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The Shiloh Campaign (Civil War Campaigns in the Heartland)

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Many students of the Civil War develop their own passion for an aspect of the conflict -- be it a leader, an organizational unit, or a battle. It is a delight and a challenge to learn what can be learned about a subject of relatively restricted scope. In my studies of the Civil War, I have been fascinated by the battles of Gettysburg and Shiloh. Gettysburg has been studied extensively, but Shiloh somewhat less so.

Although it occurred early in the War (April 6-7, 1862), Shiloh was a pivotal moment in many ways. As a result of the failure of the Confederate attack, the South was unable to reverse the opening up of its heartland resulting from the earlier loss of Forts Henry and Donelson. The battle thus led the way to the large Confederate defeat in the West. The South lost a leader of promise in General Albert Sidney Johnston, while the Union found a team in Grant and Sherman that would carry them through the war. The Shiloh Battlefield is located in a remote part of South Central Tennessee between Savanna, Tennessee and Corinth, Mississippi. The Confederate attack was staged at Corinth. The loss of the battle opened the way for Corinth's seizure by the Union. The Battlefield remains in a virtually pristine condition. I visited it about five years ago, and I am looking forward to seeing it again.

This collection of eight essays, "The Shiloh Campaign" (2009) is for readers with a strong interest in Shiloh. The book is edited by Steven Woodworth, a scholar of the Civil War in the West who teaches at Texas Christian University. Woodworth also contributed an essay to the volume together with a brief introduction. With the exception of Timothy Smith's collection of essays called "The Untold Story of Shiloh", this is the first book of essays on Shiloh of which I am aware, and the first consisting of studies by several authors. (Smith's book includes only his own essays.) Of the essays in this Woodworth volume, only one was previously published. The essays are scholarly and thoughtful. They cast light on many of the controversial issues surrounding the Battle of Shiloh.

Of the eight essays in this collection, three involve studies of the commanding generals. John Lundberg's essay "I must save this Army" explores the role of the charismatic Confederate leader, Albert Sidney Johnston, who died on the first day of the battle. Johnston's military abilities remain a matter of dispute. Lundberg sides with those who consider his death a terrible blow to the Confederacy.

Upon Johnston's death, Pierre Beauregard assumed command of the Confederate Army. On the evening of April 6, Beauregard called a halt to the Confederate attack upon Grant's Last Line at Pittsburgh Landing on the Tennessee River. Grady McWhiney's essay "General Beauregard's 'Complete Victory' at Shiloh" examines this difficult decision of Beauregard and finds it wanting. There are many students of the battle who disagree.

The essay "After Shiloh" by Brooks D. Simpson examines the roots of the complex friendship between Grant and Sherman that developed as a result of the battle. Grant came close to dismissal or to resignation following the battle. Sherman, who defended against the Confederate assault brilliantly but who failed to plan for or discover it, stuck loyally with Grant. The two leaders formed a partnership and friendship that lasted througout the remainder of the war.

Of the remaining essays, four describe specific action on the battlefield. Timothy Smith's essay "Anatomy of an Icon" examines the fighting in the central portion of the Battlefield known as the Hornet's Nest. For many years, the Hornet's Nest was considered the place where the Union made a heroic stand and saved the battle. Recent scholarship, which Smith explores, makes a strong case against the centrality of the Hornet's nest. This theme is also explored, indirectly, in Alexander Mendoza's essay "A Terrible Baptism by Fire" which describes the stout defense of the extreme left of the Union line which delayed for hours the Confederate advance. Steven Woodworth's own essay, "Intolerably Slow" takes a careful look at the controversy surrounding Lew Wallace. Located at Crump's landing only six miles north from the battle, Wallace was unable to come to Grant's assistance until the end of the first day's fighting. Finally, Gary Joiner's essay, "Gunboats at Shiloh" describes the sometimes overlooked effect on the battle on the bombardment of Confederate lines from two Union gunboats on the Tennessee River beginning mid-afternoon on April 6.

The final essay in the collection, "Victory for Neither Side" by Charles Grear examines how the Confederate soldiers perceived the result of the Battle of Shiloh. This essay helps bring perspective to the carnage and ferocity of the fighting and offers many quotes and perspectives from Southern troops. Although today the battle is almost uniformly viewed as a Union victory, for many years some viewed the battle as a draw. This division of opinion is evident in the reports of the views of Confederate soldiers. Grear's essay gives a good description of the chaotic character of the Confederate retreat. He also suggests, given the enormity of the casualties both Union and Confederate, that neither side could properly be regarded as winning the battle.

