Customer Reviews

Spymaster: My Life in the CIA

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Ted Shackley was an important player for many years in CIA Operations, and there is much to be learned with respect to how one formerly could succeed in the CIA. The flip side is that Shackley carefully cherry-picked events and operations that made him seem omniscient, prescient, and squeaky-clean while burying his failures, mistakes, and political machinations. This is a book where the author uses a self-serving memoir to wash his hands in public while requesting adulation.

Nonetheless, Shackley was at or close to important events in our intelligence history, and his recounting of those events is important to the historian. One would not totally discount Layton's book concerning Pearl Harbor because of its inaccuracies and distortions. One simply takes such works for what they are.

One should note the extemely important impact of social graces and political adeptness required for success in the CIA. This, of course, had been established by its forerunner, the OSS (Oh, So Social), which provided vast numbers of invisible windbreakers to the Eastern Elite during World War II (One couldn't see them, but they protected you from the draft.) Membership in the OSS was even better than enlisting under the ASTP (Army Specialized Training Program) where elite whiz kids of the "Greatest Generation" were sent to college with the Army providing room, board, tuition and pay for two years, hopefully remaining there until the war was over. Robert F. Kennedy availed himself of this program as did many others of his social status.

A second nugget was that anyone who could speak a foreign language immediately came in with a leg up. Shackley spoke Polish, and although I could not find where he had do so, apparently learned German over the years. That gave him his start as a case officer, but he rapidly progressed to supervisory positions that widened his horizons. Shackley mentions the importance of paper work and his talent in writing cables and keeping headquarters well-informed. For a case officer, paper work consumes more than 50% of his time, but at managerial levels, paper work, meetings and social obligations can reach 90% of the individual's activities. As always, literary ability is crucial to career success, not action on the ground or successful operations. Remember, the "Cold" (courtesy of LeCarre's "The Spy That Came In From The Cold") is not East Germany -- it is the field as compared to the warmth of headquarters.

Shackley would have us believe that the CIA was the primary US intelligence agency in Germany from World War II until he left for Miami in 1962. This is hardly accurate, as the vast majority of intelligence such as that which Shackley contributed was being supplied by the CIC and Army Intelligence during that period. Until 1959, Army Intelligence's influence in the DDR was so great that it could control all movements on the East German railways. More often than not, the Agency acted as an umbrella organization although it did select certain high profile operations and take them away from other agencies. The Army's focus on Vietnam ended much of AI's positive intelligence gathering in Europe by 1965, and one result was the gross intelligence failure by any agency to detect the Soviet moves on Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Shackley's activity to provide early warning by radio of Soviet aggression in Europe was actually antedated by several years by an US Army intelligence operation penetrating East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union. Possibly Shackley was unaware of that operation, but that operation also provided ground photos of Soviet SAM sites and supporting installations that were later used to good effect to analyze the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. It is difficult to believe that Shackley never learned of its existence, and more likely, he chose to ignore it to receive credit when none was due.

A third important disclosure by Shackley is the extremely debilitating effect of "turf wars" on intelligence activity and overall operations success. Ambassador Sullivan almost single-handedly insured that the US would not be able to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and has to go down in history as one of the US's most inept State Department officials (and there have been many, including wacky Madeleine Albright who ignored terrorism almost religiously.) Sullivan's canard of maintaining Laos's "neutrality" which the North Vietnamese freely ignored by making use of Laos's territory to make war on Laos and South Vietnam was silly and stupid in the extreme.

There is much to criticize Shackley about, but he glosses over or omits those situations in this book. He used the Hmongs to fight the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese almost to the last Hmong (like the British have done throughout history (they fought the French to the last German or Spaniard, and then the Germans to the last Frenchman (now they'll fight anyone to the last American). One can say that they were all the resources he possessed, but there were other options like fighting for the removal of Sullivan. And, of course, the whole discussion of the CIA and opium is absent.

Shackley's criticism of Angleton was much too muted and he tended to save his criticisms for those in lower ranks than himself or in other organizations like the Special Forces. Apparently his life-long political skills were simply too ingrained to overcome in producing good analysis. His recounting of operations against Castro and Cuba leaves the reader feeling that he told only a very small percentage of the story, but one must give the author some slack here since much of this may still be classified.

I enjoyed his proof that the CIA was not involved in the killing of a Vietnamese agent by the Special Forces by dwelling on the term "termination with extreme prejudice." Then he himself uses the term "mole" discussing operations in the 1950s although that term would not be coined by John LeCarre until the late 1960s. Who's reading too many spy novels now? "Termination with extreme prejudice" was used by most intelligence agencies by the early 1960s.

And lastly, Shackley makes a good case not to trust American politicians as the example of Senator Symington shows most clearly. As the Congressional hearings in 1945 over why the US had produced such an inferior battle tank (the Sherman) proved, Congress does little more than shoot the wounded. All intelligence agent handlers (CIA case officers) must continually bear that in mind. Unfortunately, this has now been taken to an extreme, with the CIA becoming increasingly inept through risk-aversion and it's reliance on self-important Eastern Liberals (epitomized by Valerie Plame) to fill out its ranks. It is possible that today the CIA has more case officers in the US itself serving in some capacity, sometimes in training (& playing at training), than on station in foreign countries. In addition, almost all CIA case officers today are operating under diplomatic cover which greatly limits the scope of their activities but provides them with safety and security. Human intelligence gathering suffers greatly as a result.

