Customer Reviews

Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns (Great Campaigns of the Civil War)

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4 star:		(6)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

The author's depictions of the principal characters of the Southern armies at Chickamauga seem to be penned by someone who believes there is merit in the post-Civil War mythology of the "Lost Cause". This bias cannot be ignored in Woodworth's diverse treatments of Generals Braxton Bragg and James Longstreet. Woodworth would have his readers to believe Bragg's ineffectiveness was due to a cabal of subordinates who were in a constant state of either panic, fear or mutiny or a combination thereof, and that Longstreet was vain, petty, conniving and unworthy of his reputation as a superb General. Closer examination of Bragg's performance prior to Chickamauga reveals a lack of success that cannot be solely attributed to his subordinates, but can help explain how and why his subordinates - and the troops they commanded - lost confidence in their commanding officer. Of particular offense is Woodworth's treatment of General James Longstreet. The author provides excruciating detail about the areas between Ringgold, GA and Chickamauga, and the propensity to become lost or disoriented in the maze of mountains, but attributes Longstreet's anger at not being met at Catoosa to vanity. More likely are the facts that Longstreet was not familiar with the area, did not have maps of the area (Bragg would later provide a crudely drawn map, and did not know the positions of the opposing armies or Bragg's HQ. Longstreet's near capture by Federal troops along the way could have been avoided, and a more timely positioning of Longstreets troops could have been facilitated had some member of Bragg's staff been deployed as an escort. When Longstreet located Bragg nine hours later, Bragg, at that time, was asleep and after almost two days of fighting was unaware of the whereabouts or condition of his army's entire Left Wing. Woodworth faults Longstreet for delaying his attack when Bragg's instructions were for Longstreet to delay his advance until General Leonidas Polk's troops had advanced en enchelon, and successive units had moved forward sufficient to meet the Confederate Left Wing. Longstreet waited but the agreed upon signal to advance did not come. When Longstreet did advance the resulting attack was considerably more effective than Woodworth's description, and it was not until General George Thomas (The Rock of Chickamauga) stood firm on Snodgrass Hill that Longstreet's attack was blunted. For an excellent account of Longstreet's attack consider Jeffry Wert's "General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier". I will also take issue with the author's characterization of Longstreet as being complacent during the battle regarding reconnaisance of the Federal positions, and of his stopping to take rations during the battle. On more than one occasion Longstreet had nearly been killed conducting personal reconnaisance, or with his staff, and it would be the case at The Wilderness that he, like Stonewall Jackson, would be shot by Confederate pickets because he was so far in front of his lines that he was mistaken for the enemy. As most readers already know the taking of rations during a battle was not uncommon. Men ate and drank what they could when they could. This would certainly have been the case when trying to remove the Federals from the formidable defense Thomas mounted from Snodgrass Hill. Although I was willing to give this book a three star rating I now believe it deserves no more than two due to the author's reliance on and citation of questionable resources. One such resource is Edward Carr Franks, whose opinion of General James Longstreet found resonance with Woodworth's subscription to Lost Cause mythology. The sole reference to Carr's bibliography is an article published in a Civil War journal edited by Steven Woodworth. Woodworth also cites Judith Lee Hallock's whose doctoral-dissertation-turned-two-volume, 740 page "Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat", and 134 page "General James Longstreet in the West: A Monumental Failure" also resonate with the author's bias. Bragg, according to Woodworth suffered defeat not at the hands of Ulysses S. Grant but by those of his reluctant and rebellious subordinate officers. No Lost Cause excoriation of Longstreet would be complete without the use of the South's finest apologist, Douglas Southall Freeman, who in his biography of Robert E. Lee presents in dramatic prose the case for Longstreet being responsible not only for the defeat at Gettysburg, but the war itself. Not surprisingly the author does not cite Freeman's subsequent admission that he had erred in making Longstreet the scapegoat, or his subsequent lack of focus on Longstreet - in "Lee's Lieutenants" - or any other individual as being responsible for the outcome of Gettysburg, or the war. Although the author is an Associate Professor of history at Texas Christian University he has demonstrated here either an inability or an unwillingness to offer a full account of the historical records arising from the events in question, and thus denies both his readers and students the full benefits of our nation's history.

