Customer Reviews

The Somme

5 star:		(8)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Prior and Wilson are very critical of Douglas Haig and contend that he never understood the complexity of modern warfare. During the intial planning of the Somme offensive Haig did not develop an effective bombardment plan that would neutralize the German defenses. As a result thousands of British soldiers were killed in the opening phases of the campaign by German defenses that managed to survive the massive British bomdardment. But this bomdbardment was very ineffective because the artillery failed to cooperate with the infantry and this led to gunners missing their target but a large margin. Haig continued his errors by believing that the battle could be a Napoleonic type of decisive victory and this made him to commit thousands of troops to a stalemated camapign. The only weakness of the book is that the authors leave out the French and German perspectives of the camapaign, but otherwise this is an excellent account of the battle.

This book claims to be the first book to look at primary sources in writing a account of the battle of the Somme rather than relying on journalistic accounts of the battle. The main difference is the first day of the battle. Most previous accounts seem to have been based on one account put out in 1917 that suggested that on the opening day the artillery barrage failed to destroy the German positions. The barrage finished prematurely and that 50,000 British troops advancing at a walking pace were mowed down by German machine gunners who were able to reach their defensive positions just in time. It was suggested that the British troops were ordered to move slowly and in formation by higher command.

The book suggests that this account is one based on the movement of some troops from rear positions to the British front line. In this sector the British occupied low lying ground and the German machine guns and artillery were able to destroy the British troops even before they could enter the battle. The fact that they were distant from the front line is the reason that they were moving in close formation and moving slowly. Rather than this being a general pattern the reasons for the disaster were more complex and varied from sector to sector.

In fact the planning of the attack on the first day seems to have been entirely decentralised. The nature of the attack, the use of artillery were all made at sector level. Later in the war the most effective use of artillery during an attack was the creeping barrage. That is a slowly moving curtain of fire that allowed the infantry to move forward while the enemy position was destroyed or suppressed. On the opening day only one sector used a creeping barrage, and it is in this sector that most gains were made. In other areas the barrage was largely ineffective in destroying the German positions. The reasons for this ranged from poor accuracy, use of light guns to poor observation. One of the key factors however was the overoptimistic view that the attack could reach the third German defensive line. For that reason the artillery barrage was too widely dispersed to be effective. In addition there was little counter battery fire which meant that when the attack began the Germans were able to pour a withering and effective fire on the attackers.

Following the first day the sorts of mistakes again were not simple. The general pattern was to make small scale poorly supported attacks on a piecemeal basis which were uncoordinated. This allowed the Germans to concentrate their artillery and reserves so that at no point were they ever really threatened with a decisive breakthrough. The one positive aspect of the battle from the British point of view was that the German high command fought it almost as stupidly as the British. They believed that not an inch of ground should be given up. Thus the defence was characterised by a large number of counter attacks and very heavy German casualties because of men being kept in defensive earth works. When Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenburg and Lundendorf they adopted a change in defensive strategy. Instead of relying on trench lines they used a defence based on the existing technology. Lots of machine guns in concrete defensive positions with most of the infantry being held back out of range of artillery fire.

Following the war Haig the British commander was the subject of attack by historians such as Liddel Hart. Generally the suggestion was that the British army was an army of lions led by donkeys. The critism after the war was partially propaganda for a form of warefare relying on movement and a mechanised arm. In recent years the Donkey theory has been much attacked as a simple caricature. In this book however the command errors of the British are outlined in embarrassing detail. Haig seemed to be living in a fantasy world developing plans unrelated to reality. Meanwhile small uncoordinated attacks occurred for months after the initial day. There seemed to be a greater understanding of the use of artillery developed by the lower ranks which made some of these effective. However the Germans were able to move seven fresh divisions into the area and to move large numbers of heavy guns because of the slow pace of offensive operations meaning that any victories achieved by the British troops could never lead to strategic victory.

The Somme will forever live as one of the bloodiest campaigns in Britain's glorious military history. In the span from July to October 1916, over 430,000 British and over 200,000 German were casualties in the French countryside. Australian historians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, authors of two previous books on World War 1 battles examine the campaign from the British perspective with a critical eye, revealing some illuminating insights into the massive leadership failures that plagued the British Army in 1916.

