Customer Reviews

Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II

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This is a terrific book, and is primarily a summary and analysis of the available literature on the combat history of the German Tiger I and II tanks of WWII. There are only a few descriptions of individual tank to tank combat, which is probably the only weakness of this book. Wilbeck instead concentrates on painting an overall picture of the effectiveness of the Tiger tanks in combat. In the end, Wilbeck concludes that despite their fearsome reputation, born out of many anecdotal tales of awesome lethality, the Tiger tanks were severely limited in what they could accomplish on a strategic level.

In tank to tank combat, the Tigers were incredibly good at killing other tanks, reaching kill ratios up to 13:1 in many cases. But, as Wilbeck points out in great detail, the end result of designing a tank with very heavy armor and extreme firepower was a tank that was very heavy and extremely expensive and time consuming to manufacture (Hitler personally ordered the specifications for the Tiger tank). The Tigers were very prone to breaking down (mostly because of their weight, which strained the entire mechanical system), could not cross most of the bridges in Europe, and had to be shipped by train to the battlefield (they would break down if they had to be driven for any great distance). There were only a few Tigers ever manufactured (1,348 Tiger Is and less than 500 Tiger IIs ), and even fewer that actually showed up on the battlefield. They guzzled gasoline, were extremely slow (with an average speed of about 4-9 miles per hour on rough terrain or dirt roads - well below the stated maximum design speed of 25 mph), and had an extremely short combat radius and duration. The high kill ratios when they did engage in combat were offset by their tendency to either run out of gas or break down in combat, which resulted in large numbers having to be abandoned (more than were destroyed by Allied tanks). Also, U.S. and British forces had superior mobility due to widespread mechanization, as well as superior artillery and airpower. Because of the immobility and limited numbers of the Tiger tanks, it was possible to avoid confronting them with tanks, and instead, Allied forces would try to bypass and isolate them, or destroy them with heavy artillery or airpower.

There were other major weaknesses - for instance, the German Army was the only one of the major armies in Europe to not have minesweeping tanks. Inexplicably, the Germans persisted in using these precious few Tiger tanks to "bull-through" minefields, a tactic that led to long trails of busted Tiger tanks whenever a unit encountered a minefield, leaving few to carry out the attack at the other end of the minefield. The Germans also suffered from a lack of sufficient retrieval vehicles that could handle the heavy Tigers. This led to the abandonment of many Tigers that could have been repaired had they been retrieved.

Wilbeck gives the statistic that each Tiger I tank cost 800,000 Reichmarks, which was equivalent to the weekly wages of 30,000 people, and required 300,000 man-hours to produce. [Note bene: at those rates, the Tigers were very much high end super-weapons, equivalent on a cost basis to something like the U.S. B-29, which cost about a million dollars apiece, or a Navy destroyer].

There is an interesting analysis in this book of Tiger ace Michael Wittmann's famous attack at Bocage-Villers. Wilbeck points out that although the battle did temporarily halt the British advance and take an appalling toll on their tanks, by the end of the day, Wittmann's entire unit had been knocked out and was combat ineffective whereas the British tanks were quickly replaced. Continuing the story, Wilbeck describes how Wittman was later killed in another attack on the Caen-Falaise road in which he unknowingly charged into battle against some 900 Allied tanks with only some 50 on his side (only 8 of which were Tiger tanks). Wittmann's Tiger was most likely flanked by a Sherman Firefly which fired the fatal round.

Ultimately, as can be seen in the demise of Michael Wittman, numbers were what won tank battles in WWII. By 1944, the technology for destroying tanks had far outstripped the ability to make armor protection. Tank losses were very high on all sides as a result.

The German Army understood the value of powerful tanks, but never took to heart the even greater importance of producing large numbers of tanks. This is what made the Tiger tank a failure - the fact that such an enormous amount of German resources went into producing so few tanks that could be so easily disabled or bypassed.

"Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II" by Christopher W. Wilbeck is a great read for those simply curious about tank warfare as well as those more serious about their studies. Wonderfully written and seriously researched, "Sledgehammers" fulfilled all my expectations as a historical piece. My knowledge of German Tiger tanks was probably not that different than many other amateur historians - deep enough to know that most reports of battles with Tigers in "popular" historical accounts are exaggerated, mistaken and/or poorly researched, but not much beyond that. Wilbeck, in one single treatise, conveys a concise, useful and exciting history of one of the most feared tanks in the WWII. Several factors make this a great book:

One of the most positive attributes of "Sledgehammers" is its simple yet very effective organization. In the first two sections, Wilbeck gives a coherent introduction of the German Heavy Tank Battalions. By placing the development and implementation of Tiger tank battalions with the context of German thinking (doctrine), technological advances, war planning and execution, Wilbeck makes it easy of the reader to understand the real "strengths" and "flaws" of the Tiger's role in the German advances and retreats. The discussion of German heavy tank Doctrine, or Tiger Battalion Organizations, is worth its weight in gold if one is to truly make sense of the effectiveness of these battalions. As Wilbeck points out the German military leaders were very doctrinal and only in rare cases were there breaks with doctrine at high levels. Yet on the battlefield where front-line commanders had control, doctrine, while a driving force, was not necessarily law. Nor was it particularly well applied. This had both negative and positive influences on the overall effectiveness of the Tigers.

The next four sections of the books describe many of the combat missions in which Tigers were employed, from early years in the Desert when the Panzers were king, to the last battles of the war when the huge and expensive King Tigers were sacrificed in the final spasms of the Nazi regimes attempts to yoke the world. Wilbeck makes every apparent effort to confirm battle data from records of both combatants. Only in cases where the Soviets are the second combatant are Wilbeck's data weakened by lack of confirmation. Yet this is due not to a fault of the author, but rather from a simple lack of clear information on the Soviet side. In such cases Wilbeck is the first to point out the potential pitfalls. It is refreshing to read a book where the author acknowledges the historical weaknesses of ones own text. Despite this caveat (which again I point out the author makes clear exists!) these four sections represent the heart of the book and are fascinating. Wilbeck has a clear writing style that allows the reader to go through the battles with clarity and ease. The 35 maps, numerous photographs, and multiple tables of data each contribute to the enjoyable and factually rewarding nature of this book. "Sledgehammer's" publishing house, Aberjona Press, is quite possibly the finest serving the WWII historical genre with regard to this type of supplemental material.

The last two sections of the book (save the Epilogues by Viktor Iskrov and Ray Holt) try to make sense of the data. Where Tiger tanks effective tools of war or not, and why or why not? Wilbeck makes a good case for both pros and cons of the Tiger Battalions. The author demonstrates that the Tiger tank was a VERY effective killing machine, achieving an impressive average kill ratio across the entire time of its employment of just over 12 enemy lost to every 1 Tiger in battle!!! Even when the horrible mechanical troubles of the Tigers (both I and II), logistical woes, and defensive nature of many battles fought are considered the Tigers still "killed" over 5 enemy tanks for their own lost (including self destruction). Thus, the Tiger tank has to bee seen as a serious weapon of war. Yet these numbers are averages and reflect a snap-shot of the entire picture. Wilbeck makes it clear to the reader that for all of their positive attributes as killing machines the Tigers were also a burden on the German war machine. Tigers were mechanically unreliable (as compared to the Soviet T-34 or US M4-Sherman), had a small radius of action (again in contrast to the aforementioned Allied tanks), and were so large that most terrain rendered them practically useless as breakthrough weapons for which they were manufactured, if less employed, according to Doctrine. Moreover, while the Tiger was a lethal machine essentially impervious to enemy when initially added to the cannon of German war material, the Allies were remarkably quick to respond to counter both the Tiger's lethality and thick "skin".

The Prologue and Epilogue of the book also merit mentioned here. These sections were contributed not by Wilbeck but by soldiers fighting with (Prologue) or against (Epilogue) the Heavy Tank Battalions. These sections thus provide a unique perspective on this weapon and its impact.

