The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War (Canto) [Paperback]

Gerald Brenan (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0521398274 | ISBN-13: 978-0521398275 | Publication Date: November 30, 1990

Gerald Brenan's The Spanish Labyrinth has become the classic account of the background to the Spanish Civil War. Written during and immediately after the Civil War, the book has all the vividness of the author's experience. It represents a struggle to see the issues in Spanish politics objectively, whilst bearing witness to the deep involvement which is the only possible source of much of this richly detailed account. As a literary figure on the fringe of the Bloomsbury group, Gerald Brenan lends to this narrative an engaging personal style that has become familiar to many thousands of readers over the decades since it was first published.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Written with wit, lucidity and a Gibbon-like sweep--as well as a human detail earned by years of living in southern Spain--it was an inspiration to such later historians as Raymond Carr and Hugh Thomas." Los Angeles Times Book Review

Book Description

Written during and immediately after the Spanish Civil War, this classic account of its background represents a struggle to see issues in Spanish politics objectively, despite the author's personal involvement.

Product Details

• Paperback: 404 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (November 30, 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521398274
• ISBN-13: 978-0521398275
• Product Dimensions: 8.4 x 5.4 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #212,622 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #69 in Books > History > Europe > Portugal

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

23 of 23 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Incisive Assessment of an Important but Forgotten Historical Episode, April 15, 2006

By 

James E. Egolf "James E. Egolf, MA" (Florida) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War (Canto) (Paperback)

Gerald Brenan's THE SPANISH LABYRINTH is a masterful account of the mosaic of the history and immediate events leading to the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Brenan effectively deals with the complexities of Spanish political history from the end of the Napoleonic Wars (c. 1799-1815)to the start of the Spanish Civil War. Brenan is clear that the Spanish Civil War was the culmination of events of the early 19th century to 1936. In other words, he does not provide a "quick fix" to superficially explain these events. Another asset of this book is the fact that Brenan carefully examines the Spanish Civil War based on a precise review of Spanish Civil War. Brenan dismisses the notion that too many lazy historians use in describing the Spanish Civil War as one between righteous "Democracy" and wicked "Fascism."

Brenan is one of the few historians who gives the reader an explanation of how geogrpahy and climate affected Spain's political history. Since the 17th century, Spain was geographically and culturally isolated from the rest of Europe. Historically, Spain was forgotten by the rest of Europe. Brenan also gives the reader a geography of Spain's topography and climate regions. Parts of Spain were mountainous while other areas were flat plains. Some areas of Spain get adequet rainfall while other areas are semiarid at best. This geography lesson is important in understanding the reasons for Spain's political instability. Those Spanish farmers or peasants who lived in areas that were semiarid and had poor land were often those Spaniards who were more rebellious against the old monarchy and landlords. On the other hand, those Spanish farmers who lived in areas with decent rainfall and adequet rainfall, were less likely to rebel and were more conservative.

Brenan's assessment of the "Spanish character" is interesting. Brenan describes the Spanish peasants as proud, charitible, enthusiastic, excitable, etc. This was probably true of almost all Spaniards regardless of class. These characteritics were assests and liabilities. The urge to rebel against perceived injustice is easier to explain. On the other hand, these characteristics were liabilities that often prevented political unity and a clear program. As Brenan explains, these characteristics and divisions were common for both the Spanish "Left" and Spanish "Right." Brenan explains that there were often instances whereby the Spanish "Leftists" and "Rightists" switched sides because of temporary common interests.

Brenan also gives the reader a "scorecard" regarding the different political parties. He describes each party and leader as well as their political program. These parties included the Monarchists, the Liberals, the Catholic parties, the Military, the Socialists, the Anarchists, the Anarcho-Syndicalists, the Carlists, ect. Readers may be interested in knowing the within these political parties there were bitter political divisions. These internal divisions were often just as bitter or more so than the animosity shown toward opposing political parties. This helps explain the political instability from the early 19th century to 1936. These political divisions also inform the reader that the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 did not "just happen." There were previous rebellions, civil wars, and political unrest long before 1936. Brenan's political sympathies were probably with the Spanish "Leftists," but he is clear about their political blunders and excessive violence. In other words, Brenan does not ignore the excesses of the political violence of either side during the 19th and 20th centuries which other bland historians do without doing any serious research.

Brenan's last chapter which deals with the start of the Spanish Civil War is good. He explains that one of the political liabilities of the "Left" was their hostility toward the Catholic Church which was excessive and alienated a large segment of Spaniards. Brenan argues that a reasonable reconciliation could have helped the Spanish "Left" and the Spanish Republic against the Franco's Phlangists. Brenan also gives a good account of how Soviet Stalinist agents helped as well as hindered the Spanish "Left." The Republic survived as long as it did due to Soviet arms. Yet, the Soviet disciplined bureaucratic mind did not fit well with the Spaniards' independence of spirit and pride. Therefore, the Soviet sympathizers and agents did not cooperate with some of the Spanish "Leftists" and withheld arms. This was expecailly true in regard to the Communists antipathy toward the Spanish Anarchists who fought so well early in the Spanish Civil War. Stalin was fearful that a successful Anarchist movement would antagonize the Western Europeans against the Soviets. One could argue that Soviet diplomatic interests far outweighed any independent revolutionary ideals or Spanish revolutionary goals.