The commonly held view of the Somme is that of waves of soldiers marching bravely into machine gun fire, and being mowed down like wheat under the scythe. In fact, aside from the mass push of British forces on July 1st, the Somme was a running battle over several months, with daily attempts by the British forces to take the same bits and pieces of land laced with barbed wire, German machine guns, and thousands of men wearing the feldgrau of the German Army. Under the leadership of Gen Rawlinson, a shining example of indecisive incompetence, and the distant and out of touch Gen Haig, the British wasted thousands of lives by ignoring the basic tenets of warfare: Learn from your mistakes, reinforce success and abandon failure, in the face of strong defense seek better intelligence and reconnaissance, and use artillery to batter the enemy sufficiently to permit the infantry to close with and destroy the enemy. For example, the most successful infantry attacks against trenches were under the cover of creeping barrages, but the British failed to adopt this as a standard tactic in all divisions. In any case there were neither the numbers nor the ammunition required for the artillery to properly sanitize the German defenses, and for that the fault lies squarely with Haig and the Minister of Munitions.

As Prior and Wilson note, Rawlinson and Haig constantly bickered over planning, and never adjusted tactics to adapt to the nature of the Somme battlefield. Coordination with the French on the right was negligent, artillery was used piecemeal and incorrectly, and attacks that failed daily were repeated daily. The only innovative tactic was the first use of the tank, but the tanks were divided piecemeal amongst the attacking divisions, negating their punch. (to be fair, this is not Haig's fault, as tactics for new weapons have a steep learning curve) The authors are correctly harsh on the British leadership, while illustrating the bravery of the British infantry in the face of hopeless attack. This Materialschlacht, or war of attrition, was the strategy, and not much of one at that. Much is pulled from primary sources and battlefield reporting from the brigade to corps level, and this adds a human element to the otherwise academic critique, which is both fair and deserved.

As other have noted, this book draws little from German or French sources, and they are mentioned mostly in passing. The book reads smoothly and moves quickly through its 365 pages. The authors have no real agenda except to expose the reality of the Somme battle and the faults of the British Army in it. As a reader its staggering to think that officers could be so incompetent and so blind to tactical thinking. Their failure was a failure to adapt to the reality of the battlefield. The British attempted to fight a battle better suited for another field, and despite massive failure didn't make the changes necessary to ensure victory. This was a different kind of war, but had they read their Sun Tzu, they might have done better, and a generation of young men from both sides would have lived another day. Prior and Wilson do those men a service with this book. Recommended.

A.G. Corwin
St. Louis, MO

The authors provide a highly analytical study of one of the more famous campaigns of WWI. Their conclusions seem unassailable. The British soldier performed well but senior command performance was deficient. Haig had dreams of one great Murat-like cavalry charge ending the entire war. Communication between the various senior levels of leadership was lacking or dysfunctional. Even the civilian leadership refused to take a meaningful involvement. At times the writing style is a bit dry and the text can read a bit like a spreadsheet. Yet, the authors make their point and make it well. This will probably stand as the definitive study of the Somme for years to come.

"The Somme" covers the events surrounding 1916's Battle of the Somme with a renewed look at the evidence, in some cases reviewing previously held beliefs and claims about events. In doing so, the book presents a very large amount of detail.

The book is divided into chapters that focus on different phases of the battle, with the 1st July being dealt with over a few chapters, each focusing on particular sections of the front. With operations beyond that first period, the book shifts more to a chronology-based division of discussion. Although there were lots of things happening, the authors sometimes condense them and turn their attentions to representative operations in that phase of the battle.

Coupled with extensive quotes from unit War Dairies, letters, communiques and other primary sources, the presentation of the information builds up a very solid overview the battle and its ebb and flow.

While the authors are very critical of the commanders and their failures, (a case fairly well supported, as far as I could see), they also emphasise the fact that the civilian leadership was no more enlightened, contrary to commonly held opinions. Of particular interest to the critical eyes of the authors are Haig and Rawlinson, for varying reasons.

One thing that was of particular note for myself was the inclusion of lots of maps, at least one per chapter. These maps give a good view of the section of the front for the chapter, making tracking the movements of units all that much easier.

Prior and Wilson have given a great account of the Battle of the Somme, and certainly has my recommendation for anyone wanting a starting point for the battle itself. One will end this book with a very detailed understanding of the Battle of Somme, and some of the lessons that were eventually learnt from it.

