Customer Reviews

Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics

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If you don't read a lot, and especially if you did not read the author's two extraordinary works on "Understanding International Relations" and "The Paradox of American Power,", this is the book for you. This is a dumbed down inexplicit version of his more carefully documented ideas from the earlier books, and especially the second one.

I do want to emphasize that this book is worth reading if you only have time for one book (or you could read all my reviews instead--they are free), because I am going to be severely critical of the book in a professional sense.

First, this book does not focus at all on the most important soft power of all, that of a strategic culture. Others have documented how North Vietnam whipped the United States, not with firepower, but with political will deeply rooted in a strategic culture that was superior to that of the United States of America.

Second, despite the author's earlier service as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, the book gives cursory attention to intelligence reform, and does not mention, at all, open source intelligence (disclosure: my pet rock). It is especially weak in failing to point out that the Department of State's one chance to be effective within US politics and the US policy arena lies with its potential dominance of legally and ethically available information in 29+ languages. The Department of State has chosen to be ineffective and ignorant in this area of collecting, translating, and interpreting to the American public all that we need to know about the real world, and if and when Colin Powell goes to the World Bank, which has transformed itself into a knowledge organization (see Stephen Denning, World Bank KM manager before he became world-famous story-teller, "The Springboard: How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era Organizations", he is going to rue the day he failed to kick off a $125M budget for OSINT under State control.

Third, the book lacks substance in the sense of effective examples. A simple illustration: $100M can buy a Navy ship of war or an Army brigade with tanks and artillery (two forms of hard power) or it can buy 1,000 diplomats or 10,000 Peace Corps volunteers or a water desalination plant capable of distilling 100M cubic meters of fresh water a year (three forms of soft power), or it can buy one day of war over water (the typical failure cost of hard power).

The book has exactly one paragraph on corporate misbehavior, which as William Greider has documented in "The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy", is the most evil and destructive form of "soft power." This is a severe oversight.

The book neglects foreign aid in a strategic context, and shows no appreciation for open spectrum, open source software, and open source intelligence, the triad of the new global open society. There is no hint of how a Digital Marshall Plan might be the most powerful "soft power" device every conceived.

The book neglects non-governmental organizations, with no mention of the organizations that are giving soft power a whole new dimension today (the European Centre for Conflict Prevention or ECCP, for example) and the book makes no mention of the "good" side of religious activism, the soft power so ably articulated by Dr. Doug Johnson in his two seminal works on faith-based diplomacy and religion as the missing dimension in statecraft.

Finally, while the book makes useful reference to some Pew polls on global attitudes, they struck me more as space fillers than core reference material--four pages where one would do--and do not reflect the more valued-based and multi-dimensional near-real-time direct citizen surveying such as characterizes the next generation of surveying instruments (e.g. Zarca Interactive, whose DC area chief describes it as a tool for real time democracy).

This leads to my last comment: this book, perhaps deliberately so, but I suspect not, is out of touch with mainstream scholarship such as the last 50 books I have reviewed for Amazon. It is one massive "Op-Ed", and its sources are virtually all "Op-Eds" (a number of them not written by the purported authors), with the result that this book gets an A for a good idea and a C-, at best, for scholarship. One simple example: the sum total of the author's references on "virtual communities", one of the most important ideas of this century, is one Op-Ed from the Baltimore Sun. There is no mention of the book by the same title written by Howard Rheingold, arguably the most talented chronicler in America if not the world of how this non-state communitas is changing the world.

Joe Nye has my vote as the new voice of reason within the Democratic circles, but he needs to be balanced by the Jonathan Schell, William Greider, Herman Daly, Paul Ray, and other European and Asian scholars. The world has gotten too complicated to be addressed by Op-Eds out of Harvard. It is time we got serious about harnessing the distributed intelligence of the Whole Earth, and we can start right here at Amazon, where most of the books not cited by this book have been reviewed by many people whose views, in the aggregate, are vastly more informed than the views of either the White House or its intelligence purveyors.

