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The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost

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The Russian/Soviet General Staff is well known and highly esteemed for its comprehensive studies of past Wars and Campaigns. Following the Afghan War, a small group of Senior Officers gathered together to publish a history of the Soviet War experience in Afghanistan. They hoped to pass on the hard won lessons of their war onto a new generation of Russian officers who are currently engaged in guerilla wars in the Caucusus and Central Asia. Unfortunately, there has been little interest in publishing their book in Russia. In an effort to get their book published they turned to Lt. Col Grau, an American soldier/scholar of the Russian Army.

"The Soviet Afghan War" is an attempt to distill lessons from a bitter experience. The Soviet Army that rolled into Afghanistan in 1979 was a formidable force trained to do battle with NATO in Western Europe. They were unprepared for a guerilla war waged in the high mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. However, as the war progressed, the Soviets learned and adpopted new tactics. The Army that left Afghanistan was radically transformed. This learning process is at the core of the book.

This is the third book in Lt. Col Grau's trilogy on the Soviet Afghan War. "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" is about combat as seen through the eyes of Platoon and Company Leaders. "The Other Side of the Mountain" is war and all its tactical permutations as seen by the Muhajadeen. "The Soviet Afghan War" is the big picture as seen by colonels and generals. Of the three books, "The Soviet Afghan War" is the most intellectually satisfying.

On many occasions during my reading of this book, I was filled with questions. Eventually, each and every question was answered in full. It covers everything from footwear of the Airborne forces to the pay of senior officers. It's filled with hard won knowledge of a largely misunderstood (by both Russia and the west) war. I was constantly struck by some comparisons with U.S. Army, Vietnam experience. We see an army, known for it's operational and technical excellence, finding its strengths of little or no use in a hostile and underdeveloped country. Although the 40th Army made some adaptations to their environment, they suffered from, "an ideological blind spot in the Marxist-Leninist tenets." Let's hope that the U.S. Mandarins who are running the present war in Afghanistan read this book. It would be great tragedy to see ideological blind spots cause a repeat of the Soviet experience.

The organization of this book is worth noting. Each chapter covers a given subject, written by a different Russian officer who we can assume is a subject matter expert. As I alluded to earlier, I would be filled with questions at the end of some of these chapters. The editors always came to my rescue by adding their own comments in the end of each chapter and subject that neatly answered all questions.

This is one of those books that should be read by every serving officer and enlisted man in the armed forces. It not only gives a clear and understandable view of how combat maneuver units work, but also logistics, combat support and all the other services that make war possible and impossible, or were used and misused. While I'm on the subject of who should read this book, it might be even more important for politicians and Foreign Service officers to study it thoroughly. This book showcases the disconnect between policy that's easily created and the effort it takes to enact that policy.

Les Grau had already firmly established himself as an expert on Soviet and Russian tactical operations in Afghanistan before the release of this latest work. Here he partners with Michael Gress to provide a timely translation of the Russian General Staff's perspectives on the Soviet military's war in that nation. The result is a fine work that offers members of the United States and other armed forces a number of valuable lessons. It is apparent as we watch current events that many of these were known and taken into account. The use of special operations forces and focus on those nodes of greatest criticality have served allied interests well. Yet it is unfortunate that this book was unavailable a few months earlier, for other lessons proffered by Grau and Gress have been learned at unfortunate cost. That competing interest groups in Afghan society seek to use U.S. firepower against potential foes other than the common enemy has become all too obvious. The authors let their readers know that such internal struggles were also characteristic of the Soviet's conflict. The Soviet-Afghan War may have been a different military against a different enemy a decade ago, but its study is still of pertinence today. Les Grau and Michael Gress should be thanked for making its lessons available. That they have done so with so readable a translation and such insightful supplementary analysis makes their feat all the more notable.

Definitely a manual/lessons learned for Soviet leaders or those who have to read it for a class, etc... I couldn't get past page 84. The book couldn't keep my attention. I recommend reading "The Other Side of The Mountain." Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. This book is a testimonial of how the Mujahideen fought and defeated the Soviets. Much more engaging......

This book should be required reading for any person wishing to express an opinion about the current U. S. military involvement in Afghanistan. A retrospective of the experiences of the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan, it is generally an honest appraisal of how the war progressed, from the invasion to the pullout.
Combining the information in this book with other historical facts about Afghanistan, one conclusion is clear.

*) It is not possible for the United States to achieve a classic military victory in Afghanistan.

Given that the British Empire suffered one of its' worst defeats in Afghanistan and the United States will be unable to do some of the things that the Soviets did, no other conclusion is possible.
With this as an established fact, the next point is just as clear.

*) The best possible outcome of a continued U. S. military presence in Afghanistan is an extended draw. Both sides continue to fight with neither side capable of militarily defeating the other.

As is made clear throughout this book, the Soviets enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in technology and firepower, as do the Americans, won every engagement that could be considered a battle, yet reached a deadlock against the enormous determination and staying power of the Afghan resistance to a foreign invader.
There is frequent mention of the significant Afghan forces that fought alongside the Soviets as well as some of the tactics used by the Soviets to have the Afghan forces take over the fighting. This was a colossal failure as the Afghan government installed by the Soviets had a short life after the departure of the Soviet military. In the minds of many if not most Afghans, any government backed by an occupying power is illegitimate. Therefore, the third point is also clear:

*) It is most unlikely that the current government of Afghanistan will ever be able to defend itself against the insurgents and will not long survive an Allied pullout.

While there are sections of this book that make very dull reading, for example the descriptions of logistics and vehicle repair policies, the bulk is fascinating and leads you to only one possible conclusion. The probability is near certain that the United States forces will eventually go down the same path and with the same consequences that the Soviets did.

