This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalizes earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. Substantively the monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, reputation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants, as well as how it rationalizes certain types of political behaviour and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an "incomplete information" world.
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First Sentence:
In the past twenty years or so rational choice models have become a common if not completely accepted paradigm from which to generate predictions of and explanations for political behavior. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
universally divine equilibrium, costless signaling games, most informative equilibria, induced ideal point, electoral announcements, equilibrium proposal, equilibrium messages, pooling equilibria, sequential equilibrium, best response correspondence, informational gains, separating equilibrium, incomplete information games, universal divinity, debate stage, voting stage, closed rule, intuitive criterion, posterior belief, pooling equilibrium, sequential equilibria, induced preferences, open rule, closed procedure, utility equivalent New!
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Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
In the past twenty years or so rational choice models have become a common if not completely accepted paradigm from which to generate predictions of and explanations for political behavior. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
universally divine equilibrium, costless signaling games, most informative equilibria, induced ideal point, electoral announcements, equilibrium proposal, equilibrium messages, pooling equilibria, sequential equilibrium, best response correspondence, informational gains, separating equilibrium, incomplete information games, universal divinity, debate stage, voting stage, closed rule, intuitive criterion, posterior belief, pooling equilibrium, sequential equilibria, induced preferences, open rule, closed procedure, utility equivalent New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
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This book cites 20
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20
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- Democratic Legitimacy (Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought) by Fabienne Peter in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
- Models of Strategic Choice in Politics by Peter C. Ordeshook in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Economic History by E.T. Atkinson in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Models of Imperfect Information in Politics (Political Science and Economics Section) (Vol 6) by R. Calvert in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Economic Development (A Scientific American book) by Scientific American in Back Matter
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- The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient (American Politics and Political Economy Series) by Donald A. Wittman in Back Matter
- Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power (Communication, Society and Politics) by Bruce Bimber in Back Matter
- The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) by Arthur Lupia in Back Matter
- Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process (SAGE Politics Texts Series) by Gideon Doron on page 84
- The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics by Kevin M. Esterling in Back Matter
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