All in all I give "Sledgehammers" five solid stars for content, presentation and overall impact. If you want solid facts and reasoned analysis about Tiger tanks and their roles in WWII this is THE book to read.

As the book's description says, the author is trying to fill in a gap on the topic of German heavy tank battalions in WWII. I found the book interesting in the fact that it was the first that I have come accross that actually analyzes the effectiveness of the Tiger and King Tigers tanks in combat. Most other authors simply retell the histories of the engagements these tanks fought in, leaving the reader to judge for himself. The author Christopher Wilbeck is a US Army armor officer in the 1st Cavalry Division, and at this time May, 2004 is serving in Iraq. His credentials definately lay credence to his analysis. The writing style, anyone familiar with the military style of writing will also notice this, is concise and to the point.

Upon reading the book, it is inevitable that one would revise their idea about the invincibility of the Tiger tanks. Their most notable flaws were the mechanical unreliability and fuel hungry engines. These two factors alone definately limited the effectiveness of the units fielding Tiger tanks during the war. Those factors severly hampered their doctrinal role of a breakthrough and exploitation. A unit was lucky if 66%, and that's high, of its Tiger tanks were combat ready and not at the maintenance depot. The statistic that 41% of Tiger tanks were destroyed by their own crew, verses 45% destroyed by enemy action, is telling enough. It makes you think how much more effective they would have been if the mechanical reliability was higher. The Germans lost 713 Tiger tanks in action, and the Tigers destroyed 8600 tanks. An excellent in combat kill ratio of 12.16 to 1. However, 868 were destroyed by either their own crews or other ways, bringing the overall ratio down to 5.44 to 1.

Any design of a tank has to balance the three aspects of mobility, firepower, and armor. No doubt the Tigers had great firepower and armor, their tank killing record speaks for itself. However, mobility was sacrificed to achieve that. It was precisely that lack of mobility, mechanical reliability, and high fuel consumption that severely hampered their effectiveness.

Thank you to Christopher Wilbeck for a great book and God be with you while serving our country.

Major Wilbeck has done a great service in writing a top-notch book that is applicable to today's armor or mechanized infantry officer as it is to any military historian or Tiger tank enthusiast. At a minimum I must say it is very thought provoking. I found myself reading a few paragraphs and then pausing to analyze the author's synthesis and comparing it with my own experience with mechanized forces.
This compact and focused study effectively integrates and illustrates the development, tactics, and deployment of the Tiger tank. With historical specificity the author reveals the strengths and weaknesses of what has become a tank of legend.
Professional Soldiers will find that many of the points brought out by Major Wilbeck continue to plague us today as we move from a Heavy force developed to defeat the armored threat of the Soviets during the Cold War to a more mobile, lightly armored force tailored for swift deployment to regional hot-spots.
Adding to this book are the wonderful maps that I have come to expect from Aberjona Press.

This book is a study of the German Tiger tanks. The writer starts with a brief summary of the early history of the tigers. Then goes on and discusses many battles that had the tigers. He then presents his conclusions that they were are great tank but the Germans never developed a proper military doctrinal guidance that could have used them. As such they were used mainly as tank killers. In this I think he makes a strong case.

However I am not sure that he has proven his case that the tigers were that much better tank killers compared to other German tanks. For example, I have read of some Panthers devastating Allied tanks too in figures equal to what he quotes of Tigers. Overall in both fronts for different reasons the Germans tanks tended to do better.

In the west the Allied tanks were deficient compared to German tanks in armour, mobility and armament. This can be seen as in August in Normandy the Germans had about 1,400 various tanks while the Allies had about 6,000. The Allies losses in tanks were about 3:1. Then put in all the allied air and artillery and you get a feel of the problem.

The Russian figures are disputed with wide range but its clear that overall the Germans lost far fewer tanks then the Russians. The Russian loss ratio is probably higher then the West.

Its an interesting question considering the high cost of the Tiger weapon system. Which the writer does discuss.

