18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Very critical of Haig, June 27, 2005
This review is from: The Somme (Hardcover)
Prior and Wilson are very critical of Douglas Haig and contend that he never understood the complexity of modern warfare. During the intial planning of the Somme offensive Haig did not develop an effective bombardment plan that would neutralize the German defenses. As a result thousands of British soldiers were killed in the opening phases of the campaign by German defenses that managed to survive the massive British bomdardment. But this bomdbardment was very ineffective because the artillery failed to cooperate with the infantry and this led to gunners missing their target but a large margin. Haig continued his errors by believing that the battle could be a Napoleonic type of decisive victory and this made him to commit thousands of troops to a stalemated camapign. The only weakness of the book is that the authors leave out the French and German perspectives of the camapaign, but otherwise this is an excellent account of the battle.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
25 of 28 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Yes the Somme was a disaster, December 29, 2005
This review is from: The Somme (Hardcover)
This book claims to be the first book to look at primary sources in writing a account of the battle of the Somme rather than relying on journalistic accounts of the battle. The main difference is the first day of the battle. Most previous accounts seem to have been based on one account put out in 1917 that suggested that on the opening day the artillery barrage failed to destroy the German positions. The barrage finished prematurely and that 50,000 British troops advancing at a walking pace were mowed down by German machine gunners who were able to reach their defensive positions just in time. It was suggested that the British troops were ordered to move slowly and in formation by higher command.
The book suggests that this account is one based on the movement of some troops from rear positions to the British front line. In this sector the British occupied low lying ground and the German machine guns and artillery were able to destroy the British troops even before they could enter the battle. The fact that they were distant from the front line is the reason that they were moving in close formation and moving slowly. Rather than this being a general pattern the reasons for the disaster were more complex and varied from sector to sector.
In fact the planning of the attack on the first day seems to have been entirely decentralised. The nature of the attack, the use of artillery were all made at sector level. Later in the war the most effective use of artillery during an attack was the creeping barrage. That is a slowly moving curtain of fire that allowed the infantry to move forward while the enemy position was destroyed or suppressed. On the opening day only one sector used a creeping barrage, and it is in this sector that most gains were made. In other areas the barrage was largely ineffective in destroying the German positions. The reasons for this ranged from poor accuracy, use of light guns to poor observation. One of the key factors however was the overoptimistic view that the attack could reach the third German defensive line. For that reason the artillery barrage was too widely dispersed to be effective. In addition there was little counter battery fire which meant that when the attack began the Germans were able to pour a withering and effective fire on the attackers.
Following the first day the sorts of mistakes again were not simple. The general pattern was to make small scale poorly supported attacks on a piecemeal basis which were uncoordinated. This allowed the Germans to concentrate their artillery and reserves so that at no point were they ever really threatened with a decisive breakthrough. The one positive aspect of the battle from the British point of view was that the German high command fought it almost as stupidly as the British. They believed that not an inch of ground should be given up. Thus the defence was characterised by a large number of counter attacks and very heavy German casualties because of men being kept in defensive earth works. When Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenburg and Lundendorf they adopted a change in defensive strategy. Instead of relying on trench lines they used a defence based on the existing technology. Lots of machine guns in concrete defensive positions with most of the infantry being held back out of range of artillery fire.
Following the war Haig the British commander was the subject of attack by historians such as Liddel Hart. Generally the suggestion was that the British army was an army of lions led by donkeys. The critism after the war was partially propaganda for a form of warefare relying on movement and a mechanised arm. In recent years the Donkey theory has been much attacked as a simple caricature. In this book however the command errors of the British are outlined in embarrassing detail. Haig seemed to be living in a fantasy world developing plans unrelated to reality. Meanwhile small uncoordinated attacks occurred for months after the initial day. There seemed to be a greater understanding of the use of artillery developed by the lower ranks which made some of these effective. However the Germans were able to move seven fresh divisions into the area and to move large numbers of heavy guns because of the slow pace of offensive operations meaning that any victories achieved by the British troops could never lead to strategic victory.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
17 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Critical Analysis of British forces during the disastrous Somme campaign, June 29, 2006
This review is from: The Somme (Hardcover)
The Somme will forever live as one of the bloodiest campaigns in Britain's glorious military history. In the span from July to October 1916, over 430,000 British and over 200,000 German were casualties in the French countryside. Australian historians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, authors of two previous books on World War 1 battles examine the campaign from the British perspective with a critical eye, revealing some illuminating insights into the massive leadership failures that plagued the British Army in 1916.
The commonly held view of the Somme is that of waves of soldiers marching bravely into machine gun fire, and being mowed down like wheat under the scythe. In fact, aside from the mass push of British forces on July 1st, the Somme was a running battle over several months, with daily attempts by the British forces to take the same bits and pieces of land laced with barbed wire, German machine guns, and thousands of men wearing the feldgrau of the German Army. Under the leadership of Gen Rawlinson, a shining example of indecisive incompetence, and the distant and out of touch Gen Haig, the British wasted thousands of lives by ignoring the basic tenets of warfare: Learn from your mistakes, reinforce success and abandon failure, in the face of strong defense seek better intelligence and reconnaissance, and use artillery to batter the enemy sufficiently to permit the infantry to close with and destroy the enemy. For example, the most successful infantry attacks against trenches were under the cover of creeping barrages, but the British failed to adopt this as a standard tactic in all divisions. In any case there were neither the numbers nor the ammunition required for the artillery to properly sanitize the German defenses, and for that the fault lies squarely with Haig and the Minister of Munitions.
As Prior and Wilson note, Rawlinson and Haig constantly bickered over planning, and never adjusted tactics to adapt to the nature of the Somme battlefield. Coordination with the French on the right was negligent, artillery was used piecemeal and incorrectly, and attacks that failed daily were repeated daily. The only innovative tactic was the first use of the tank, but the tanks were divided piecemeal amongst the attacking divisions, negating their punch. (to be fair, this is not Haig's fault, as tactics for new weapons have a steep learning curve) The authors are correctly harsh on the British leadership, while illustrating the bravery of the British infantry in the face of hopeless attack. This Materialschlacht, or war of attrition, was the strategy, and not much of one at that. Much is pulled from primary sources and battlefield reporting from the brigade to corps level, and this adds a human element to the otherwise academic critique, which is both fair and deserved.
As other have noted, this book draws little from German or French sources, and they are mentioned mostly in passing. The book reads smoothly and moves quickly through its 365 pages. The authors have no real agenda except to expose the reality of the Somme battle and the faults of the British Army in it. As a reader its staggering to think that officers could be so incompetent and so blind to tactical thinking. Their failure was a failure to adapt to the reality of the battlefield. The British attempted to fight a battle better suited for another field, and despite massive failure didn't make the changes necessary to ensure victory. This was a different kind of war, but had they read their Sun Tzu, they might have done better, and a generation of young men from both sides would have lived another day. Prior and Wilson do those men a service with this book. Recommended.
A.G. Corwin
St. Louis, MO
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