In recent years I have seen articles and film documentaries which tend to rehabilitate the image of the British military leadership, and of Haig in particular, during the Great War. The propositions are that the conditions of the war produced new and difficult challenges that it took the leadership time to adapt to, that whatever they did they could not avoid taking heavy casualties and that, in the end, they did learn and developed the most effective tactics by the end of the war.
Reading this book reveals that the leadership really were donkeys. The last two propositions above may be true, but the top-level commanders are shown to be dreadfully slow learners given the amount of experience they already had by the time the Somme campaign began. Furthermore, they seem to have been devoid of any capacity for self-criticism.
The book is a chronicle of incredible incompetence and Haig's aspirations had me, by the end, wondering if he might have actually been a bit deranged. The authors' conclusions, however, are measured and clear: Haig was simply the wrong man for the job; in fact too romantic rather than the dull plodder as he is usually characterized.
The authors' thoroughness in investigating a broad range of original material, and their well-supported arguments, leave no doubt that this is the definitive study of the British performance at the Battle of the Somme, and not just of the military leadership but also the political, and of the lower-level command and the ordinary soldier as well. But it is not just a dry history text. The book reads well, lightened by the occasional flashes of dry humour, and the drama and tragedy of the battle is always apparent.

The book is another British interpretation of the battle.using almost solely British sources.The author faults the British commanders for not understanding the "changing face" of 20th century industrialized warfare where artillery and machine guns were the major consideration.Haig,the British commander is characterized as a "romantic",pretty much stuck in the 1850's "charge of the Light Brigade" type mentality.According to the author,the new technologies of the tank and the airplane are still too new to make a pronounced tactical difference one way or another at the battle of the Somme.These 2 new technologies while having instances of success were minor compared to the advances in artillery and the author states that about 70% of battlefield casualties during WW1 were caused by artillery alone.
The author spends alot of time explaining the fine points of different calibers of heavy guns and mortars and their capabilities and effectiveness.The major theme of the book seems to revolve around the failure of the British High Command to understand how to properly use the "creeping barrage."Before you get to the end of this book you will definitely have the concept of a "creeping barrage" as part of your vocabulary.The German part in this book revolve around setting up good killing zones and waiting for the British Tommies to "come on."
The book would be contemporary because it stresses the resposibilities of governments to be at the top of their military game in regard to preparation,equipment,hospital sevices,etc. when indulging in a war." The oft used quote by unsuccessful politicians and general,"WE did our best"!!,doesn't cut it in regard to a war,although the quote can be successfully used when doing the dishes.

It might sound a hackneyed truism ,yet mythmaking and any great battles are somehow inseparable. Among the great myths created by awe, respect, and sheer masquarade to hide follies are truth that causes bitter taste in anyone's mouth who is keen to know what really happened. There has been so much talks on the disaster of Somme, especially July first that perhaps will be forever remembered as the darkest day of British military. Were commanders such as Haig and Rowlinson responsible of the disater? Or, Were Germans simply too strong to Britain's relatively green army? What went wrong? . The commonly held view is that High command and its faulty leadership are responsible for the debacle of Somme ,however, recently this donkey led lion view has been challenged by revisionists

Australian scholar Robin prior and Trevor Wilson's book "The Sommne" is a perfect example that refutes and enhances the commonly held view at the same time. The authors' merticulous research on archive actually provides very valuable information that can dispel commonly held and widely dispersed myth.

According to the authors, most casualties of the British army on July 1, 1916 were fallen inside of their own lines , not while walking on No man's land. some units casualtie rate were so high that it seriously hampered further operations( since the trenches were so full of bodies of fallen soldiers), especially Northern part of operation area of the 4th Army, e,i XIII and X corps area. Also, the authors show how British artillery was almost totally ineffective on the first day all along the front. Instead of creeping barrage , which was truly effective in the case of the offensive, many units duly relied on jumping barrage . As a result of this, many infantry men literally walked to the German machine gun fire.

The authors repeatedly shows how both commanders Haig and Rowlinson were totally inept to the operation of this size. They shows how Haig and Rowlinson , whiile their soldiers sustained appaling loss, upheld absurdly optimistic plan (even using cavalry for rolling-up of allegedly shattered German units).According to authors , this sort of sheer daftness were indeed combined with French army's inadvertent evasiveness as well as politician's dilletantish opinion created the atrocious losses of many citizen soldiers without gaining minute adavance.