Brenan's THE SPANISH LABYRINTH should be read along with George Orwell's HOMAGE TO CATALONIA and Franz Borkenaus's THE SPANISH COCKPIT. These books explain the complexities and the importance of the Spanish Civil War. These books also undermine the superficial historical accounts which display many historians' ignorance and intellectual laziness. One should note that both Brenan and Orwell had a high regard of the Spaniards' character and courage. The fact that Franco's Phalangists won the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939 may have been due to the political divisions of the Spanish Republic and the parties who were supporting this government more than Franco's political ability. Brenan's book is well worth reading.

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A good history of 19th century Spain and up to 1936, June 14, 1999

By 

G. DeRome "minister-of-truth" (Greendale, USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War (Canto) (Paperback)

Only for those with an interest and some background in Spanish history and politics. Sets the stage for the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Well written and readable; the English author uses research as well as first-hand experience to paint the complex mosaic of Spanish political factions. In the last line of the epilogue he condemns the English policy of appeasement toward Hitler of allowing the Spanish Civil War to take place by not imposing an arms embargo against Germany. The Spanish fascists were allowed to import German arms and thus, eventually, maintain superior firepower over the Republicans.

Another piece in the history puzzle; worth reading.

5 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Interesting but flawed study, February 8, 2010

By 

William Podmore (London United Kingdom) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War (Canto) (Paperback)

Paul Preston was fundamentally wrong when he wrote that Gerald Brenan provided the 'foundations of all modern scholarship on the Spanish Republic and Civil War': "While most contemporary writers were still playing with the simplistic notion that the Spanish war was a battle between fascism and communism, Brenan perceived that it was a fundamentally Spanish affair."
It was neither a battle between fascism and communism, nor a fundamentally Spanish affair.
The German and Italian intervention in Spain in July 1936 changed the nature, and the prospects, of the war. The government's, and people's, defence of the legitimately elected government against an attempted fascist coup became a war of national defence, waged by a sovereign nation against international fascist aggression. A matter internal to Spain became a matter of international concern.
The British government worked against further intervention, not against the growing German and Italian intervention, but against any French intervention in support of the Republic. When socialist Premier Leon Blum came to London on 22 July, Baldwin warned him that Britain would refuse to aid France if Germany or Italy attacked her because she was aiding Spain, and told him to ban at once the supply of arms to the Republic.

Blum did so. Later, too late, he admitted that prompt arms shipments could have saved the Republic and that non intervention had been idiotic.
The British Government wanted Hitler and Mussolini to win. Eden said that his Government "preferred a Rebel victory to a Republican victory." It aimed to deny the Republic the right to buy arms. From the start, it secretly embargoed arms exports to the Republic.
The British government tried to justify its policy by defining the war as a civil war between 'rival factions.' This analysis deliberately left out of account Hitler's and Mussolini's interventions.

If the British government had instead correctly defined the war as one of national defence against foreign aggression, then the Republican government alone could legitimately have been awarded belligerent rights.
Non Intervention could be enforced against the Republic, which would be denied its legal right to buy arms abroad. But Germany and Italy would ignore the ban and would carry on both their direct aggression and their aid to the rebels. In effect they were being awarded belligerent rights in the country they were illegally invading, while that country's legitimate government was denied its right to defend itself. Japan, when attacking China, was allowed to buy arms. Spain, defending itself from Axis aggression, was forbidden to buy arms.
The British government set up the Non Intervention Committee (NIC). As the British Charge d'Affaires assured the German government, the proposed NIC "was not to have the task either of exerting control powers or of making majority decisions or the like." A Foreign Office official called it 'an extremely useful piece of humbug.'

The NIC, chaired by Lord Plymouth, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, first met on 9 September in the Foreign Office. It found `no evidence of foreign intervention in Spain'. The British government now asked fascist Portugal to join the NIC, promising Prime Minister Salazar that this would not stop him sending troops to fight the Republic. So Britain's 'oldest ally' joined the NIC, and promptly sent 20,000 troops to Spain. Salazar said his policy was one of "complete support for the rebels as far as it was possible to do so and maintain the semblance of complete neutrality" - just like Baldwin's.
The policy of Non Intervention effectively blockaded the Spanish Republic. "It isolates only the Spanish Government", as The Spectator admitted at the time. It tipped the balance decisively against Republican Spain.

Baldwin and Chamberlain had rigged the fight while claiming to hold the ring. They had blockaded the victim and backed the aggressors. The Spanish people fought "the overwhelming superiority of their enemy not only in personnel, but in the all-important weapons of modern war, trucks, tanks, artillery, and aircraft." "Success was impossible for the Republic without sufficient men, arms, basic equipment or transport." The British, French and US policy of non-intervention sanctioned the German and Italian intervention, which was the main cause of the Republic's defeat. The Daily Telegraph's obituary of Eden in 1977 said, "The Non Intervention Committee failed to prevent intervention. It merely localised the conflict, and in effect, it helped to ensure the victory of Franco and his unofficial allies, the Nazi and Fascist dictators. Eden loyally carried out the British Government's policy."
The British Government had ensured the fascist victory in effect, and in intention. It had not designed the Non Intervention Committee to prevent the decisive German and Italian intervention. It had always intended to leave the Spanish Republic alone and at the mercy of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and their agents the rebels. The British Government was determined that the Republic should be defeated.