Customer Reviews

Solferino 1859: The battle for Italy's Freedom (Campaign)

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Having been looking forward to the publication of Osprey's new campaign title, I was deeply disappointed with the result. The author obviously didn't take the pains to consult German sources (not even secondary ones), thus producing a completely one-sided account. Moreover, Brooks keeps on repeating stereotypes, makes several factual errors and shows a pitiful lack of understanding of the Austrian army of the period. His very limited range of sources can also be seen in the illustrations, most of which again only represent the French/Italian perspective. Even though the maps and the battlescenes by Peter Dennis are very well-done as usual, the worth of this publication is at best doubtful. Unfortunately Osprey missed a great chance by not letting one of their accomplished writers, like David Hollins, Ian Castle or Simon Millar, familiar with German/Austrian sources, write this book.

It's refreshing to read a book about French military prowess and élan actually pulling off a victory and Solferino 1859 by Richard Brooks is that book. Unabashedly pro-French at times, this volume in Osprey's Campaign series still brings one of the long-forgotten battles of the mid-Nineteenth Century to life in vivid detail. The volume covers the entire campaign, involving France and Sardinia against Austria fought on the north Italian plain. While the war barely lasted two months, the author does a superb job pointing out its wider implications, ranging from technological innovations to changing tactical methods. Overall, this volume is well-researched (at least from the French side) and quite well-written and is one of the finer titles in the series.

Solferino 1859 is a very handsome volume in Osprey's campaign series, beginning with its eye-catching cover depicting French Zouaves and Chasseurs a pied in combat. This volume is very well supported by six 2-D maps (Italian campaign: theater of war and opening moves; the action at Montebello, 20 May 1859; the Allied turning movement, 28 May - 2 June; the Battle of Magenta, 4 June; the Battle of Solferino, approach to contact; the Sardinian assault on San Martino, 24 June) and three 3-D BEV maps (Magenta: the French pincers close in; French breakthrough at Solferino; the French stand on the Campo di Medole). The three richly-detailed color battle scenes by Peter Dennis are: street fighting in Magenta; French rifled field guns in action at Solferino, and an Austrian cavalry charge at Solferino. Both the French and Austrian uniforms are very colorful and shown to great affect in these battle scenes. The author also provides a short bibliography and three pages of notes on the battlefield today.

The volume begins with a short but very pithy three-page introduction that aptly sums up the causes of the war and what each side hoped to achieve. The only disappointment in Solferino 1859 was the unusually short sections on opposing commanders and opposing forces, which barely total 7 pages. For example, the author does not provide any background on four of the five French corps commanders at Solferino. He does mention French artillery modernizations which contributed to their victory at Solferino, and their talent for skirmishing, but the Austrians and Sardinians are skimmed over quickly. The four-page order of battle is very detailed and goes down to battalion-level. The author also gives short shrift to the section on opposing plans and says that, "none of the three armies in the Italian campaign conducted the war in accordance with any consistent strategic scheme or plan." This is a bit too simplistic, given that the French movements of entire army corps by sea from Algeria and Toulon and then by the Italian rail system must have required considerable planning to have pulled off so smoothly and efficiently. Furthermore, while the Austrian logistics were consistently poor, the French were able to operate an army of almost 100,000 men in Italy and keep them fed and equipped.

The campaign narrative proper covers 64 pages and begins with the fumbled Austrian effort to crush Sardinia-Piedmont before French intervention could arrive, then the arrival of the first three French corps at Genoa. Once the Allied forces were united and blocking the path to Turin, the Austrians began to back-pedal and the author covers several minor actions and the Battle of Magenta on 4 June 1859. Deciding to retreat toward their quadrilateral fortresses, the Austrians withdrew eastward but then reversed direction to take on the pursuing Allies near Solferino. The author neatly divides the action into three main chunks: the Sardinian attack in the north, the French breakthrough in the center and the French holding action in the south. The author sensibly makes good use of small tables to provide data on casualties and forces engaged. Period artwork and photos of the terrain today complement the text.

The author sees three main reasons for the Austrian defeat at Solferino: their lack of a central reserve, poor offensive spirit and the unsuitability of the terrain for defense. Throughout the book, the author contrasts the fatal indecision and incompetence of the Austrian commanders versus the take-charge attitude of the French commanders. Given that these commanders include Marshalls MacMahon and Bazainne and the Emperor Napoleon III - well known for indecision in the Franco-Prussian War eleven years later - this portrayal is remarkable. In a nutshell, better French weapons, better leadership, better troop spirit and a bit of luck enabled the French to run rings around the larger Austrian army and achieve most of their objectives in a short campaign. The author then points out the implications of the war, such as the first use of railroads to move troops for operational purposes and the creation of the Red Cross. This book makes an excellent introduction to a study on the evolution of mid-Nineteenth Century tactics, particularly those interested in the technological and tactical aspects of the American Civil War (plus those readers who love Zouave uniforms). The author is probably unduly harsh at times on the Austrians - they did succeed in inflicting heavy casualties on the French and it was no easy win - but no matter how you slice it, their battlefield performance was poor in 1859 and again in 1864 and again in1866.