We all know what "hard" power is: You can make someone do whatever you want them to do . . . either by coercion or by intimidation backed up by the potential for coercion. What is "soft" power? That's the subject that Kennedy School dean Joseph S. Nye, Jr. explores in this interesting book.

Dean Nye originally coined the term "soft power" so he's a good person to develop the concept. He sees government power coming from three sources: Military power; economic power; and soft power. Military power is all bout coercion, deterrence and protection through threats and force. Government pursues this path through war, coercive diplomacy, and alliances. Economic power is the carrot and the stick enforced through payments and sanctions. Payments take the form of aid and bribes, and sanctions can be anything from boycotts to interdictions.

Soft power looks at the other hand from the gloved fist: Attraction and agenda setting. Countries use their values, culture, policies and institutions to make inroads as applied through various forms of diplomacy.

These themes are explored in the context of the Cold War, the policies of the Clinton and two Bush administrations, and the war on terror. In making his arguments, Dean Nye addresses philosophical arguments made by conservative and neo-conservative thinkers who favor the fist in all situations (including unilateral action), and provides examples of what has and has not worked.

Dean Nye's basic point is that a country should use both its hard and its soft power to obtain the best results. He analyzes what this means for the major countries in the world in specifics (the choices for Finland are a lot different than for the United States or Japan).

Of particular relevance for the current moment is the data he provides on the costly erosion in soft power that the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq have created for the United States. People still like the United States outside of the U.S. but most of them don't trust us any more . . . and they like us a lot less than they did two years ago. They often don't feel that we ever consider their interests. The problem is most severe in the Muslim world. Dean Nye points out that these problems are as bad as they were at the worst of the Vietnam quagmire, but that we can recover. He argues persuasively for reinstating more people-to-people contacts, operating from democratic principles in dealing with all other countries, developing alliances and consensus before taking military and economic action, and sharing all parts of our culture with the citizens of other countries through "open" exchanges.

Those who are appalled by the Iraq war will be very attracted by this book. It provides concrete suggestions to the alternative of just working with the United Nations when problems arise and hoping that all will be well. Those who think we did the right thing with our invasion will hate this book a lot.

Regardless of your stance on Iraq, I hope that both presidential candidates will heed the lessons of this book. We've gotten away from what helped us be successful in the Cold War. Those lessons need to be reapplied today to meet the new global challenges.

Soft Power, by Joseph Nye, Jr., is an interesting publication that blends together contemporary events and brief American history lessons to support his theme that America?s success in its war on terrorism must rely on properly balancing two types of power. The first is hard power, which Mr. Nye identifies as a state?s ability to use economic or military might to force other nations to comply with particular sanctions or directives. Mr. Nye declares that many in our government have mistaken this power as the only wielding influence that can be used to attain victory during times of war and that the other type of power is often ignored or never acknowledged. This second type of power, whose identification has been introduced and coined by Mr. Nye, is soft power. Soft power, which ?arises from the attractiveness of a country?s culture, political ideals, and policies? is the ability of that country to persuade other nations to share its objectives or desired outcomes.

At the introduction, Mr. Nye acknowledges that hard power, through force, can be used to conquer one state or, at most, a few states in the name of fighting terrorism. However, he asserts that it, alone, cannot create an international cooperation of governments to hunt down every person who serves as a threat to world peace. This latter objective, Mr. Nye proclaims, can be met by merging the coercive presence of hard power with the persuasive influences of soft power and that this combination is an effective approach to forming a coalition of nations. To draw a bold line of distinction between hard power, by itself, and the union of hard and soft power, Joseph Nye quotes Newt Gingrich, who comments that the measuring rod of success is not how many enemies are killed but, instead, how many allies are gathered.

Throughout the book, Nye reinforces that the overarching goal for America to effectively enact and establish its policies is to make the ideals of the United States as attractive as possible to the rest of the world. Though this extraordinary aim might be hailed as unrealistic, at worst, or as idealistic and Jeffersonian, at best, Nye contends, notwithstanding, that this intention is being panned because opponents misread it as appearing too soft. He subsequently reaffirms that the spread of any ideal is not often dependent upon hard or soft power, exclusively, but the proper melding of the two.

