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The Sources of Normativity

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In this brilliant work, Christine Korsgaard tackles her title topic with flair and vigor: What are the sources of normativity? How is it that we become morally obliged? Drawing heavily on Kant but also striking out on her own, Korsgaard locates the origin of obligation in the ability to reflect, and in particular to reflect upon oneself as an agent in the pursuit of ends (a "citizen of the Kingdom of Ends").

Her view is at heart a modification of Kant, and she is careful to explain both what her approach shares with Kant's and exactly what her departure consists of. (Basically, finding some versions of "reflective endorsement" untenable, she finds that she must modify Kant's abstract principle of universalizability to take account of our need for practical identity.)

There might seem to be a difficulty here in that (as one other reviewer has noted in somewhat different language) agents who are _not_ (sufficiently) reflective might seem thereby to avoid moral obligation altogether. However, Korsgaard does deal with this point and does at least leave us a way to say that agents ideally _ought_ to be reflective. In that sense, the agent who simply shrugs off the pain he is causing to another can still, on Korsgaard's theory, be said to be reneging on an obligation. (And I think we _would_ say that "obligation" could obtain no purchase at all on someone who was simply incapable of any reflection whatsoever.)

At any rate, whether Korsgaard's analysis is found to be satisfactory or not, it makes highly rewarding reading. Her theory is not only trenchantly presented but developed through an enlightening discussion of the history of ethical theory.

Moreover, the text also includes responses/critiques from Thomas Nagel, G.A. Gohen, Bernard Williams, and Raymond Guess, with a final wrapup reply from Korsgaard (the entire volume is adapted from a lecture series). And that helpful feature means that certain important criticisms are made available to the reader at once, together with Korsgaard's responses thereto.

(By the way, her arguments with one or two of the other contributors will be clearer to the reader who is familiar with _Creating the Kingdom of Ends_. For example, her disagreements with Nagel over agent-relative vs. agent-independent reasons are discussed in "The Reasons We Can Share." And contrary to what one of the other reviewers seems to believe, both Korsgaard and Nagel have devoted sustained attention to the question of how "reasons for you" are also "reasons for me." Merely announcing that "they aren't" is a way not of solving the problem but of refusing to address it.)

All in all, then, this is a fine piece of work on the part of Korsgaard and all her interlocutors. There is some excellent ethical reasoning in this volume, and even readers who wind up disagreeing with Korsgaard's solution will appreciate her fair and careful treatment of the problem.

Korsgaard' book is one of the boldest and most thoughtful treatments of the philosophical problems around practical reason. The author has a wide knowledge and a deep understanding of the history of the subject, but she is also a daring and original thinker, and so whether or not her theory is entirely correct (what theory is?) it will deservedly attract enormous attention and scrutiny for years to come. The comments and reply attached at the end are also of very high quality, and it is good to have such good criticism appear immediately in this way. Everything here is well written, but it will be difficult going for any readers who don't have some prior acquaintance with previous treatments of the issues discussed, such as the relation between reason and desire, the difference between explaining and justifying action, the difference between rational and moral normativity, etc. But her vivid style makes it more accessible than much professionally produced philosophy, so if the issues interest you, give it a try!

The Sources of Normativity is an admirably well written and inspiring book. Korsgaard's style will capture the reader right from the beginning of the Prologue.

In this book Christine Korsgaard is mainly concerned with justifying morality. Her aim is not to tell us what to do, i.e. which moral obligations we have, but rather to show that we do indeed have moral obligations, that we are in fact bound by morality. Korsgaard, having discussed various accounts of the sources of normativity and shown them to be inadequate, gives her own Kantian answer to the question, focusing on the roles we play and our role as human beings. I won't go into details here.

I myself am inclined to disagree with Korsgaard's theory, but it doesn't matter, I still love this book. It is both thought provoking and inspiring, and it's just so beautifully written. It is truly a pleasure to read.

Korsgaard sets out her theory in four lectures (in addition to the Prologue) which are then followed by responses from four distinguished philosophers: G.A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams. Korgaard then gives her reply in a final chapter. There is also a very short introduction by Onora O'Neill.

I highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in philosophy, and especially if you're interested in moral philosophy.

"The Sources of Normativity", based on Christine Korsgaard's Tanner Lectures, is certainly one of the most important works in ethics written in the past twenty years. Korsgaard argues in favor of a neo-Kantian metaethical theory, derived from a discussion of Hobbes, Kant, Aristotle, Williams, and Nagel - among numerous others.