This book is a must for serious students of the Battle of Shiloh. James Durney's review above offers a good introductory list of books about the battle. Shiloh has also inspired considerable literary effort. I would suggest Herman Melville's short poem "Shiloh -- A Requiem" which includes the following famous lines:

Foemann at morn, but friends at eve-
Fame or country least their care:
(What like a bullet can undeceive!)"

In addition, readers with a literary interest might explore Ambrose Bierce's short story "What I saw at Shiloh" and Shelby Foote's early novel, "Shiloh".

Robin Friedman

Shiloh, the first big battle of the Civil War, no longer evokes the intents feelings of 1862. The larger bloodier battles that follow command more of our attention. The Shiloh battle park remains unspoiled by tourists and development but is difficult place to visit. A combination of larger battles and ease of access combine to make Shiloh one of the less studied battles. "Shiloh: Bloody April by Wiley Sword" and "Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862" by Edward Cunningham and Gary D. Joiner and Timothy B. Smith are the two best-detailed treatments of this complicated battle. Larry J. Daniel's "Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War" is the best introduction. With so little available, the possibility of a quality book on Shiloh is always an event for the Civil War community. I am very happy to report that this is a quality book on Shiloh, one that students of the battle will want in their library.
Eight historians, all with excellent knowledge of the battle and fine writing skills, produced a series of essays that are informative and enjoyable. Each essay is about 20 pages and covers a specific topic. The focus and length allows the author to be detailed without overwhelming the reader. Reading the book is like attending a series of excellent lectures for about $2 or $3 each.
John R. Lundberg starts the series with a look at the Confederate commander Albert Sidney Johnston. This gives us both the South and Johnston's stake in the battle.
Alexander Mendoza contributes an essay on the Union defense of the Left flank, an area of the field that got a lot of coverage but is gaining importance. In addition, this allows us to see how inexperience the two armies were.
Timothy B. Smith's essay on the Hornets' Nets looks at the development of an icon and the current thinking on this action. It is both history and a look at making "history".
Steven E. Woodworth contributes a detailed look at Lew Wallace's march to the battlefield. This balanced look is free of rancor and blame, allowing the reader to make very reasoned decisions on this question.
Gary D. Joiner looks at the forgotten subject of the Union gunboats. This is a welcome addition to our history of the battle. The gunboats often overlooked are seen as nothing more than floating artillery batteries. Joiner shows us how they functioned as weapons and as a physiological instrument of terror.
Grady McWhiney examines Beauregard's "complete victory" and the chances of breaking the finial Union line. This is an intelligent, well-balanced piece providing ample food for thought.
Charles D. Grear and Brooks D. Simpson provide strong pieces on how the Confederate soldier's reacted to the battle and how Grant viewed Shiloh. Each essay is less a battle story than a history of how Shiloh is seen. The author's show how time altered their subject's view of what happened on the field and how this influenced what they wrote. They provide an excellent ending to the book by placing the development of the story within the battle.
This is not an introduction to Shiloh! This is an intermediate series of lectures on specific aspects of the battle. The intended reader is someone who has a working knowledge of the battle and wants to develop a more in-depth understanding of things. Each essay has excellent footnotes, most of which are to primary sources. This excellent book is informative, thought provoking, fun to read and a valuable addition to your Shiloh library.

Almost 20 years ago, I was stranded in downtown Los Angeles for an afternoon unexpectedly. Looking for something to do, I wandered into the downtown library, meandered into the history section, and wound up checking out Gary W. Gallagher's book of essays on the first day at Gettysburg. Up until that time I was not really a fan of essay collections: my mind wants the book to agree with itself, for some reason. By the time I'd read the third book in Gallagher's series on Gettysburg, I was sold on the series, and I've been buying and reading them ever since. By deconstructing the battle and examining minor parts of it more intimately, the authors reach some interesting, and strong, conclusions about the fighting and why it occurred the way it did. Much of this scholarship changed the way we think about the battle, and frankly I thought the whole thing extremely well-done.