I stumbled upon this title by accident, when I was looking for Civil War books about Tennessee. I am very happy that I did. The book was an easy read, but not so easy that I flew through it without learning anything.
One of the best things about the book was Woodworth's writting style. He wrote it in such away that I felt I was there, living these events with the generals and the soldiers from both sides. Having hiked the regions that the events took place in helped too, but even if you have not the descriptions are very strong. He never writes over your head like he expects you to be a Civil War historian, nor does he dumb it down to a fifth grade level.
The transitions from the North's side to the South's side of the conflict was brilliantly done. Nothing was left out in going from one side to the other. If events were taking place at the same time Woodworth let you know. When he talked of the battles they were well layed out as to who was doing what,where and when.

The thing that I learned most from this book was the internal bickering in the South's upper chain of command. No one was doing what they were suppose to do when they were suppose to do it. It would seem to me,after reading this book, if the generals under Bragg's command would have done as they were told the outcome would have been totally different and maybe even the outcome of the Civil war itself.
If you are from Chattanooga or Knoxville, I highly recommend reading this book. If you just like reading Civil War histories this is a must.

Woodworth is a first-rate writer with an impressive command of the material. The campaign is complicated one and he deals with it well, although not in the detail that Peter Cozzens offers in his landmark books. I have two quibbles: There is no map with the Chickamauga chapter, a battle of mind-bending complexity. Also, Woodworth deals very lightly with Gen. John B. Turchin, surely one of the war's most colorful characters

This book was very interesting to me. I am familiar with the area in which the fighting took place and that made it even more exciting to read. At times I would get lost in all the different military maneuvers, but overall it was very good reading.

What a waste of real talent by an assistant professor of history. Great writing style. Very readable. BUT, lacks objectivity which is so important when writing about historical figures. His take on Gen. Longstreet is ancient, stale, and is almost comical in view of the reams of information now available which are not tainted by LOST CAUSE rhetoric. This is inexcusable for someone who professes to teach history. It shows a superficiality and lackadaisical attitude towards the subject and a willingness to sacrifice accuracy to the almighty dollar. I guess bashing Longstreet still sells . . . in spite of the facts.

I've previously read many books on various aspects of the Chickamauga battle and campaign, and events surrounding them; and there are many excellent books that dive into great detail, such Cozzens' "This Terrible Sound". However, I have to say that "Six Armies in Tennessee" is the best overview of the whole campaign that I have read. It is an easy read, full of interesting vignettes, and very well written.

I was surprised that the author is pretty sympathetic to Bragg, and very negative towards Longstreet. I'll have to go back and re-read my various other books on Bragg and Longstreet and see if I need to reconsider my opinions of those two confederate generals...

Ugh. Another rehash of the generals under Bragg should have listened to him. Bragg got a huge help in the arrival of General Longstreet, who broke through the Union right, and would have demolished or captured the entire right wing (and maybe the left) if he got the reinforcements he asked Bragg for after the breakthrough. Bragg did not listen, and lost the Chattanooga campaign because of it. Nothing new in this stuck on incorrect Lost Cause thinking about Bragg.

When a Civil War historian names his son Nathan you would expect a one sided biased account. However, Woodworth is surprisingly even handed in his treatment of the six armies that fought over Chattanooga. He is at his best in describing the backbiting in the southern leadership and the incompetence of Longstreet. This is a thin book. Perhaps too thin for those who would like a little more detail. We still await an indepth look at the Tennesseans who fought for the north.

A very good and easy read. This book is written for anyone intrested in the Civil War. A good over view of the thoughts, actions and concepts of each side in this conflict over Tennessee.