In short, this is a valuable book that must be read carefully by the historian and compared to a number of other works, some still coming out. In no respect is it the last word or even fully accurate in what it covers.

I would normally have given this book only three stars for its incompleteness and deception (outlined below), but Ted Shackley was arguably a giant in the clandestine world, and whatever his crimes of omission or commission might have been, I consider this a "must read" for anyone who wishes to move beyond the entry level in the clandestine service. I note with respect that B. Hugh Tovar, himself an accomplished officer, writes the Foreword.

Shackley's career covered all the hotspots, from attempting regime change in Cuba to Berlin Cold War operations to Laos where he excelled while killing tens of thousands, to Viet-Nam where he helped cook the books and ramp up the "report count" (the CIA equivalent of the body count), to Chile to Iran Contra in his afterlife. I pay particular deference to the author's discovery that the combination of US air power for surveillance, mobility, and fire support, with indigenous irregulars, constituted a new form of warfare, one CIA executed well in Afghanistan.

This personal account is grotesquely incomplete. The author has essentially provided a "CIA Lite" account that is not as much fun as Mile Copeland's "Without Cloak or Dagger," not nearly as revelatory as "Blond Ghost" by David Corn, which clearly rankled the author and perhaps drove him to devise this account; and not nearly as detailed as any of the books on Viet-Nam including those by Snepp, De Forest, and of course Allen, whose "None So Blind" is the definitive work. There is no mention of Sam Adams or the author's acquiescence in false force reports demanded by General Westmoreland and the politically-motivated Ambassador. There is also no mention of his role as a recruiter and funder of Zbigniew Brzezinski when the latter was a student here in the USA and Shackley was a Polish-speaking case officer trolling for influentials. The book is yet to be written on the triangle between Shackley, Breziznski, and the mandarins of the extreme right like Dick Cheney, all of whom agreed that the capture of the Caspian Sea energy and the Eurasian region was a priority for the 21st Century.

This personal account is also extremely deceptive. The naive reader who is not widely read or is lacking in professional experience will not be familiar with the very deep literature on drug running and money laundering that was pioneered by CIA officers working out of Laos in the Viet-Nam era, and its subsequent evolution into the Nugen Hand and BCCI money laundering bank activities. Nor is there mention here of the Safari Club or other notorious alliances by select elements of the CIA with South Africa, Argentina, or Saudi Arabia. The account also ignores any reference to the alleged activities of Ted Shackley in running arms to the Contras and bringing drugs back into America via Southern Air Transport, going onwards to Europe to convert the drugs into money and the money into more arms for the Contras (against the will of Congress).

Within this book, the author is at pains to document that he forbade any drug activity to be associated with Air America or any of his operations in Laos, that he conducted spot checks, and on one occasion intercepted and then publicly burned a case of high-grade opium.

He concludes the book with some moderate recommendations for change, but most interestingly for me, as the international proponent for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), he states on page 282 that the world has changed to such an extent (i.e. commercial access to Russia and China and other previously denied areas) that fully 80% of any secret wish list from 1991 can today be satisfied with overt means, including overt human legal travelers. We agree on this important point, which most of the U.S. Intelligence Community continues to deny.

I read this book with care, in part because as resident in Viet-Nam from 1963-1967, and as a clandestine case officer in Central America during very ugly times, I feel I have walked in this ghost's shadow.

I have three bottom lines:

1) By any standard, this was an extraordinary officer who performed at the very top of the profession as it was then defined. He earned the respect of his Laotian counterparts, and I have absolutely no doubt that those whom he was charged with impressing or serving, were impressed and served.

2) Much of what he did was covert action of questionable legality and value, such as the pin prick sabotage attacks against Cuba, but this was not his fault, it was the fault of an extraordinarily stupid political system in America (Bobby Kennedy exceeded Ollie North on the idiot standard in our world).

3) Finally, we have the question mark. I have no direct knowledge, but I venture to suggest that Ted Shackley, according to multiple accounts in the published literature, was at least indirectly if not directly associated with a number of criminal or extra-legal adventures. I do not believe he profited personally--I believe he felt that whatever he was doing was in the service of his government, but like so many others, I do wonder if he did not confuse loyalty to the system with integrity in preserving the Constitution.

Hence, I believe this book, and the author's life, were one third heroic, one third mundane, and one third highly questionable--not because he lacked honor, but because the system that he served lacked honor.

Shackley tells his tale of a career in the CIA. This is not a biography of everything he did and is not intended to be. There are no secrets revealed here. Instead, is an honest look at what life in the CIA was like for Shackley. In the foreword it is suggest that the word 'My' could have been left out of the title. This is a fair assessment of the book.