Fast forward 17+ years. I'm browsing around Amazon, and I come across a book titled "The Shiloh Campaign". It's edited by Steven Woodworth, whom I know from reading his books "Jefferson Davis and his Generals" and "Lee and Davis at War". I generally like Woodworth, who in my opinion is probably the pick of the litter among the more or less pro-Southern historians currently writing. He's not really obnoxious in terms of insisting on Southern bravery or whatever, and though he concentrates on Confederate issues he generally isn't unfair to the Yankees. So I was intrigued by this idea, and bought the book. It turns out that it's a direct response to Gallagher's books, with an introduction that references them by name. "The Shiloh Campaign" is the first in a projected series of books, following the format Gallagher devised first: no overarching account of the battle, and a group of authors deconstructing portions of the fighting, or issues surrounding it, in considerable detail. The second book in the series, "The Chickamauga Campaign", has a list in back of projected titles; including the two books already produced, there are 17 titles listed. All I can say is sign me up.

OK, so Shiloh is the first entry in the series. The book's rather thin, weighing in at ca. 160 pages. There are eight essays in the collection, dealing with a range of issues and events during the fighting. The first is by John Lundberg, and discusses Albert Sidney Johnston's role in the campaign leading up to the battle. Lundberg argues that after stumbling during the Henry/Donelson campaign, Johnston recovered rather nicely, and was growing as a commander, learning that he couldn't trust subordinates as much as he wanted to (as Lee learned, after the death of Jackson and the absence of Longstreet). It's an interesting observation, cogently argued.

Next there's an essay recounting the defense of the Union left flank, which was held by a brigade commanded by David Stuart. The fighting is typically not covered much in books on the subject, so this was interesting and informative. This is followed by a discussion of the place of the "Hornet's Nest" in the history of the battle, and how it came to be the centerpiece of the narrative of the first day's fighting. Woodworth follows that with his own essay, enumerating Lew Wallace's actions on the day of the battle and his inability to get his division into the fighting before sundown.

Next there's an essay recounting the actions of the gunboats at Shiloh. Along with the "Hornet's Nest", I think the gunboats are one of the "icons" of the fight, because everyone who participated in the fighting saw the shells at one time or other, and most who wrote about the battle had something to say about them. The author brings some perspective to their actions and effect on the fighting, and it's interesting. Next the late Grady McWhiney is tapped for an essay he wrote for a historical journal 20+ years ago. He argues that if Beauregard hadn't stopped the Confederate attack towards evening on the first day of the fighting, there was a chance that Grant's army might have been driven into the river and destroyed, and possibly the war won, or at least lengthened considerably. This is followed by an essay discussing the effect of the fighting on the morale of the Confederate troops after the battle, and another (by Brooks Simpson) discussing the course of U.S. Grant's career in the direct aftermath of the battle. Simpson believes that the famous account of the aftermath of the battle, with Grant almost leaving, and Lincoln sparing him, is mostly myth, and he examines the accepted story in light of the documents he can find on the subject.

I do have several issues with the way the book is assembled and constructed, and its content. For one thing, there's a lack of maps, and illustrations. Illustrations give context to the narrative as it flows, and there are none here. Maps are crucial when discussing the tactical aspects of a battle like this, and they're sorely lacking here. The chapter outlining David Stuart's actions on the Union left is bereft of maps, which means you can only sort of follow the course of the narrative in the book. The "Hornet's Nest" chapter has two maps, and they're more or less adequate, but could have stood some help. The McWhiney chapter could have stood a map, too, though it wasn't crucial.

The other issue is objectivity. While I still will defend Woodworth's objectivity, there's an undertone to the whole book of "might-have-been" which undermines the neutrality of the narrative, a bit. In the years after the Civil War, Southern historians indulged themselves, a lot, discussing what would have happened if..., with any number of events slightly changed so that events were turned in the South's favor, and they won a particular battle, which would have led to something else, and within minutes they're marching through Washington in a Victory Parade. None of them ever considers what-if's that lead in the other direction (at Shiloh, for instance, one could speculate what would have happened if Lew Wallace had gotten his act together and arrived on the battlefield at noon or 1 p.m., as he probably should have). This insistence on pro-Confederate "what-ifs" betrays a certain bias in the history of an event, and it's troubling. Here, the opening essay on Albert Sidney Johnston spends a lot of time wondering what he would have done if he hadn't died when he did, and how the battle would have gone if he'd properly supervised it (as the author thinks he could, and should, have done). The McWhiney essay is the most annoying, however. The stated purpose of the whole thing is to discuss the lost opportunity that Beauregard missed when he broke off the attack at the end of the first day.

So, while I enjoyed the collection a great deal, I do have some misgivings. I am looking forward to the rest of the series, however, and did enjoy this book. I wouldn't recommend it to anyone but a Civil War buff, but within that group it's bound to be pretty popular.

