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127 of 132 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Great analysis of why the Tiger tanks failed, January 10, 2005
This review is from: Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II (Paperback)
This is a terrific book, and is primarily a summary and analysis of the available literature on the combat history of the German Tiger I and II tanks of WWII. There are only a few descriptions of individual tank to tank combat, which is probably the only weakness of this book. Wilbeck instead concentrates on painting an overall picture of the effectiveness of the Tiger tanks in combat. In the end, Wilbeck concludes that despite their fearsome reputation, born out of many anecdotal tales of awesome lethality, the Tiger tanks were severely limited in what they could accomplish on a strategic level.
In tank to tank combat, the Tigers were incredibly good at killing other tanks, reaching kill ratios up to 13:1 in many cases. But, as Wilbeck points out in great detail, the end result of designing a tank with very heavy armor and extreme firepower was a tank that was very heavy and extremely expensive and time consuming to manufacture (Hitler personally ordered the specifications for the Tiger tank). The Tigers were very prone to breaking down (mostly because of their weight, which strained the entire mechanical system), could not cross most of the bridges in Europe, and had to be shipped by train to the battlefield (they would break down if they had to be driven for any great distance). There were only a few Tigers ever manufactured (1,348 Tiger Is and less than 500 Tiger IIs ), and even fewer that actually showed up on the battlefield. They guzzled gasoline, were extremely slow (with an average speed of about 4-9 miles per hour on rough terrain or dirt roads - well below the stated maximum design speed of 25 mph), and had an extremely short combat radius and duration. The high kill ratios when they did engage in combat were offset by their tendency to either run out of gas or break down in combat, which resulted in large numbers having to be abandoned (more than were destroyed by Allied tanks). Also, U.S. and British forces had superior mobility due to widespread mechanization, as well as superior artillery and airpower. Because of the immobility and limited numbers of the Tiger tanks, it was possible to avoid confronting them with tanks, and instead, Allied forces would try to bypass and isolate them, or destroy them with heavy artillery or airpower.
There were other major weaknesses - for instance, the German Army was the only one of the major armies in Europe to not have minesweeping tanks. Inexplicably, the Germans persisted in using these precious few Tiger tanks to "bull-through" minefields, a tactic that led to long trails of busted Tiger tanks whenever a unit encountered a minefield, leaving few to carry out the attack at the other end of the minefield. The Germans also suffered from a lack of sufficient retrieval vehicles that could handle the heavy Tigers. This led to the abandonment of many Tigers that could have been repaired had they been retrieved.
Wilbeck gives the statistic that each Tiger I tank cost 800,000 Reichmarks, which was equivalent to the weekly wages of 30,000 people, and required 300,000 man-hours to produce. [Note bene: at those rates, the Tigers were very much high end super-weapons, equivalent on a cost basis to something like the U.S. B-29, which cost about a million dollars apiece, or a Navy destroyer].
There is an interesting analysis in this book of Tiger ace Michael Wittmann's famous attack at Bocage-Villers. Wilbeck points out that although the battle did temporarily halt the British advance and take an appalling toll on their tanks, by the end of the day, Wittmann's entire unit had been knocked out and was combat ineffective whereas the British tanks were quickly replaced. Continuing the story, Wilbeck describes how Wittman was later killed in another attack on the Caen-Falaise road in which he unknowingly charged into battle against some 900 Allied tanks with only some 50 on his side (only 8 of which were Tiger tanks). Wittmann's Tiger was most likely flanked by a Sherman Firefly which fired the fatal round.
Ultimately, as can be seen in the demise of Michael Wittman, numbers were what won tank battles in WWII. By 1944, the technology for destroying tanks had far outstripped the ability to make armor protection. Tank losses were very high on all sides as a result.
The German Army understood the value of powerful tanks, but never took to heart the even greater importance of producing large numbers of tanks. This is what made the Tiger tank a failure - the fact that such an enormous amount of German resources went into producing so few tanks that could be so easily disabled or bypassed.