Overall the tiger, I wish had more description. The battles are well discussed. The maps are extremely good. I hope that other historians that use this book copy him in producing such maps. The book is certainly worth reading if you are interested in this subject.

This book is exactly what the title says it is. Very concise. Doesn't get bogged down in minutia. After reading it, I was amazed at just what was accomplished with these tanks. From other sources, I knew that Tigers and Tiger II's had maintenance problems. In no way did I realize just how extensive these problems were until reading this. Start the day with 45 operational tanks. Drive them 10 miles down a road, and have 6 tanks able to fight. But then attain a 10+ plus kill ration.

The author presents all this information very objectively, which is something I also appreciate.

The Tiger tank was designed and envisioned to be a breakthrough vehicle, leading the attack through enemy defenses and achieving victory on the operational level, much as the Panzer Corps had done in Poland, France, North Africa and Russia. All of those great operational victories had been achieved with the lowly, even obsolete at the time, Panzer III. The Tiger was at the time of its introduction and literally years afterward the most powerful tank on the battlefield, on any battlefield. Yet it never achieved the victories expected of it. What went wrong?

This fine book endeavors to explain what did, in fact, go wrong. From the very introduction of the Tiger in late Summer of 1942 through the end of the war very little went right for the employment of this mighty weapon. Meant to be employed in full battalion strength in operational offensives it rarely was even available in such numbers due to 1) low production and 2) high maintenance requirements and breakdown rates combined with 3) low recovery rates of damaged/broken down Tigers. Further the Germans found themselves on the defensive almost continuously after the disaster at Kursk in July of 1943 and the Tigers were needed in small units, barely units, groups, to counterattack or simply stop enemy armored breakthroughs. And besides, from mid-1943 onward the Germans never mounted much of what would be considered an operational offensive in which the Tiger might have proven itself.

A further reason that the Tiger never achieved its operational purpose was that it was too slow. Having achieved a breakthrough it was too slow to exploit it, even if it were not plagued with a breakdown rate often exceeding 70%. Another problem was that there was never a mine-roller type device designed for the Panzer Korps. This meant that upon encountering mines the usual method of clearing was for the Tiger tank to enter the minefield, blow some up, become disabled, and another Tiger would take the lead. While the tank itself and the crew were usually not damaged its running gear would be and it would be essentially rendered 'hors de combat'. This problem was never solved by the Wehrmacht for some unknown reason.

The Tiger was admirably suited to defensive warfare. Its big 88mm gun could kill nearly any enemy tank at great distances. But its incredibly high breakdown rate led to the majority of Tigers lost having to be destroyed by their own crews because their Tigers would simply stop running (from breakdowns or lack of fuel- they used prodigious amounts to barely get about) and they lacked the ability to easily tow these behemoths back for repair before they were overrun. It amounted to the most powerful warrior on the field having weak ankles and a bad heart.

It is ironic that the finest tank in the war could not achieve what an obsolete little tank achieved. While the Tiger gained a reputation for its own invincibility the Panzer III obtained that reputation for the entire German Army.

This book on Tigers does what so many others fail to do - it provides context and analysis on the success, or lack thereof, of the Tiger tank.

Most other books on the Tiger tend to emphasize the qualities of the tank when it fought at the very tactical tank-on-tank level. This book, while noting the positive aspects of the tank at that level, considers how the tank actually functioned at higher tactical and operational levels. The bottom line - it didn't do that well.

The reason the tank was mediocre is because of its limited operating range and especially its mechanical unreliability. Even on simple road marches of 20-30 miles a number of tanks would break down, which meant that few went into combat. At the same time, once engaged, even full strength battalions would be combat ineffective within days, not due to enemy fire but to breakdowns. This was especially true during defensive actions where, when their lines of communications were threatened and they had to retreat, more Tigers would be destroyed by their own crews than were destroyed by the enemy.

