Customer Reviews

Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition)

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Written early in the 20th Century to teach British officers how to wage war against non-European armies in Asia and Africa, "Small Wars" retains its fascination at century's end. In fact, many of its lessons could well be applied to conflicts today.

The author served in the Second Afghan and both Boer Wars, was an assiduous student of warfare around the globe and retired as a Major General after heading the British Army's Intelligence division during the Great War. The breadth of his knowledge is shown by the range of examples that illustrate the principles laid down in his book. The chapter on "Feints", for instance, draws on actions from the Zulu Wars, the Indian Mutiny, the 1821 Wallachian insurrection against the Ottoman Empire, the Second Afghan War, the Kaffir War of 1878, the French occupation of Algeria, the British expedition against Abyssinia in 1868, the siege of Khartoum, the suppression of Riel's revolt in Canada, the war against the Mahdi and a couple of Indian campaigns. Elsewhere, we are presented with the Russians in Central Asia, the French in Tonkin, Dahomey and Madagascar, the U.S. cavalry against the Indians of the Great Plains, the British and French in China, and many more now-obscure imbroglios.

The first several chapters lay down broad strategic principles, most of them flowing from the key insight that regular armies enjoy great tactical advantages over forces inferior in organization, arms, training and discipline but suffer equally great strategic handicaps. In a "small war", therefore, the more "advanced" power can easily lose, due to ignorance of the enemy, failure to formulate clear objectives or, worst of all, the pursuit of military objectives that do not contribute to the conflict's political goal. Erroneous strategy, Callwell warns again and again, leads to desultory, defensive war that exhausts the regulars' resources while merely exasperating rather than subduing their enemy. (The reader may draw his own contemporary parallels.)

After the strategic foundation come discussions of operations and tactics from multiple perspectives: the character of the action (attack, defense, pursuit, retreat, feint, etc.), the terrain on which it is fought, and the types of troops that fight it (including such exotica as camel corps and the not-yet-dominant machine gun). The commander who mastered Callwell's course was prepared to force a mountain pass, assault a Boer laager or Sudanese zeriba, maneuver through a jungle or carry out any of the other varied tasks that circumstances might demand.

Aside from the inherent interest of its variegated subject matter and its appeal to wargamers, "Small Wars" will prove illuminating to the reader who wishes to understand more fully what happened in colonial warfare and how and why European forces won and lost. It is one of those rare works that makes concrete the challenges and achievements of a bygone era.

Long before the term "insurgent" entered the military vocabulary the British had developed a long experience in fighting them during much of the 19th century. Colonel Callwell's book is an excellent source if you want to understand the roots of counterinsurgent warfare in the 20th and 21st centuries. Callwell covers the topic completely from strategy to tactics used against different fighting styles e.g. mounted troops, fanatics, etc. hill and bush warfare, the use of infantry and mounted troops as well as night operations. Callwell supplies good examples accompanied by nice action maps for his subjects. Before reading this book I found it helpful to read "Queen Victoria's Little Wars" by Byron Farwell which gave me a much better appreciation of entire small wars from which Callwell takes his examples. If you are doing an indepth study of insurgent warfare this is a must, but if your time is limited you might want to come back to it and move on to more contemporary readings first.

The author is one of the earliest and most influential writers on counter-insurgency. He was a British military officer writing to teach junior officers on how to defeat non-European forces. While many of his tactics seem rather tough and barbaric, one must be careful to judge him by the standards of his time (early 20th century), not by the whims of today. If one is able to look past many of tougher stances, like destroying the food and water sources of uncooperative local citizens, there is quite a bit worth learning. The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940 owes much to this work. While more modern counter-insurgency writers have overshadowed Caldwell's teachings, he still deserves credit for being one of the first to record the lessons and basic tenets of counter-insurgency. It is amazing the see how little has changed and how well this book holds up. I understand why this book is still required reading at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