The book does not read like a novel, but neither it is a dry retelling of historical events. Instead, Shackley uses many different stories to explain different topics such as the use of Air America, Public Relations and Counterintelligence. Details are left to a minimum. Anecdotes such as having to leave behind his daughter's rocking horse because it was too big for the moving allowance or getting overly drunk at a ritual going away party in Laos show the human side of the job.

Why 4 Stars?:
Shackley and Finney tell some good stories and show a lot about what it is like to have a career in the CIA. The book is not meant to be a tell-all of CIA operations and it does not attempt to do so; it fits with the no-nonsense manner that Shackley was known for. Unfortunately, about 50 pages in the middle were just plain boring; my advice to readers is to just barrel through them becuase it gets better and there are a few good pieces of CIA life in there. At times, the book follows chronologically, but there is also quite a bit of jumping around. This weak timeline makes it hard to use as a reference. All in all, it does give an account of a CIA Officer's career and what it was like to be involved in those events.

Ted Shackley spent a career in the CIA during quite interesting times. From Berlin to Saigon to Cuba he was in the thick of the action. He was recruiting spies, managing offices, working on the attempt to overthrow Castro, involved with Chile and much more.

This is not a traditional biography of born, school, married, etc. This is purely the story of his actions within the CIA, what he was doing, and what happened as a result. He also discusses the impact of the penetrations of the CIA by the KGB.

After the discussion of his career is over, Mr. Shackley gives some ideas about the future of intelligence in a non-Cold War mode. He comments on drug and terrorism activities and their differences. He talks of the use of commercial intelligence where the intelligence might help American companies compete.

Finally he comments on the legal structure of intelligence in the US. This includes the eight committies of Congress with authority in this area, and the need for a more centralized control of the numerous agencies now involved.

I knew Ted Shackley personally. Many called him cold and extremely calculating, which he was, but he also had a heart (and a sense of humor) and made time for his family. Now we can all know what he did, where, and when.

I can't add much to the more comprehensive reviews already posted, but I did enjoy this book. It is quite interested to read the intricate dealings of the CIA with various foreign leaders.

Of course, like others have said, this book is just a series of highlights. Shackley has a fairly dubious reputation, and this book leaves out a lot of Shackley's career. A lot of criticism can be given for that and some parts have to be taken with a grain of salt, knowing that Shackley isn't going to condemn himself for anything he did.

That being said, this book was worth reading, but I wouldn't consider it an "entry-level" read. It can be dry at times and not always a page-turner. But for those familiar with Shackley and aspects of his career, this will be a worthwhile read.

The first few chapters are good. Shackley, via Finley, does provide a nice outline for understanding the various traditional missions CIA is tasked with. Ted provides a much better view of Bill Harvey than I had ever read before.

The book falls short when Ted writes about the Vietnam War. First, Ted claims to have known nothing about CIA involvement in world heroin distribution. Mr. Shackley claims that it was those awful USAID guys who were the cowboys running drugs in concert with some rogue Laotian's. Anyone who has investigated this mess knows that Edgar "Pop" Buell was in charge of this "assistance" program along with his sidekick alleged CIA Sky operative George Cosgrove. They reported to CIA because they handled the military logistics for the entire Laotian area of operation.

A second area of the book, which I found ingenuous was Ted's alleged hatred for the Phong Hoa or "Pheonix Project." Clean Ted claims that he and all of the good CIA staff found Phoenix "repugnant." Shackley looses sight of the fact that Phoenix was the most successful CIA operation of that war. In contrast, Ted's own Sky operations failed miserably by settling for the establishment of listening posts along the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. If Ted had demanded that NVA convoys be interdicted by ground forces from the Mu Gia Pass to Tchepone, the South Vietnamese might have won that sorry war. If you think I am wrong, ask yourself did Shackley fail to become the director because he wasn't one of the skull and bones or was it because Colby outperformed him during the Vietnam era?

The CIA Laotian operations ended up getting generations of Hmong males killed. By the end of the war, CIA was employing boys so young that they could not operate in the field. CIA called them "Hill Sitters" because they were restricted to defensive positions at base camps. There were so few men that Thai mercenaries were utilized to defend these camps from being overrun. How is that for being repugnant?

Anyway, Only real historians need read this book because only someone with prior knowledge will be able to sift fact from congressional testimony. Read "The Blood Road" by John Prados and "The Politics of Heroin" by Alfred McCoy before you read this book.

Shackley could have chosen to enlighten us about what he learned as head of CIA's Miami office in the months before and after the JFK assassination. He chose not to do so. There is no mention of many issues raised in other books that he could have discussed to make a major contribution to history. He never mentions Operation 40, or operations against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (which Oswald made famous by his association with it), or the efforts of anti-Castro operatives to blame Castro for JFK's murder (which he would have known a lot about), or his testimony to the House Assassinations Committee, or his knowledge of operatives, or alleged operatives, accused over the years of complicity in the events preceding JFK's murder. On the other hand, there is ample coverage, with many pictures, of the award ceremonies in his honor, if you are interested in that sort of thing. I wonder why this self-named "Spymaster" bothered to write this book.