Whether destroyed by the enemy or their own crews the effect was the same. For example, the Tiger battalion with the best kill ratio (1:50) saw the ratio drop to 1:12.8 when the total number of Tigers lost to breakdowns, and then destroyed by their crews, and other causes is also considered. The next best battalion had a kill ratio of 1:19 which drops to 1:7.1 due to the Tigers being destroyed by their own crews and other causes. This meant, and what frequently happened, is that although the allies may have had to confront Tigers when they had no choice, they more frequently attacked weaker units on the Tigers' flanks, forcing them to withdraw and breakdown.

All-in-all an excellent book with great analysis. You cannot understand the Tiger without reading this book.

This book is not a battle history, although it does describe several battles involving the Tigers. Instead, the book focuses more on German armor doctrine, and how the Tigers, both the Tiger I and the later Tiger II, were supposed to have been incorporated into it.

The first two chapters cover heavy tank battalions in general. Background and essays on these battalions, from countries other than Germany are discussed. Also, so the reader can better understand the author's approach, he explains a little about how he wrote the book, how to overcome misconceptions, and understand different levels of warfare. This is followed in Chapter 2 by an actual introduction to the Heavy Tank Battalion. Subjects such as doctrine, organization, equipment and personnel, and tactics are discussed here.

The rest of the story has been broken down by the author not by calendar or campaign, but more by growth and development of the Heavy Tank Battalions. He begins with Army Group North's Tigers, moves to Tunisia, the back to Russia with Army Group Don. It was these campaigns that helped mold the Tiger battalions. It is easy to see how different commanders could have such an impact on the effectiveness of this weapons system. This chapter closes with changes incorporated leading up to and including the battle of Kursk.

The next chapter deals with the "Strategic Defensive," and the Tigers seem to be moving backwards more than forwards here. It is during these retreats that so many Tigers were lost, when they were unable to be recovered by the maintenance platoons. In Italy, we also find what an important factor terrain is, when the Tiger crews found out how debilitating winding mountain roads were to their mounts. The failure to develop adequate recovery equipment to handle the weight of the Tiger is one of the contributing factors to the number of losses.

The last year of the war goes into battles where a small number of Tigers was able to inflict great losses on their enemies, ultimately to no avail. After a look at Operation Bagration, the reader once again goes back to Heavy Tank Battalion 502, and their actions around Dünaburg. Examinations of Tiger combat in Normandy and Poland rounds out this chapter.

The last chapter of combat looks at "The Final Battles," battles that most of us have read about. Hungary, WACHT AM RHEIN, and the Vistula, are examined from the Tiger perspective.

The final chapter, entitled "Assessment and Conclusion" goes well into just that. This is almost the whole point of the book. Did the Tigers accomplish their missions? Did commanders follow doctrine, or where Tigers used merely to shore up morale? A very interesting tool the author uses here is statistics. Charts on Tiger kill ratios and losses are rather interesting.

There are two other parts of this book that will be of interest to anyone interested in WWII armor. One is an analysis of the heavy tank doctrines of the USSR, UK, US, and France. The other consists of the Forward and Epilogue. The forward is written by one of the most well-known Tiger commanders, Otto Carius. Reading his words is a very good way to start this book. At the other end, the epilogue contains writings from two Tiger killers, a Russian and an American.

The book contains a number of photographs of some of the major tank types discussed in the book. Over thirty maps aid the reader in following the various battles.

While I have made every effort to be objective in this review, it is only fair to point out that I am personally associated with the publisher, and that I made the maps for this book. When I began to work on the maps, I had the unedited version of the manuscript, but I was impressed with it even then.

Good book to understand the mythical Tiger tank, how it was employed, what the purpose was behind the design, and the organization of the units that employed it. After reading this book you will understand there is a lot more to tanks than the size of the gun and the thickness of the armor. Tanks require lots of care and maintenance, cost a lot to operate, and need highly trained crews. This book will give the reader a good understanding of how Heer employed the Tiger, and why, and the limitations of tanks and in particular the Tiger tank.

The name "Sledgehammers" seems a little over the top, but it is written well enough. Check it out!