The Kingdom of Sardinia saw the wide scale European uprisings of 1848 as an opportunity to drive the weakened Austrians out of northern Italy. However, their dreams were soon dashed by the skilled generalship of Field Marshal Joseph Radetsky. For the next decade, Sardinia licked its wounds and searched for a big friend whom they could take to their fight with Austria. The support of the ambitious Napoleon III allowed Sardinia in 1859 to provoke the Austrians into a foolish invasion. The Austrians ill conceived attack was the critical event that led to the eventual political reunification of the Italian Peninsula.

"Solferino 1859" is a well written account of the campaign waged on the plains of Lombardy with its culmination at the twin bloody battles of Magenta and Solferino. In 1859, most military observors believed France had the best army in Europe and Austria, the second best. The Prussian Army was seen as little more than a well organized militia. Ten years later, both France and Austria's martial reputations would be in serious decline after the drubbings they received at the hands the Prussians. The seeds of their perciptious declines can be clearly seen in this campaign. At the end of day, the French and Sardinians are the victors not because of any great strategic or tactical skill. They win because they are just slightly more competent than their incompetent Austrian foes.

When reading any book in the Osprey Campaign Series, one never knows what they are going to get. Sometimes, the volumes are a really well written and a pleasure to read. Other times, they can be excrutiatingly boring and pedantic. Fortunately, Richard Brooks is a good writer and "Solferino 1859" is an easy to follow account of the campaign. However, what keeps me from giving this review five stars is that Brooks does not do a good job of selling the story. Why should a reader invest the time and money into reading an account of a campaign whose hallmarks were blunders and overall mediocrity? As a military campaign, the Franco Austrian struggle was unremarkable. But as a political story, Sardinia's use of France to help launch the Risorgimento is a fascinating tale. "Solferino 1859" would have worked better if Richard Brooks could have found a way to integrate the politics into the campaign.

Solferino is one of those battles that few people know anything about, except maybe who won, yet it led inexorably to the unification of Italy and the new style of warfare demonstrated in the American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, not to mention being an interesting battle in its own right. Richard Brooks does an able job of bringing this little known action to light. He covers the whole 1859 campaign, including Magenta and several minor actions, as well as Solferino; the result is a "campaign" book and not just a "battle" book.

The book is well written and ably supported by excellent maps. I don't know why so many otherwise excellent military histories suffer from totally inadequate maps, but this is not a problem with Osprey books. The maps, with the way they help explain and supplement the narrative, are probably the best part of the book. Brooks sets the stage for the campaign well in a minimum number of pages, gives a detailed (and very necessary) order of battle, and then dives into the action. The book flows along, with the author again setting the stage (both strategically and with a description of the battlefield) for the actual battles, which are covered in sufficient detail that I felt I really understood them. This includes a number of minor incidents that adds some depth to the necessarily short narrative. He is, after all, limited to 96 pages.

The are some problems, the most notable being identification of the brigades and divisions. They are named after their commanders, but casualties among the officers (and some promotions) meant that they often changed names. The author is not always consistent about whether he uses the new name or the old one in the text and sometimes the names on the maps don't match up either. This means you have to keep going back to the order of battle (which goes from being useful to essential) to figure out which unit is which.

This is mostly just annoying until you come to the action on the southern flank at Magenta. A lot of Austrian units show up that I couldn't identify and the units in the text are often different than the ones on the map -- actually they seem to mostly be different. The French do much better, but a whole division doesn't make it onto the map; fortunately it doesn't really matter. The problem is made worse by a couple of issues. The narrative seems to lose some of its coherence at this point, with a lot of small incidents that don't come together to make a whole and some obviously missing pieces. The maps have critical events marked on them, which usually helps greatly in understanding the action, but this time many of the events described in the text don't make it onto the map. The general course of the action is clear enough, but the details aren't. The French defeated twice their number of Austrians. How exactly did they do it? Well, the Austrians committed their forces piecemeal, but I don't really know what they did with them when. Fresh masses of Austrian troops showed up late on the battlefield, but we aren't told who they were and where they come from.

This is why the book got fours stars instead of five. The rest of the book is well done and I thoroughly enjoyed it. I just wish that one piece was as good. Brooks draws some interesting conclusions, although his comment that the experiences of the 1859 campaign contradicted the lessons of the American Civil War misses the point. The Americans fought their first battles in a similar fashion to the French (who greatly influenced a number of key officers); it was only after hard experience that things changed.

I was very surprised by how well Napoleon III and his generals performed. To someone like me, who only knew them from the Franco-Prussian War, this was a shock. Napoleon III even performed a brilliant redeployment (using railroads) right under the nose of his opponent. I am guessing that age sapped their energy; it would have been nice if Brooks had given their ages. Granted, the Austrians weren't of the same caliber as the Germans in 1870, but they managed on occasion to give the Prussians a hard time in 1866, when their tactics were stupider and artillery (admittedly) better. Napoleon III recognized the shortcomings the war had revealed and tried to address them, but the army was uninterested and the politicians refused to provide more money to the army; an interesting commentary on the actual power of the Emperor in the Second Empire. Still, I can't help feeling that, if the Franco-Prussian War had occurred in 1860 instead of 1870, the result might have been very different.

I would be glad to review this book,but it did not arrive yet.
Can you do something to control where the book is?
Thanks,GdeG