day revisionists from claiming that the only reason Americans win wars is because of wealth and materiel.

Read "Shattered Sword"! You won't be disappointed.

I was fortunate enough to bump into Mr Parshall's site and the boards he likes to frequent just as he was still introducing the idea. After reading his paper and the discussion on the board, I was sold. Ever since, I've been waiting for eternity for this book which he promised to finally come out, and so it came.

I knew even at the start that this would be a revolutionary work. Just the stuff on Japanese carrier doctrine alone would have been enough to make it a truly valuable source that would renew debate.

Over time, Mr. Parshall gave us a few other 'spoilers', such as promising to add descriptions of AA fire control into the book. Through 2005 we hear occasional signs of the book approaching the printer. Great again. I just hadn't expected so much more.

I would admit I am an amateur, but in my experience, Midway books b/w Fuchida (50s) and Bicheno (early 21st century) are often somewhere between "evolutionary" and "static". Each new source has new tidbits, yet they are so much the same. There is IMO little reason to get them all. Carefully choose one of the Classics for keeps, read it well, then read the other classics in the library and photocopy/take notes of the pages/points that say something important and new.

Try that with "Shattered Sword" and you will break your arm trying to copy all the new stuff down. Do it with a copier and you'd bust 'fair-use' guidelines for copying too great a fraction. Because in every chapter there is plenty of new stuff. Even the more stereotypical portions, such as the Yamamoto Critique that seems to be in every Midway book to a greater or lesser extent (for good reason), are written out in great (perhaps even unprecedented) depth. Totally new, are the stuff on topics from doctrine to AA fire control mechanics to bridge ergonomics.

The book is clearly Japanese centric, but the Americans are hardly missed. I suspect in truth there is at least an above average amount of info on the Americans (complete with more than a few insights there too), just that it is so overshadowed by all the work Mr. Parshall and Mr. Tully did on the Japanese that by comparison it looks small.

The text is really a very good read. My only concern is that some of the diction ("Superstar") might be just a little too light to impress for some. For those, I can only recommend they look past style and focus on substance.

As an aside, in the book, it is mentioned that the Japanese actually knew at least some of the subjects he wrote since as early as 1970. It may well be known in their historian community. I'm not so sure whether their laymen knows it. Perhaps not only us, but the Japanese citizen also can use "bringing up to speed" on the latest developments in Midway analysis.

Conclusion: If you get only one Midway book, this is the one to buy.