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119 of 124 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Tiger Tanks: Potent Killers with Fatal Flaws, May 8, 2004
This review is from: Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II (Paperback)
"Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II" by Christopher W. Wilbeck is a great read for those simply curious about tank warfare as well as those more serious about their studies. Wonderfully written and seriously researched, "Sledgehammers" fulfilled all my expectations as a historical piece. My knowledge of German Tiger tanks was probably not that different than many other amateur historians - deep enough to know that most reports of battles with Tigers in "popular" historical accounts are exaggerated, mistaken and/or poorly researched, but not much beyond that. Wilbeck, in one single treatise, conveys a concise, useful and exciting history of one of the most feared tanks in the WWII. Several factors make this a great book: One of the most positive attributes of "Sledgehammers" is its simple yet very effective organization. In the first two sections, Wilbeck gives a coherent introduction of the German Heavy Tank Battalions. By placing the development and implementation of Tiger tank battalions with the context of German thinking (doctrine), technological advances, war planning and execution, Wilbeck makes it easy of the reader to understand the real "strengths" and "flaws" of the Tiger's role in the German advances and retreats. The discussion of German heavy tank Doctrine, or Tiger Battalion Organizations, is worth its weight in gold if one is to truly make sense of the effectiveness of these battalions. As Wilbeck points out the German military leaders were very doctrinal and only in rare cases were there breaks with doctrine at high levels. Yet on the battlefield where front-line commanders had control, doctrine, while a driving force, was not necessarily law. Nor was it particularly well applied. This had both negative and positive influences on the overall effectiveness of the Tigers. The next four sections of the books describe many of the combat missions in which Tigers were employed, from early years in the Desert when the Panzers were king, to the last battles of the war when the huge and expensive King Tigers were sacrificed in the final spasms of the Nazi regimes attempts to yoke the world. Wilbeck makes every apparent effort to confirm battle data from records of both combatants. Only in cases where the Soviets are the second combatant are Wilbeck's data weakened by lack of confirmation. Yet this is due not to a fault of the author, but rather from a simple lack of clear information on the Soviet side. In such cases Wilbeck is the first to point out the potential pitfalls. It is refreshing to read a book where the author acknowledges the historical weaknesses of ones own text. Despite this caveat (which again I point out the author makes clear exists!) these four sections represent the heart of the book and are fascinating. Wilbeck has a clear writing style that allows the reader to go through the battles with clarity and ease. The 35 maps, numerous photographs, and multiple tables of data each contribute to the enjoyable and factually rewarding nature of this book. "Sledgehammer's" publishing house, Aberjona Press, is quite possibly the finest serving the WWII historical genre with regard to this type of supplemental material. The last two sections of the book (save the Epilogues by Viktor Iskrov and Ray Holt) try to make sense of the data. Where Tiger tanks effective tools of war or not, and why or why not? Wilbeck makes a good case for both pros and cons of the Tiger Battalions. The author demonstrates that the Tiger tank was a VERY effective killing machine, achieving an impressive average kill ratio across the entire time of its employment of just over 12 enemy lost to every 1 Tiger in battle!!! Even when the horrible mechanical troubles of the Tigers (both I and II), logistical woes, and defensive nature of many battles fought are considered the Tigers still "killed" over 5 enemy tanks for their own lost (including self destruction). Thus, the Tiger tank has to bee seen as a serious weapon of war. Yet these numbers are averages and reflect a snap-shot of the entire picture. Wilbeck makes it clear to the reader that for all of their positive attributes as killing machines the Tigers were also a burden on the German war machine. Tigers were mechanically unreliable (as compared to the Soviet T-34 or US M4-Sherman), had a small radius of action (again in contrast to the aforementioned Allied tanks), and were so large that most terrain rendered them practically useless as breakthrough weapons for which they were manufactured, if less employed, according to Doctrine. Moreover, while the Tiger was a lethal machine essentially impervious to enemy when initially added to the cannon of German war material, the Allies were remarkably quick to respond to counter both the Tiger's lethality and thick "skin". The Prologue and Epilogue of the book also merit mentioned here. These sections were contributed not by Wilbeck but by soldiers fighting with (Prologue) or against (Epilogue) the Heavy Tank Battalions. These sections thus provide a unique perspective on this weapon and its impact. All in all I give "Sledgehammers" five solid stars for content, presentation and overall impact. If you want solid facts and reasoned analysis about Tiger tanks and their roles in WWII this is THE book to read.
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54 of 59 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Analyzing the Tigers, May 6, 2004
This review is from: Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II (Paperback)
As the book's description says, the author is trying to fill in a gap on the topic of German heavy tank battalions in WWII. I found the book interesting in the fact that it was the first that I have come accross that actually analyzes the effectiveness of the Tiger and King Tigers tanks in combat. Most other authors simply retell the histories of the engagements these tanks fought in, leaving the reader to judge for himself. The author Christopher Wilbeck is a US Army armor officer in the 1st Cavalry Division, and at this time May, 2004 is serving in Iraq. His credentials definately lay credence to his analysis. The writing style, anyone familiar with the military style of writing will also notice this, is concise and to the point. Upon reading the book, it is inevitable that one would revise their idea about the invincibility of the Tiger tanks. Their most notable flaws were the mechanical unreliability and fuel hungry engines. These two factors alone definately limited the effectiveness of the units fielding Tiger tanks during the war. Those factors severly hampered their doctrinal role of a breakthrough and exploitation. A unit was lucky if 66%, and that's high, of its Tiger tanks were combat ready and not at the maintenance depot. The statistic that 41% of Tiger tanks were destroyed by their own crew, verses 45% destroyed by enemy action, is telling enough. It makes you think how much more effective they would have been if the mechanical reliability was higher. The Germans lost 713 Tiger tanks in action, and the Tigers destroyed 8600 tanks. An excellent in combat kill ratio of 12.16 to 1. However, 868 were destroyed by either their own crews or other ways, bringing the overall ratio down to 5.44 to 1. Any design of a tank has to balance the three aspects of mobility, firepower, and armor. No doubt the Tigers had great firepower and armor, their tank killing record speaks for itself. However, mobility was sacrificed to achieve that. It was precisely that lack of mobility, mechanical reliability, and high fuel consumption that severely hampered their effectiveness. Thank you to Christopher Wilbeck for a great book and God be with you while serving our country.
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