The Soldiers' Story: Soviet Veterans Remember the Afghan War (Research Series (University of California, Berkeley International and Area Studies)) [Paperback]

Anna Heinamaa (Author), Maija Leppanen (Author), Yuri Yurchenko (Author)

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Language Notes

Text: English (translation)
Original Language: Finnish

Product Details

• Paperback: 131 pages
• Publisher: Univ of California Intl & (October 1994)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0877251908
• ISBN-13: 978-0877251903
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6 x 0.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 8.8 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #5,019,841 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A Series of Revealing Vignettes, November 13, 2001

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Tom F - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Soldiers' Story: Soviet Veterans Remember the Afghan War (Research Series (University of California, Berkeley International and Area Studies)) (Paperback)

With recent world events, I thought this book might prove interesting. Some have even taken to looking at the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in a new light--casting them as protagonists. This book contains about a dozen personal accounts from Russian soldiers who served in Afghanistan during various periods of the war. A typical section starts with "My name is..." followed by when the soldier served and a description of his unit or duty. Each account ranges from about 6 to 20 pages. Those who are looking for a broad view of the war, or even military tactics will be disappointed. The real focus is on the day to day life of soldiers (not officers) completing their Afghan tour of duty. There are several common themes that run through all the accounts. First is the bitter hatred that almost all Soviet soldiers felt toward the officers appointed over them. This disdain was directed toward platoon commanders all the way to the top. The general consensus was that officers ("jackals") in the Soviet military were only operating in Afghanistan for their own self-interest. Officers would trade unit supplies, including weapons, to local Afghan merchants (or even guerillas) for consumer items such as blue jeans and tape players. These items would then be smuggled into the Soviet Union and sold on the black market for profit. Other contentious points between officers and enlisted included the unfairness of the military award system and the general lack of human respect shown by officers toward their soldiers. The second common theme was the lack of training Soviet soldiers had. Frequently they were given less than half the usual six months of basic training. Some soldiers never fired more than a few rounds, or even participated in squad level exercises. This lack of training was further compounded by the fact that many soldiers were shipped to Afghanistan to fill jobs that they were not originally trained to perform. The third common theme is the lack of a professional non-commisioned officer (NCO) corps in the Soviet army. Most soldiers were on two year conscriptions, and a pecking order based on seniority was the prevailing chain of command. A "junior" (under one year of service) was basically held in servitude by the "short-timers" (three to six months of service remaining). In between, a soldier was considered a "pheasant", not entitled to the privleges of a short-timer, but not quite as abused as a junior. The striking thing in several accounts was the brutality of the short-timers toward juniors. There were systematic beatings and a general atmosphere of terror prevailed. The officers tolerated this behavior, and generally kept better relations with short-timers in order to maintain control over the enlisted. The fourth theme was how poorly Soviet soldiers were supplied in Afghanistan. It seems that one of the first things that a junior experienced upon arrival was the pilfering of his personal supplies by short-timers. Additionally, food and uniforms were either inadequate or in short supply. The only thing not in short supply were weapons and ammunition. There are several other common themes, but these are the ones I remember off-hand. The conclusion that one can draw is that the Soviets were doomed to lose this conflict, and for reasons mainly internal to their own way of operating. It's clear that, with the exception of Spetznez and other special operations forces, the Soviets are incapable of fighting effectively in small unit actions of less than battalion size. Most of the reasons for this are revealed in the reading--poor training, rigid thought processes, an inexperienced conscript army with no NCO leadership, poor supply, and a lack of a clear objective for soldiers to work toward. Overall, this book captures the general sense of savagery and hopelessness that soldiers felt in Afghanistan. It is similar, in many respects, to some of the more pessimistic accounts given by veterans of the Vietnam war. It does an equally effective job of indicting the Soviet army and the war in Afghanistan. In fact, I think it may be more interesting as a guide to how the Soviet army operated at the small unit level than as a collection of personal histories of the Afghan war. One caveat--it seems that the authors had a definite agenda when assembling this book, and there isn't much balance to the given accounts. There's almost nothing positive mentioned about anything to do with army life or the war, but this does seem to be the majority opinion.