To support why soft power is so important, Nye states that it can be used in capacities that hard power cannot and identifies tools in which it can be put into effect. For example, broadcast capabilities and the internet can enhance communication strategies to spread democratic sentiments to other parts of the world. Also, soft power can be an aid in establishing peaceful relations among countries; for instance, programs established to send civilians such as doctors, teachers, and entertainers abroad to provide the types of services that other nations are seeking are powerful, positive overtures for democracy.

Intermittently, Nye states that the effective use of hard and soft power will come to fruition if the goals are properly stated. He cites instances of key shortcomings, the most recent of which pertains to the War in Iraq. Though the United States is criticized from an international perspective for going into war without U.N. consent, Nye states that on the domestic front, there was no solidarity on why the U.S. troops had to engage in combat. He blames this lack of cohesion on the Bush team, who used a wide variety of themes that appealed to so many different groups to the degree that no unifying consensus was ever reached.

Not only does Nye criticize the Bush White House for not properly enforcing hard and soft power, he also places a notable burden of responsibility on the Clinton administration. Nye highlights that a critical mistake that weakened U.S. soft power was the decision of Clinton and Congress to cut budgets and staff for cultural diplomacy and exchanges by almost thirty percent after 1993. How might this be regarded as weakening? Nye points out that knowledge is power and by failing to maintain closer lines of communication with the states concerned, we reduce our ability to select relevant themes and modify our short-term and long-term goals so as to establish and maintain stable relations.

Soft Power, overall, is a very interesting read that cites themes that argue how our U.S. government needs to invest more of its budget in the State Department in order to exercise not just hard or soft power, but smart power. For those interested in other types of power mentioned in war and politics that are synonymous with, if not identical to, hard power and soft power, another interesting book about power is Steven Brams? Theory of Moves. Brams does not use the words hard power and soft power; instead, he applies the terms threat power and moving power, both of which run on a respective, game theory parallel to the aforementioned.

In essence, this book presents an introduction to, if not a popularization of, a system of principles of international relations that Nye and others have been espousing since the early 1990's. As such, it is a good introduction to those principles. However, like all popularizations, it can be misinterpreted, which is the case with a previous review.

Nye's approach is not merely diplomacy, although diplomacy may play a part in it (just as diplomacy may play a part in 'hard power'). So to say, as a previous reviewer did, that diplomacy might not "work" misses the point of Nye's thesis.

In all cases "power" is the projection of a particular viewpoint. It is the means of that projection that Nye wants us to consider.

Nye argues here for a balance between 'soft' methods, such as using multilateralism, cultural connections, economic persuasion through prosperity, etc., and the 'hard' methods of direct military and economic action. Nye presents a case that this sort of balance is more effective in producing long-term willing partners than are unilateralist 'hard' methods alone - which he asserts tend to coerce a begrudging short-term obedience rather than alter the will of the target.

Whether you agree or disagree that this is a formula for success, there is no doubt that as an approach it is different from the current adminstration, which has been notably unsuccessful in its projection of American power.

In addition to presenting a simplified version of these principles, this book also contains specific criticisms of the approach of the current administration, as well as an implicit criticism of the whole 'neo-conservative' agenda. This is probably the reason for the appearance of the book at this time.

As I mentioned, "Soft Power" presents in some respects a simplification of a more nuanced system of international relations. Nye's system is presented by him in more detail in his previous book, "The Paradox of American Power", which I strongly recommend to anyone who wants to go into greater depth on this subject.

Joseph Nye is a renowned foreign policy expert and former government official, and some of his previous books have been highly erudite and influential. Therefore one has to wonder about the lack of depth or detailed discussion in this particular book, which was either written for the (very) general reader or was tossed off quickly without the proper amount of research effort. Nye's basic premise is strong enough. Soft power is the ability to encourage, rather than force, other political entities to contribute to your best interests, and the best way to succeed in world politics is to smartly mix soft power with hard power - a tactic that has fallen by the wayside in very recent American history. But beyond that serviceable premise, this book is poorly written and lacks a truly authoritative voice.