The Civil War battle at Shiloh was the first really monster battle of that sanguinary conflict. Two days of desperate fighting bloodies both Union and Confederate forces. Steven Woodworth has edited a volume with a set of essays looking at various aspects of the battle. Some of these are excellent and thought provoking and others are less so. Nonetheless, as a package, this is a good addition to the library on Shiloh.

Among the best essays. . . . Mendoza's chapter, "A Terrible Baptism of Fire," is an excellent analysis of the key role played by David Stuart's lone brigade at the far left of the Union line. This small force grudgingly retreated from position to position, preventing Confederate forces from flanking the Union position. A well detailed analysis of this part of the battle. Smith's "Anatomy of an Icon" continues the revisionist view of the Hornet's Nest. At one time, this was considered a central battle within a battle that delayed the Confederate advance and saved Grant's forces. More recent studies have raised questions about this, and this essay is a part of that debate. Woodworth's chapter, "Intolerably Slow," suggests that Lew Wallace, in fact, had the slows (for whatever reason) in not moving swiftly to reinforce Grant's army. Inconsistent reporting among different witnesses raises a number of questions. Very well done. Joiner's essay on the role of the gunboats' firing at the Confederate positions also elaborates on one of the stories that shows up in histories of the battle. Here, the sense is that the firing may have been more psychological in effect than any actual damage done.

One of the less stellar chapters is a reexamination of Albert Sidney Johnston's record as army commander. He had struggled earlier, not always appearing to be on top of his game. This chapter suggests that he began growing as he retreated from Kentucky and began gathering his forces at Corinth. The chapter wonders if he might have become a major force in the West if he had not been killed in battle. I'm not so sure that I'm convinced. For an army commander to be up front with his troops is not very effective. He had no sense of the overall shape of the battle (not that confusion wasn't rampant anyhow). McWhiney's chapter is soundly done, but I'm not sure that I learn much that I had not thought of earlier.

The final chapter, by Simpson, does a nice job of addressing what the author refers to as myths about Grant and Shiloh.

As with any edited volumes, some chapters are weaker than others. But, as a whole, this is a useful addition to the body of work on Shiloh.

It was pointed out to me that "Shiloh was merely the biggest battle in the Corinth campaign." (which is really the correct way of looking at it--Corinth, MS, was Grant's real objective--he never expected to fight a battle at Pittsburg Landing/Shiloh), and I have another book entitled "The Shiloh Campaign", altho' it was originally published in Great Britain (author: Martin), it has also been published in U.S. Contents of this book are very good, tho'.

Most of my first 40 years' Civil War reading focused on the eastern campaigns (Mom was a Confederate, and started me early); in the last 10 years a growing fascination with Grant has pulled me into extensive remedial work on the west. I had hoped that this collection of essays would clarify Shiloh for me, in concise historigraphical review of the standard story and texts.
I got a little of that, the explanation of Lew Wallace's delay, and the gunboats' importance the best of the bunch. I would love to have understood the account of the small-unit action on the Union left, but absent any map at all, and despite reference to my own atlases, the essay is incomprehensible. The basic point about the Hornet's Nest came through (more bypassed than bad fight), but again, the absence of maps showing the evolution of the fight left the story flat. Perhaps, like so much of the battle, the single map of the Nest showed reality: a slugging match between amateurs, each line of assault piling on a prior line, piecemeal chaos.
The opening essay on Johnston and the strategic setting is exceptionally weak, alleging the importance of Shiloh to the western campaign, and praising Johnston's skill. Like so much "so-close" Gettysburg history, when it really wasn't close at all, even a win at Shiloh would have been a temporary setback for hugely superior Union forces (the greatest damage might have been to remove Grant from command). As a tactical affair, the raw Confederate organization and Beauregard's fantastic folly in sequential lines of assault inevitably reduced Shiloh to a brawl, CCC impossible. Loss of CCC and unit integrity at the outset meant that even if the Confederates managed to break or flank the Union position the success could not be exploited, and the Union was all but certain to retain the field -- and no matter how shot-up and embarrassed, that is all that Grant had to do. Even if Johnston's army had been properly deployed (three corps abreast, one in reserve, reserves in each corps), the two sides were so evenly matched that the South still could not have carried the field -- or kept it, with a quarter of its men down, Wallace and Buell so close by.
My frustration with this book may well reflect my frustration with the western reality. Union lines of communication were more troublesome than the Confederates, and the expertly forted-up Vicksburg position bought a year, but the issue was never in doubt.