The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost [Paperback]

Lester W. Grau (Translator), Michael A. Gress (Translator), Theodore C. Mataxis (Foreword)

Book Description

Series: Modern War Studies(Paper) | Publication Date: December 2001

The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) has been called "the Soviet Union's Vietnam War," a conflict that pitted Soviet regulars against a relentless, elusive, and ultimately unbeatable Afghan guerrilla force (the mujahideen). The hit-and-run bloodletting across the war's decade tallied more than 25,000 dead Soviet soldiers plus a great many more casualties and further demoralized a USSR on the verge of disintegration.

In The Soviet-Afghan War the Russian general staff takes a close critical look at the Soviet military's disappointing performance in that war in an effort to better understand what happened and why and what lessons should be taken from it. Lester Grau and Michael Gress's expert English translation of the general staff's study offers the very first publication in any language of this important and illuminating work.

Surprisingly, this was a study the general staff never intended to write, initially viewing the war in Afghanistan as a dismal aberration in Russian military history. The history of the 1990s has, of course, completely demolished that belief, as evidenced by the Russian Army's subsequent engagements with guerrilla forces in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and elsewhere. As a result, Russian officers decided to take a much closer look at the Red Army's experiences in the Afghan War.

Their study presents the Russian view of how the war started, how it progressed, and how it ended; shows how a modern mechanized army organized and conducted a counter-guerrilla war; chronicles the major battles and operations; and provides valuable insights into Soviet tactics, strategy, doctrine, and organization across a wide array of military branches. The editors' incisive preface and commentary help contextualize the Russian view and alert the reader to blind spots in the general staff's thinking about the war.

This one-of-a-kind document provides a powerful case study on how yet another modern mechanized army imprudently relied upon the false promise of technology to defeat a determined guerrilla foe. The Red Army had fought their war to a military draw but that was not enough to stave off political defeat at home.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

This is the third volume in a trilogy on the operational aspects of the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1988. The first two dealt respectively with Soviet and mujahideen tactics. This one is the perspective of the Russian General Staff. It follows the Soviet tradition of recording the events and experiences of previous wars not from a historical perspective, but in a "lessons learned" context, to help improve future performance. The work lacks the shaping, ideologically based overview of its predecessors. It is, rather, a compilation of information from a broad spectrum of sources synthesized by a group of authors who mostly have been through the fighting, and the book is destined for think tank and military academic libraries. Its text, admirably translated and edited, will be nearly impossible for lay people to stay with, but it tells a story of poor intelligence compounded by inappropriate force structures, inadequate operational doctrine and no strategy to speak of. Soviet forces did not understand their opposition, especially the mujahideen's ability and willingness to sustain the fighting far beyond rational-actor parameters. Repeated failures of conventional, large-scale war techniques led the Soviets to adopt smaller, more flexible formations and nonlinear tactics with increasing success, but mujahideen-operated Stinger ground-to-air missiles provided by the U.S. helped drag out a conflict the Soviet military could not win decisively in a time frame acceptable to Soviet political authorities. In the end, Afghanistan contributed significantly, perhaps decisively, to the collective loss of confidence that brought the U.S.S.R. to self-destruction. (Feb. 5)Forecast: The hardcover is priced out of the trade market, but if the paperback makes it onto the shelves, expect some unsuspecting browsers looking for layperson's narrative to pick this one up. Otherwise, only collections concerned with the nitty-gritty history of operations planning and execution will find what they're looking for here.

Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

From Library Journal

The stark contrasts between the current American-Afghan war and the traumatic events of the Soviet conflict that ended more than a decade ago are dramatically apparent in this book. Translator and editor Grau (Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, ret.; The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan) had help deciphering the Russian General Staff papers from Gress, a Soviet migr who served in the Soviet army. The main body of the book is about Soviet army and air force tactics, operations, and armaments. At the end of each section, Grau offers "editor's comments" to explain and draw perspective on the accounts from the Russian General Staff. Several recurring themes are that the Soviets/Russians have not given accurate statistics on the war, the Soviet military had thoroughly penetrated the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan before the invasion, and the Marxist-Leninist framework kept the generals from making a proper assessment of their task. Although of some historical interest, this book is ponderous with details and is not a light read. Recommended for public libraries with Soviet history collections and academic libraries. Harry Willems, Southeast Kansas Lib. Syst., Iola
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 392 pages
• Publisher: University Press of Kansas; 1 edition (December 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 070061186X
• ISBN-13: 978-0700611867
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (14 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #366,024 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Learning From a Defeat, January 25, 2002