The book is a scholary work and the structure of the book is very professional. It is divided by 28 chapters plus detailed maps on the first pages of each chapter. each chapter is roughly subdivided by three sub-chapters that show plan, battle and battle evaluation. The authors also picked up the 1st division for a case study. The authors argument and thesis are clear , lucid, and often riveting. It's a superb military history book that both enhances and refutes the myth of Somme. Highly recommended!

This is a well written operational level analysis of the disastrous British offensive of the Somme during July-November 1916. The British had roughly 60,000 casualties on the first day and suffered a total loss of about 432,000. The authors estimate that about 150,000 of these died and that 100,000 more were unable ever to fight again. The authors state (page 301) that "the Somme destroyed forever the fighting capability of 250,000 men, or the infantry strength of 25 divisions. One out of every two British soldiers who fought on the Somme never fought again."

The authors estimate German casualties at about 230,000, so the British had nearly two casualties for every one they inflicted. The offensive moved the Allies ahead two or three miles or so in some areas (primarily the south) and less in other sectors. No strategic advantage resulted to the Allies. The fighting also failed to prevent the Germans from transferring 15 divisions from the Western Front to the East, and did nothing to help the French at Verdun. The British were using up their own army faster than that of the Germans while achieving no significant advantage for themselves or their Allies.

But this is only part of the story. British senior command was inexcusably inept. First the British CinC (Haig) and his army and corps commanders failed to understand the supreme importance of artillery in any successful attack. They repeatedly failed to employ barrages that would accomplish the necessary destruction of German defenses. Occasionally there was a well planned barrage and a successful attack, but future efforts often reverted to ineptitude. Attacks were most often piecemeal and on narrow fronts, with the result that infantry was exposed to enfilading machine gun fire and bombardment from unsuppressed German artillery while confronting unbreached defenses. The authors make clear that the British troops fought well, but even their best divisions prevailed only when an effective artillery plan was in place. Without a good fire plan, battlefield skill meant nothing.

Second, attacks were not coordinated. Haig seldom tried to coordinate his armies, leaving cooperation to his senior commanders' discretion. But the army and corps commanders often failed to cooperate and often failed to impose cohesion on the brigade and battalion commanders. Thus attacks were rarely delivered in concert or even at a common time.

Third, the orders issued by high commanders, as quoted here, are embarrassing. Instead of crisp, clear and effective, they are vague, ambiguous and unrealistic. They are little more than evidence of indecisive and wooly thinking, more pious hopes than incisive directions.

Fourth, those who directed the war seemed to have an almost insane optimism. Haig, the chief offender, believed from the outset that German morale was on the edge of collapse and readied his cavalry for the breakthrough pursuit that would inevitably result. Despite the disaster of July 1 and other failures, he persisted in this fantasy and at least twice more readied his cavalry for the purpose. Worse, he issued orders that set immensely distant objectives and were instrumental in insuring poor artillery preparation and badly planned assaults. None of Haig's senior commanders could bring themselves to tell Haig that he was in cloud-cuckoo land and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Robertson, never tired of promising the leaders of the British government possibly "great results" from continuation of the Somme campaign. Arrant nonsense, all of it. The politicians had their doubts but did nothing to stop the campaign. The major fighting essentially just fizzled out, with Haig's acquiescence, in the impossible mud and cold of November.

It is hard to escape the impression that neither the military nor the civilian leaders knew how to fight the kind of meat-grinder war which they faced and no idea how to end it. They couldn't tell the public that the sacrifices were in vain and that the war must end. Thus there was no solution but to continue to feed the grinder and to look for new meat.

The authors' tone is usually restrained. There is no ranting as in some other books. But their cool tone and their "just the facts approach" are just as damning in the end. Haig may have been an "educated soldier" (John Terraine), but his tactics were not. This is a very depressing story of human failure on several levels.

A book that goes well beyond its title. SOMME is a superb and tragic picture of how military leaders prepare very carefully for the previous war. Haig, after thousands of casualties, finally used creeping barrages to protect his attacking troops--but reluctantly. He had enormous numbers of cavalry brought over to France to "turn the tide" over waist deep mud, miles of barbed wire, shell-hole riddled no-man's land, deep trenches and a living hell. He never did acknwoledge the deadly effectiveness of machine guns. Little wonder that the stupidity on both sides produced a grinding, devastating war that continued for four years. Yes, SOMME demonstrates all too well how the military never seems to learn.