The concept of soft power is not very wide-ranging, and this subject matter would be presented better in a short but hard-hitting journal article. And while this book only has 147 pages of text, it still feels padded with flimsy examples and repetitive explanations of the basic concept. Nye has a particular problem with formulating believable examples to support his argument. For instance, the fact that AIDS originated in Africa and SARS originated in Asia is used as evidence that America is not dominant in globalization (yes you read that correctly), and pop culture items are supposedly filled with "subliminal" messages about American lifestyles (Nye may have meant "subtle"). Another problem with this book is that quantities of cultural and political accomplishments are often used in arguments about the quality of soft power exercised by America and other nations. And finally, Nye is capable of far more in-depth analysis on current events than the rather shallow punditry that he has written here. [~doomsdayer520~]

Nye's contributions to international politics have a rich legacy - including the introduction of "complex interdependence" (Power and Interdependence, with Robert Keohane) in the 1970s, the optimistic perspective on U.S. prospects in the world (Bound to Lead, 1990) while others wrote Japan as Number One and The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, and the post-September 11 call for multilateralism rather than imperialism (Paradox of American Power, 2002).

"Winning the Peace" (Robert Orr, 2004) requires success in establishing security, governance and political participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. Nye reminds us that these necessary tasks are more possible with soft power than with diplomatic, economic and military coercion. To Nye, soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction, particularly to a country's culture, ideals and policies, rather than through coercion or purchase. The most effective foreign policy will use "smart power" - the right balance of (hard) command power and (soft) co-optive power.

The discussion illuminates the high cost the United States pays (in Iraq and elsewhere) for relying, by choice or by lack of options, on hard power. Questions for undergrads might include: (1) why does soft power matter if U.S.'s hard power is so much greater than any other country, (2) when and why did the decline of the U.S.'s soft power really begin, (3) does soft power matter against ideological extremists, (4) can we compare "soft power" in international affairs to domestic elections, (5) is there a relationship between the U.S. loss of soft power and the global spread of democracy since 1974, and (6) what other countries, organizations, etc. have global or wide "soft power"?

For shorter assignments, see Nye's "The Decline of America's Soft Power" in Foreign Affairs, May-June 2004.

"Soft power" is flying over the sky. This idea is used in lectures, seminars and conferences. You may hear that Japan wants to increase its soft power by promoting sushi and comics. India desires to increase its soft power by boosting Bollywood movies. Indeed, "soft power" is not only an academic term, but also a cool phrase right now.

Nye redefines power in hard and soft power. Military capability and economic strength are hard power; cultural influence and political values are soft power. In Soft Power - The Means to Success in World Politics, Nye outlines the sources, strengths and weaknesses of soft power. In writing his conclusion, Nye believes that the United States has to use power more smartly by exercising both hard and soft power.

Nevertheless, it seems that the European Union and China are using soft power better than the United States in this moment. The European Union shares the same aim with the United States, but using soft power to achieve its goal rather than American's hard power. China is creating its soft power, but this soft power is different form Nye's one.

Nye criticizes that the United States did not use its soft power well in the Gulf War and the war on terrorism. It is absolutely true. But what is the reason behind? Why does the United States (especially under the Bush's administration) ignore the importance of soft power? Indeed, it is very easy to answer this question from the realist or the hawkish perspective. Just because using hard power is the fastest way to achieve national goal. Let's look at Nye's comparison on hard and soft power, "...soft power resources are slower, more diffuse and more cumbersome to wield than hard power resources" (p.100). Indeed, soft power is only the second choice of the superpower, but it is always the first choice of the regional powers such as the European Union and China.

The European Union, without any formidable military force, in order to expand its influence and achieve its goal, the only way is to build up soft power. It is interesting that both the United States and the European Union want to promote the ideas of democracy and human rights around the world. But the United States tends to achieve its goal by hard power such as war and economic sanction, while the European Union insists on using soft power such as cultural exchange and multilateral negotiation (recently the expansion of the European Union is regarded as one of the forms of soft power - transformative power). As Nye admits that the European Union is more attractive than the United States nowadays, and the United States is blamed for its double standards on the issues of human rights (prisoner of war in Iraq) and nuclear proliferation (Bush promised to provide India with nuclear technology although India has not signed the Non-proliferation Treaty yet).

