49 of 50 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Where does "obligation" come from?, June 8, 2000
This review is from: The Sources of Normativity (Paperback)
In this brilliant work, Christine Korsgaard tackles her title topic with flair and vigor: What are the sources of normativity? How is it that we become morally obliged? Drawing heavily on Kant but also striking out on her own, Korsgaard locates the origin of obligation in the ability to reflect, and in particular to reflect upon oneself as an agent in the pursuit of ends (a "citizen of the Kingdom of Ends").
Her view is at heart a modification of Kant, and she is careful to explain both what her approach shares with Kant's and exactly what her departure consists of. (Basically, finding some versions of "reflective endorsement" untenable, she finds that she must modify Kant's abstract principle of universalizability to take account of our need for practical identity.)
There might seem to be a difficulty here in that (as one other reviewer has noted in somewhat different language) agents who are _not_ (sufficiently) reflective might seem thereby to avoid moral obligation altogether. However, Korsgaard does deal with this point and does at least leave us a way to say that agents ideally _ought_ to be reflective. In that sense, the agent who simply shrugs off the pain he is causing to another can still, on Korsgaard's theory, be said to be reneging on an obligation. (And I think we _would_ say that "obligation" could obtain no purchase at all on someone who was simply incapable of any reflection whatsoever.)
At any rate, whether Korsgaard's analysis is found to be satisfactory or not, it makes highly rewarding reading. Her theory is not only trenchantly presented but developed through an enlightening discussion of the history of ethical theory.
Moreover, the text also includes responses/critiques from Thomas Nagel, G.A. Gohen, Bernard Williams, and Raymond Guess, with a final wrapup reply from Korsgaard (the entire volume is adapted from a lecture series). And that helpful feature means that certain important criticisms are made available to the reader at once, together with Korsgaard's responses thereto.
(By the way, her arguments with one or two of the other contributors will be clearer to the reader who is familiar with _Creating the Kingdom of Ends_. For example, her disagreements with Nagel over agent-relative vs. agent-independent reasons are discussed in "The Reasons We Can Share." And contrary to what one of the other reviewers seems to believe, both Korsgaard and Nagel have devoted sustained attention to the question of how "reasons for you" are also "reasons for me." Merely announcing that "they aren't" is a way not of solving the problem but of refusing to address it.)
All in all, then, this is a fine piece of work on the part of Korsgaard and all her interlocutors. There is some excellent ethical reasoning in this volume, and even readers who wind up disagreeing with Korsgaard's solution will appreciate her fair and careful treatment of the problem.
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26 of 27 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Important Theory of Practical Reason, November 19, 1999
Korsgaard' book is one of the boldest and most thoughtful treatments of the philosophical problems around practical reason. The author has a wide knowledge and a deep understanding of the history of the subject, but she is also a daring and original thinker, and so whether or not her theory is entirely correct (what theory is?) it will deservedly attract enormous attention and scrutiny for years to come. The comments and reply attached at the end are also of very high quality, and it is good to have such good criticism appear immediately in this way. Everything here is well written, but it will be difficult going for any readers who don't have some prior acquaintance with previous treatments of the issues discussed, such as the relation between reason and desire, the difference between explaining and justifying action, the difference between rational and moral normativity, etc. But her vivid style makes it more accessible than much professionally produced philosophy, so if the issues interest you, give it a try!
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10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Admirably well written and inspiring, July 29, 2004
This review is from: The Sources of Normativity (Paperback)
The Sources of Normativity is an admirably well written and inspiring book. Korsgaard's style will capture the reader right from the beginning of the Prologue.
In this book Christine Korsgaard is mainly concerned with justifying morality. Her aim is not to tell us what to do, i.e. which moral obligations we have, but rather to show that we do indeed have moral obligations, that we are in fact bound by morality. Korsgaard, having discussed various accounts of the sources of normativity and shown them to be inadequate, gives her own Kantian answer to the question, focusing on the roles we play and our role as human beings. I won't go into details here.
I myself am inclined to disagree with Korsgaard's theory, but it doesn't matter, I still love this book. It is both thought provoking and inspiring, and it's just so beautifully written. It is truly a pleasure to read.
Korsgaard sets out her theory in four lectures (in addition to the Prologue) which are then followed by responses from four distinguished philosophers: G.A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams. Korgaard then gives her reply in a final chapter. There is also a very short introduction by Onora O'Neill.
I highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in philosophy, and especially if you're interested in moral philosophy.
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