"Six armies in Tennessee" is as its author describes a "narrative synthesis" of the western theater in late 1863 as portions of four Union and two Confederate armies gather to contend for Middle and Eastern Tennessee. As a student growing up in the South and then as a casual Civil War reader, I believed the Union Army was run by incompetent, blundering generals, at least in the early years of the war. This belief was likely due to the revolving door of leadership of the Army of the Potomac prior to Grant. Yet, as I have read more over the years, I continually learn more about the errant leadership of the Confederacy. I think the legend surrounding Lee masks this to those with only a passing interest, but as one ventures into more detailed studies, particularly from recent authors who are freed from the burden of Confederate apologetics, you find some eye-opening material. In most cases, it's not that the Confederate generals were incompetent in a military sense; rather, they fall prey to extreme arrogance and pride and cannot work together in the best interests of the CSA.

Yet "Six Armies" presents CSA leadership in a lower low. That arrogance is compounded by extreme incompetency and insubordination. Woodworth is the first author I have read who does not portray Braxton Bragg as the sole reason the South lost the campaign: "Bragg's worst problem ... was that he had few capable generals who trusted him and whom he could trust to carry out his commands." In fact, Woodworth calls Bragg's staff a "bitter concoction of hatred and mistrust that poisoned the army's operations... The Army of Tennessee's high command was a tangled mess of bitterness, jealousy, and hatred. It was now nearing the point of ceasing to function." Dysfunction was so great that they wouldn't even talk to each other obviously resulting in egregious lapses in communications which significantly impeded their effectiveness.

Bragg was a good administrator and decent tactician who sincerely tried to win the goodwill of subordinates and superiors, but was decidedly bereft of political and personal skills. Leonidas Polk, whose "continued presence was a tumor on the Army of Tennessee's high command", was a petty and incompetent general, but magnificent politician that continuously undermined Bragg. Hindman, Hardee, Hill, and even Buckner blatantly defied orders and squandered multiple opportunities to destroy Rosecrans in the whole well before Chickamauga. The reader cannot help but wince as they recklessly defy and countermand Bragg's - and each others - orders. And that includes, at least in the events during and after the Chattanooga siege - even Longstreet (In fact, Woodworth is no fan of Lee's "Old Warhorse" and presents one of the most unflattering portrayals I have read). Ultimately, the fault must lie with Jefferson Davis and his poor administrative capabilities, his insecurities which manifested in misguided loyalties, and as Woodworth says, "his questionable penchant for viewing the western theater as the land of second chance for generals whose careers had gone awry."

Woodworth presents a balanced treatment of both sides, but the Confederate coverage resonates as he lets his readers see how the Army of Tennessee's campaign disintegrates moment by moment. Despite the loss at Chickamauga, the army of the Cumberland is able to capitalize on the continued mistakes of Bragg et al. Woodworth certainly has some opinions. I certainly don't see his treatment as complete absolution for Bragg, but it certainly attempts to lessen the disgrace that has been heaped upon him over the years. Foote was pretty rough on Bragg in his second book The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 2: Fredericksburg to Meridian, but he does hint at much of the dysfunction with the subordinates, especially in his first volume The Civil War: A Narrative--Fort Sumter to Perryville, Vol. 1.

My biggest complaint with "Six Armies" - apart from the paucity of maps typical in most of these books - is that Woodworth ends his coverage of the campaign prematurely. The narrative basically closes with Bragg's retreat from the Chattanooga siege. The whole Knoxville debacle only gets a few pages. And there the author lays some harsh criticisms of Longstreet, calling him incompetent, no less. While I cannot dispute those charges, they certainly deserve more supporting proof and reasoning. While the book is well-written and provides a great overview without deep dives into battle minutia, I struggled between a three and four stars rating because of this. In the end, I decided to rate with the latter simply because I very much enjoyed reading it.