Customer Reviews

The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War

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This work figured prominently in my research of the First Gulf War, or Iran-Iraq War, which I am focusing on during this quarter of my Masters studies. Workman concisely explains how Saddam's Ba'thist regime shook with insecurity as Khomeini's revolutionary Islamic Republic seized power, and why Saddam's reasons for invading Iran on 22 September 1980 went much deeper than a border dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Workman explores the role of oil, the rocky relationship between Saddam and the Shah, and the destabilizing effect the Kurds had on the region.

Workman also presents a very convincing and well-supported explanation as to why the war lasted so many years. To put it briefly, if not to oversimplify, both regimes found it advantageous politically to continue fighting. Each side exploited the war to consolidate their rule by drumming up patriotism, nationalism, and religious fervor behind their respective regimes. In turn, they each labeled their internal opposition as traitors and collaborators with the enemy. The war was very useful to both sides. Workman includes excellent quotes from both Khomeini's and Saddam's radio addresses as well as many other primary and secondary references.

May I suggest another book to round out study of this war. "The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum" by Stephen C. Pelletiere, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992. This work presents a very clear picture from the military perspective, both tactics and strategy (or lack thereof). Pelletiere makes a convincing argument that Iran was finished after Karbala V (January 1987), in which Iran lost 70,000 to only 10,000 Iraqi casualties. Waning public support, an unwinnable "Tanker War" (against the U.S. Navy), and an inability to reform the way it prosecuted war brought Khomeini and his regime reluctantly to cease-fire.