The lynchpin of the theory is a crucial distinction between the categorical imperative and what Korsgaard calls the "moral law". Essentially, the categorical imperative fixes that the will must select a law that it can take as its own - the source of normative motivation - but does not fix the content of that law (a common critique of Kant). The moral law suggests that the will must select a law on which all rational beings can act together in a workable system - but Kant seems to assume, rather than argue for, the truth of this. Korsgaard's addition is to contend that our practical identities fix the domain over which our moral reasons can range, and that these identities are based on the reflective structure of consciousness - thus providing a bridge between the categorical imperative and moral law. For the full argument, you'll have to read the book, and it is well worth it. Korsgaard clearly has a deep respect for the various problems associated with normativity - particularly the question of how normativity can be objective, yet still account for the deeply contingent differences in our moral psychology.

Korsgaard's work is divided into six parts/lectures, each approximately 40 pages in length:

Lectures 1 + 2 discuss historical approaches to ethics - voluntarism (Hobbes, Pufendorf), objective realism (Moore, Ross, Nagel), and reflective endorsement (Hume, Kant, Mill, Williams). Lecture 3 provides the core of Korsgaard's modification to the reflective endorsement view, while lecture 4 responds to potential criticisms and explores consequences of the view. A fifth section includes insightful critiques by prominent philosophers: G.A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams. A final section contains Korsgaard's reply to their objections.

Among all the theories of ethics with which I am familiar, I have always found Kant's system to be the best: carrying out one's duty for the sake of the duty itself. The problem with Kant, however, is that his theory of morality is grounded outside humanity, dependent on a source of which we can never, some may claim, have any understanding. Christine Korsgaard fixes, at least for me, this problem, by showing that one does not have to venture outside humanity in order to ground its morality. In short, the source of normativity is our humanity itself.

I don't want to get into too much details and give away the main points of the book. Suffice it to say that it offers, in my opinion, some of the best arguments for the objectivity of morality. The conclusion I reached after reading the book was this: It is as much justified for a human to complain 'Why should I be moral?' as it is for him/her to complain 'Why should I have two eyes?' In both cases, the answer is 'Because you are a human being, a social animal with two eyes.'

Pristine Christine, why do ya' do me like you do,
Pristine Christine, why do ya' do me like you do

You got me perfect bound, and singin' the blues

You always preachin, sayin' I got moral ends,
Say my agency's at stake,
But only so-so commitment to my friends.
Don't know what I did, now I cain't make no ammends.

Hound-doggin' me, caus I ain't formed my identity,

You sayin' "Boy --
I want nothin' to do with you till
you git' yo-self some agency!"
Oh Kantian mamma, when you gonna stop rainin' on me!

You say feelins -- dey's too in-appro-priate
But when you need some lovin' in the oven,
Baby, I'm it --
So a priori me some reason, reasonably

Oh Pristine Christine, why do ya do me like you do,
Oh Pristine Christine, why do ya thwart me like you do --
Ain't got no lovin', so I sing the Cat-o-gor-i-cal . . ..
BLUES!

Some interesting things here and there, but mainly bad. Korsgaard says this: Other's needs are necessarily a reason for me to act, because I can understand what they say when they state that they have needs. In the mere act of understanding you when you say, "I need Help!" I must understand that there is a reason for me to help you. But Korsgaard's theory is not even worth considering. From your having a reason to get help and my ability to understand that you do, it doesn't follow that I have a reason to help you. Amoral jerks can understand you perfectly well, but they have no reason to help you. But this rationalist line is very dignified and exciting, so you can be a famous Harvard professor if you proclaim it. Don't say true things, just say exciting ones. That's what makes for good philosophy, right?

This is one of the best books I've ever read. I recomend it to everyone.

The book begins with the question 'Why should I be moral?' and Korsgaard thinks that an adequate moral theory must provide a satisfactory answer to this question. It is unclear, of course, what sort of answer this question is asking for. We want to provide a philosophical foundation for the authority of morality, for the fact that we are obligated to do certain things we might call moral, Korsgaard tells us, and in that way answer this question. In this sense we want to justify the authority of morality. Yet, whose morality? What are we calling morality? Is morality an abstract, universal term which we can apply to any set of circumstances or does it gain its meaning from paticular concrete circumstances and practices of paticular cultures? Is it possible to use the word 'morality' without having some prior preconception of what morality is, based on your cultures practices and use of concepts? Is morality's authority the same for a Christian as it is for a non-christian? Is what the Christian would call 'good' the same as what the non - Christian would call 'good'? How do these concepts gain their meaning? All of these questions are left unanswered by Korsgaard as she proceeds to establish the authority of morality in our nature as human beings, in our ability to reflect on who we are and what we take to be important and our need to act on reasons and endorse the reasons we act on. The book is more than anything interesting not for what it explicitly says but for what it implicitly presuposses. In that way, it is just another link in a long circular chain called modern philoosphy.