I bought this book because it appeared to fill in the void of my knowledge on colonial wars. The author has clearly stated that all of his examples used to illustrate his principles will be that of properly formed armies versus irregular native troops (the Boers are an exception). Thus, the American War of Independence is excluded but surprisingly, several examples from the European Vendee rebellion are also included. The author's style is to state principles, followed by a litany of examples to illustrate his point. He cites many unknown engagements as examples but many of these examples lack firm details. A textual description apparently suffices as examples. The same examples could be used to illustrate other points. I found this approach rather boring and it began to read like a manual to me. On the plus side, there were some examples with more details given, including a sketch map which livened the proceedings somewhat. Douglas Porch provides a neat introduction into the background of Col Callwell, including the fact that he had numerous entries selected for the Encyc. Brittanica. Except for the one on Guerrilla warfare for which the editors selected TE Lawrence. I can see why - Callwell wrote from the perspective of the formed troops - Lawrence wrote from that of the guerrillas.

This is one of those historical works that has morphed into a genuine and valid classic. There really is nothing new under the sun when it comes to human behavior, of which warfare of a small and unconventional nature is a very ingrained behavior.

The nuances of small wars as depicted in the manual are as reliable and valid now as it was when first published. Sure, technology changes, which alters specific tactical applications, but strategy and long term outcome remains the same.

What I find interesting is the vast majority of US Military Field Manuals, Tactical Circulations and Marine Corps Fleet Manuals are mostly versions of rewritten older manuals using a language that fits the new technological advances and the political/social norm-changes of the times.

The actual human tactical and strategic applications of human males in war remain relatively constant, which this manual clearly explicates when we read it with care and understanding both the context in which the book was written and the current context of 2011 in the USA and the global network.

The book is a significant work that needs studied if one is a true student and practitioner of small wars. "To under stand the new we must first study the old," remains true to form in this book.

Every career soldier and military "expert" should read Callwell's book and absorb its lessons. Callwell has influenced the architects of our current counterinsurgency doctrine, and if we heed his admonitions, then we just might find our way out of the mess we've gotten ourselves into. I wish I had read this book prior to leaving for Vietnam as a young infantry officer.

Col. Callwell wrote an exhaustive study of the tactics and strategies of guerrilla warfare and insurgency... a hundred years ago. Because of this, it is utterly unacceptable in delicate and sensitive company, as it assumes that the reader implicitly accepts the empire and its colonies as the norm.

But if you are neither delicate nor sensitive, and have an abidding interest in the theory and practice of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, stability and support operations, and all the rest of those various names for what fall under the collective term "small wars".

Col. Callwell discusses strategy and tactics in the greatest imaginable detail, with extensive examples for every point. He starts with overarching principles like the need for robust logisitics and intelligence and the imperative to be flexible and not be limited to conventional formations and doctrine. He addresses in detail the impact of terrain, vegetation, and local culture on operations. The attention to the need for security and to night operations was fairly innovative for the time, and hinted at the commando tactics that were going to emerge only a decade or so after this book was published.

One of the most telling lessons of the whole book is "deal not with a hostile army, but with a hostile population", a premise that is often forgotten by militaries prepared for symmetrical, national armies.

The only drawback with this work is that it is written from the perspective of an imperial officer dealing with colonies. As tempting as punitive operations may be, they are effectively banned by the Geneva accords and international law. And many other aspects of this work are no longer acceptable when the jaundiced eye of the 24 hour news cycle rests upon our military, and every viewer can voice their opinion of what they thought they were seeing on the internet.

A comprehensive study with great vignettes to illustrate each major point, and meticulous attention to detail from an era unencumbered by PowerPoint and instantaneous communication. An excellent historical document with valid lessons for today.

E.M. Van Court

Colonel Callwell's book is a "must" for any student of military history and also practicing members of the armed forces. The wealth of detail and the numerous references to actual events and the ability to clearly convey the concept of how to manage such operations. I return to this volume constantly.

More than a century later, it is still a classic detailed study of irregular warfare. It is interesting and instructive with insights into modern warfare years ahead of the 4th generation warfare proving grounds of the 20th and 21st century. For the case study approach to real conflicts, this book is worth the price and worth keeping to re-read on later occasions.