8 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Ego = mc squared, September 21, 2006
The nuclear five missed an opportunity to give up their arsenal and get everyone's covenant to stay away from the bomb. It is only natural that some states and some nations sought to avoid the "less than equal" status by joining the nuclear club overtly and covertly.
Pakistan is probably the only state that was smart enough to get the bomb but not wise enough to "control" access to technology. Individuals were more important than institutions. A Q Khan used the nation's need for a bomb to create a personal fiefdom that was beyond any institutionalized control. Benazir Bhutto, the PM of Pakistan, could not visit his laboratories and got her first glimpse of Khan's facility and work when the United States shared with her the results of their espionage!
A Q Khan used his intelligence and his ability to manage perceptions to create several myths:
(a) He was not the father of Pakistan's bomb. The bomb came from PAEC and its scientists Munir Khan and Mubarakmand. (Khan had a parallel initiative in Kahuta but did not have enough "cold test" experiences to do the honours). Khan was however the one to take the limelight and give an exaggerated impression of his role. The nation took to the flamboyant A Q K and ignored the true heroes of PAEC.
(b) He was not keeping Pakistan's interest in mind. Z A Bhutto was astute in stating that Pakistan's bomb should not take the image of an Islamic bomb. Khan ignored this, and for personal gain, in an uncontrolled manner sold technology (stolen from URENCO) to Iran, Libya and North Korea. For money. Without approval from Pakistan's policy makers.
Increasing insensitivity to oppressed causes, increasing unwillingness of majority to live with a homogenous minority, increasing conflict between nations and states have all enhanced threats from terrorism and threats from rogue states for humanity.
A Q Khan's clanedestine one stop shopping mall for nuclear technology to anyone with money (and often poor credentials) may have handed terrorists and rogue states their first chance to acquire technology that has so far been under the rigorous control of responsible States including the State of Pakistan. At relatively inexpensive prices.
A Q Khan has endangered the World and has significantly affected Pakistan's image as a responsible State.
Gordon Correra traces the history of Khan's rise and fall. The author must have worked hard to get all the facts from a very sensitive nation, on a very sensitive issue. The author continues to sustain the reader's interest and attention by an easy and narrative style. Yet the book has enough material for a serious researcher to pursue further.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings., February 8, 2007
A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology and a hero in Pakistan: Khan was known as the Father of the Bomb and built a global network selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. It's surprising to note that this is the first book-length survey of the rise and fall of the man and his role in spreading nuclear technology. It use interviews with politicians and key members of his own network to survey not only Khan's life and influence on the spread of nuclear technology, but the methods and intentions of the rogue states who bought from him. New details on how the CIA penetrated his network and broke his ring makes for a unique and eye-opening analysis which is a top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings.
Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch
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4 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Nice research, though lot of it unsubstantiated, October 9, 2006
This book is an excellent piece of work on Nuclear Proliferation. Things that I would have liked to see in this book :
*) Substantiated material with actual interviews with intelligence officers. Author uses lots of qoutes from private conversations, but how did he get access to those ? That makes me question a bit the authencity of the research.
*) The book keeps on jumping back and forth, which is an excellent case to muddy the presentation. I would have liked a chronological order maintained in the book so that thought processes can be collected and processed efficiently.
Overall it is an eye-opener.
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