Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American [Hardcover]

Basil Henry Liddell Hart (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: August 23, 1978 | ISBN-10: 0313202885 | ISBN-13: 978-0313202889

Liddell Hart considered General Sherman the dominant military genius of the American Civil War. To prove this point, he traced all of Sherman's military campaigns - from the first Bull Run debacle to general Joseph Johnston's surrender in 1865. "Sherman" is not only a military history - it is a biography and a work of strategic theory. In it, Sherman emerges lifelike and dramatic, and the philosophical and military foundations of his thoughts and deeds are deftly elucidated.

--This text refers to the Paperback edition.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“The best analysis of General Sherman that has appeared.”–Saturday Review

From the Publisher

12 1.5-hour cassettes --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 456 pages
• Publisher: Greenwood Press Reprint (August 23, 1978)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0313202885
• ISBN-13: 978-0313202889
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #5,916,454 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

32 of 35 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent Work, July 20, 2003

By 

Edward Finkelstein (Staten Island, NY United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American (Paperback)

When I first began to read this book I was concerned that it might be outdated. However, I found much of the subject matter to be quite timely. Of particular interest was the impact that Sherman's successful (albeit violent) trek through Georgia had on the 1864 elections. I never realized how close the Copperhead (Peace) Democrats came to winning that election and perhaps bringing the Civil War to a far differnet conclusion . Hart bring Sherman to life. He also vividly illustrates the behind the scene politics that almost prevented Sherman (not to mention Grant) from their historic roles in the Civil War. Don't be put off by the subject matter or the age of the book. It's worth the read.

20 of 22 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars How Sherman won the Civil War, January 6, 2000

By A Customer

This review is from: Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American (Paperback)

Dispite having read most of major accounts of the American Civil War, I had not fully understood the central role played by Sherman until I read Hart's book. Hart makes it clear that Sherman's appreciation of the futility of attacking entrenched positions and his consequently developed strategy and tactics turned the tide for the North, salvaged the 1864 election for Lincoln, and saved perhaps tens of thousands of Union and Rebel lives. He also points out that the same insight accounts for most of Lee's success, i.e., Lee won battles in which he entised the North to attack entrenched positions (e.g. Fredricksburg) and lost when he attacked entrenched positions himself (e.g. Gettysburg). Hart fully disposes of the popular prejudice held widely in the South that Sherman's approach to war was more inhumane than the alternative of massive blood letting which was by virtually every other Civil War general. It is rare to find a historical account containing so much insight.

27 of 32 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars The Greatest Strategist of the Civil War, September 19, 2002

By 

Acute Observer (N. Jersey Shore) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American (Paperback)

Sherman was both the most original genius of the Civil War, and "the typical American". His career provides lessons to the modern world and to modern warfare. It was his conscious exploitation of the economic and psychological factors of war in his "March through Georgia" which helped to end the Civil War. The long and expensive battles in Northern Virginia were replayed on the battlefields of France in the Great War.

The Union attempted to take Richmond by the shortest and most direct route; but this way was blocked with natural obstacles. If the Confederates fell back they would be closer to their reserves, supplies, and reinforcements. These facts favored the entrenched defenders.

The western campaign ended in the capture of Vicksburg and control of the Mississippi from St. Louis to New Orleans. Liddell Hart contrasts the maneuvers here to the stalemate back east. But the conditions, or politics, did not allow a wide flanking invasion through West Virginia or North Carolina. The threat to Richmond kept Confederate troops there. Longstreet proposed an invasion of Kentucky, a far flanking attack, but was turned down by Lee.

It explains how Sherman out-maneuvered Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta. By threatening to outflank Johnston, the Confederates fell back. His replacement by Hood did not prevent the capture of Atlanta. This revived the hope of victory for the North, and helped to re-elect Lincoln.

Sherman then abandoned his supply and communication lines (vulnerable to attack) and marched on to Savannah and the ocean. His army lived off the land. This enabled his army to be resupplied by the Navy. He then marched north, seeming to attack other cities, but passed between and continued to destroy railroads and bridges.

The end came soon after this, as other armies invaded the South. Sherman designed an armistice and amnesty where the Confederates would be disbanded, and their arms turned over to the states. The latter would allow repression of bandits and guerillas. He was criticized for this.

Sherman was a man of modest habits. When admirers raised [money]to buy him a house, he refused to accept unless he received bonds that would pay the taxes! He lived within his means. The resisting power of a state depends more on the strength of popular will than on the strength of its armies, and this depends on economic and social security (p.429).

Liddell Hart gave preference to contemporaneous correspondence rather than Official Reports (which are written for history to justify a policy). Some of the ideas in this 72-year old book may not coincide with more recent history.