By 

Marco Antonio Abarca (Colorado) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Paperback)

The Russian/Soviet General Staff is well known and highly esteemed for its comprehensive studies of past Wars and Campaigns. Following the Afghan War, a small group of Senior Officers gathered together to publish a history of the Soviet War experience in Afghanistan. They hoped to pass on the hard won lessons of their war onto a new generation of Russian officers who are currently engaged in guerilla wars in the Caucusus and Central Asia. Unfortunately, there has been little interest in publishing their book in Russia. In an effort to get their book published they turned to Lt. Col Grau, an American soldier/scholar of the Russian Army.

"The Soviet Afghan War" is an attempt to distill lessons from a bitter experience. The Soviet Army that rolled into Afghanistan in 1979 was a formidable force trained to do battle with NATO in Western Europe. They were unprepared for a guerilla war waged in the high mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. However, as the war progressed, the Soviets learned and adpopted new tactics. The Army that left Afghanistan was radically transformed. This learning process is at the core of the book.

This is the third book in Lt. Col Grau's trilogy on the Soviet Afghan War. "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" is about combat as seen through the eyes of Platoon and Company Leaders. "The Other Side of the Mountain" is war and all its tactical permutations as seen by the Muhajadeen. "The Soviet Afghan War" is the big picture as seen by colonels and generals. Of the three books, "The Soviet Afghan War" is the most intellectually satisfying.

9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent nuts and bolts primer, February 20, 2002

By 

Emery E. Nelson (Sonora, Ca. United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Paperback)

On many occasions during my reading of this book, I was filled with questions. Eventually, each and every question was answered in full. It covers everything from footwear of the Airborne forces to the pay of senior officers. It's filled with hard won knowledge of a largely misunderstood (by both Russia and the west) war. I was constantly struck by some comparisons with U.S. Army, Vietnam experience. We see an army, known for it's operational and technical excellence, finding its strengths of little or no use in a hostile and underdeveloped country. Although the 40th Army made some adaptations to their environment, they suffered from, "an ideological blind spot in the Marxist-Leninist tenets." Let's hope that the U.S. Mandarins who are running the present war in Afghanistan read this book. It would be great tragedy to see ideological blind spots cause a repeat of the Soviet experience.

The organization of this book is worth noting. Each chapter covers a given subject, written by a different Russian officer who we can assume is a subject matter expert. As I alluded to earlier, I would be filled with questions at the end of some of these chapters. The editors always came to my rescue by adding their own comments in the end of each chapter and subject that neatly answered all questions.

This is one of those books that should be read by every serving officer and enlisted man in the armed forces. It not only gives a clear and understandable view of how combat maneuver units work, but also logistics, combat support and all the other services that make war possible and impossible, or were used and misused. While I'm on the subject of who should read this book, it might be even more important for politicians and Foreign Service officers to study it thoroughly. This book showcases the disconnect between policy that's easily created and the effort it takes to enact that policy.

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Superb analysis and an excellent translation, February 3, 2002

By A Customer

This review is from: The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Paperback)

Les Grau had already firmly established himself as an expert on Soviet and Russian tactical operations in Afghanistan before the release of this latest work. Here he partners with Michael Gress to provide a timely translation of the Russian General Staff's perspectives on the Soviet military's war in that nation. The result is a fine work that offers members of the United States and other armed forces a number of valuable lessons. It is apparent as we watch current events that many of these were known and taken into account. The use of special operations forces and focus on those nodes of greatest criticality have served allied interests well. Yet it is unfortunate that this book was unavailable a few months earlier, for other lessons proffered by Grau and Gress have been learned at unfortunate cost. That competing interest groups in Afghan society seek to use U.S. firepower against potential foes other than the common enemy has become all too obvious. The authors let their readers know that such internal struggles were also characteristic of the Soviet's conflict. The Soviet-Afghan War may have been a different military against a different enemy a decade ago, but its study is still of pertinence today. Les Grau and Michael Gress should be thanked for making its lessons available. That they have done so with so readable a translation and such insightful supplementary analysis makes their feat all the more notable.