Ah, the great literary prose of Nabakov and Dostoyevsky this is not. Keep in mind this is an official Soviet study of the conflict. For those wondering just how colorful an after-action report from the monolithic socialist empire can be, wonder no more.

You get what you pay for, this is the literary equivalent of the cold, soul-killing, concrete block architecture employed by the soviets through Eastern Europe and Afghanistan.

If you can get past all of that, and it is a DIFFICULT read, you will find a level of detail and thoroughness without peer. It is similar to books published by our own government. Lots of numbers, lots of diagrams, and tons of information (20 pages on Ammunition Combat Service Support anyone?). The reader will need a decent level of understanding of military science - because the book does not stop long to explain concepts, and assumes quite a bit of the reader.

In conclusion, it is the type of book you only really begin to enjoy when you have finished it. A worthy undertaking.

Soviet General Staff studies are generally interesting, but difficult to read. They're intended for Soviet officers, and intend to convey lessons that can be used in future conflicts. I've read a couple that deal with World War II, and if they'd been carved into trees they couldn't have been more wooden. This book suffers from that: lifeless technical prose with no attempt to keep the reader's attention. What the book contains, though, is a wealth of information and knowledge of how the war in Afghanistan was fought, from the weapons and tactics that were used to the method by which Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan received their mail.

This is at times very interesting. There's a great deal about tactics and weaponry, and much about the technical aspects of soldiering, everything from aviation to engineering to supply and construction. Though there's a lot of information in the book, it's not sorted chronologically: there's no central narrative history of events. Instead, there's a brief prologue telling of the beginning of the war, and an even briefer epilogue recounting the Soviet withdrawal. I'm still waiting for a narrative of the war that's reasonably accessible, with detail and a reasonable narrative that I can follow, so that I have a better background into what's going on there now.

This book is a general encylcopedic type that cover alot of topics.A person could use this book to write and expand on alot of the topics covered in this book.For instance there were numerous references to illegal substance abuse by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan,very similar to US soldiers during the Vietnam era.This includes some officers as well.
The Soviet war machine was geared toward a "civilized" European war and was completely unprepared for the insurgency style guerilla war that occurred in Afghanistan,also very similar to the US experience in Vietnam.Apparently the Soviet supply system wasn't able to adapt well to the vast distances that this war encompassed and the Soviet equipment broke down badly,leaving frontline troops to improvise on "scissors and paste".There are excellent summations by Soviet military writers at the beginning and end of each chapter so if you miss what is being said in the read,you can still "get it" from the summations.Indeed the chapter summations would give one a good general outline of the war in itself.
There is also a chapter devoted to ideology.Apparently the Soviets self image of,"the good guys who are devoted to workers of the world",meant little to nothing to the general Afghan population.Militant type Islam has a bigger influence on the Afghanis and the Mujahadeen have no scruples about using terrorism on local Afghanis.In addition the Mujadin are being funded and trained by Russia's superpower enemies,constructing a Mujahadeen terrorist"Frankenstein" type monster that will come back to permanently haunt the west.The authors of this book have done a great job,books like these while not a "soldiers story" can save lives in a next conflict by the abundance of interpretive info.

"The Soviet-Afghan War" is the third volume of an historical trilogy on Moscow's 1979-1989 intervention in Afghanistan. The primary author is experienced military analyst Lester Grau, assisted by translator and former Soviet officer Michael Gress. The narrative translates and comments on the Soviet General Staff study of "how a superpower fought and lost."

This volume is written at the operational level of war. The primary subject of the study is the Soviet 40th Army, which invaded Afghanistan to prevent the fall of a friendly government in Kabul, then stayed on to battle a relentless insurgency by Afghani Mujahedin. As the authors make clear, the Soviet Army was trained for major conventional combat in Europe, and adapted slowly and inefficiently to a guerrilla war fought in the high desert and mountains of remote Afghanistan.

Each chapter offer a General Stafff perspective on a different aspect of the Soviet campaign, from the organization of the intervention force to combined arms tactics to the actions of the various combat arms, combat support, and combat service support contingents. Each chapter closes with commentary by the authors, explaining what has been said, and more significantly, what was not said. It becomes clear that the Soviet Army never quite grasped the nature of the conflict they ended fighting, and thus failed to win.

"The Soviet-Afghan War" was published in 2002, just a year into the US intervention into Afghanistan. As of 2011, as the US and its NATO allies are attempting to close out their intervention, the lessons of "The Soviet-Afghan War" are no less relevant. This book is very highly recommended to military professionals and their civilian counterparts.

The translators and editors went to great pains not only to bring this detailed product of the Russian General Staff's analysis to English speakers, but have added their own analysis as well, with more up-to-date and more objective perspectives. This book will inform the readers on every aspect of Soviet operations inside Afghanistan, from logistical and medical issues, to large-scale motorized infantry tactics. Seemingly nothing was left out, except for one thing: why the Soviets lost! Also lacking was more detail on the Mujahideen perspective on the war. Accounts of Mujahideen activity were told entirely from the Soviet perspective. In fairness, this book sources only one document, and information about the inner workings of Mujahideen forces and Afghan society might have been sparse prior to 2002. But the book fails to address the non-military reasons for the war's failure, and let's face it, the Mujahideen were no match for the LCOSF in open warfare, which leaves the non-military aspects of Soviet occupation as the deciding factor in the outcome. The author makes only vague references to the effects of the occupation on the populace, the problems with the legitimacy of the DRA government, and the extent of foreign support to the Mujahideen, leaving the reader to draw his or her own conclusions about what finally forced the Soviets out. Overall, a very comprehensive, if limited, analysis of the war. I would recommend supplementing this book with other publications, such as the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (ISBN-13: 978-0226841519).