Since the rise of China has become a hot debate, the Chinese leaders acknowledge that building up soft power is the only way to solve the tensions and suspicions between China and its neighboring countries. Thus, China's soft power is not cultural, but it is practical. It is clear that cultural element such as Confucianism, democracy and human rights are not on the Chinese selling list, the selling items are practical in nature such as respecting every nation's sovereignty, denying intervention on other nation's internal policy, and developing economic prosperity among neighboring countries.

In contrast, Chinese soft power is built for strategic necessities (or for regime security) in practical terms, while the soft power of European Union is built for ideology in cultural terms.

Indeed, it is easier for China to promote its soft power than the United States and the European Union. It is because both the United States and the European Union are selling their own values, and these values may not be easily accepted by various countries. Nye quoted the President of Iran in his book, "The new world order and globalization that certain powers are trying to make us accept, in which the culture of the entire world is ignored, looks like a kind of neocolonialism" (p.40). However, China is now selling the common interest among nations, when China addresses that every nation's internal policy should be respected and should not be intervened by foreign powers, this notion really attracts the Arabic countries and the countries in Southeast Asia. When China calls for multilateral cooperation in foreign affairs, this also attracts the potential great powers such as Russia, India and the European Union who are disappointed with the American's unilateralism. More importantly, Nye notices that "To a large extent, international order is a public good - something everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to others. Of course, pure public goods are rare. And sometimes things that look good to Americans may not look good to everyone else, and that is why consultation is important" (p.61).

In sum, hard power politics reflects the will of great power or superpower, but soft power politics reflects the international public good. I guess China's soft power will win over the American and European soft power in the coming decades. It is because there is no "clash of value" in China's soft power, but there are "clashes of values" between "the west and the rest of the world" as what Huntington said.

Soft power is a very fascinating concept, but in terms of stability, peace and the suspicions of "the rest of the world", is it better to have mutual understanding and cultural assimilation rather than "power" in soft manner?

It was Mao Zedong who said, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." I doubt that President Bush and the neoconservatives around him would admit that that's where their view of America's role in the world comes from, but that's certainly the direction in which they have taken us.

Joseph Nye, Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, believes that hard power, the kind of coercion that comes from wielding guns and economic leverage, is only half the story. He argues that soft power, the ability to attract others and persuade them of the validity and desirability of our values and way of life is equally important, in fact vital to the interests of the United States at this point in time. That's the point he systematically develops and demonstrates in this short book.

I found the book balanced, clear and convincing. If anything, I felt it was overly diplomatic and balanced--just the kind of nuanced thinking that hawks love to bash. I can just hear the neocons chortling about the very idea of soft power.

At the very end of the book, Nye writes, "In short, America's success will depend upon our developing a better balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy. That will be smart power. We have done it before; we can do it again."

Now smart power, mayble that's an idea the neocons can get behind.

Robert Adler, author of Science Firsts: From the Creation of Science to the Science of Creation; and Medical Firsts: From Hippocrates to the Human Genome

As a beginning student of international relations, I found this book to be of great assistance. Professor Nye accurately and honestly critiques the Bush Administration's actions on the world stage and the theories behind them. In a social and political milieu that has been dominated by neoconservatism for much of the past six years, it was refreshing to read a different point of view so ardently put forth. After reading this book, one can clearly see the danger that America faces if we continue down the path of unilateralism and continue to unabashedly embrace the concept of an "American empire." As this book argues with excellent clarity, we must return to the combination of hard and soft power that constructed and cemented the international alliances which defeated communism and prepared much of Eastern Europe for democracy.

Great book! There is no question that military power is important for every country, but the "soft power" and diplomacy are perhaps as important in today's globalized and inter-connected world.

While Joseph Nye focuses on the United States in his book, diplomats and politicians around the world can learn a great deal about "smart" international relations, diplomacy, politics, and global legitimacy and credibility from "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics."