Customer Reviews

Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This book belongs on your bookshelf. Alongside you simply must have Joel Hayward, "Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East 1942-1943". These books give a tactical perspective and a strategic perspective. They therefore go hand in hand to give a complete picture.

This is a very nice book from reader's point of view. It reads like fiction, but it is not!

Written from the perspective of an Intelligence Staff Officer, this book offers an outstanding blend of the perspective from the top as well as a more junior officer. Specific sections on von Manstein, von Seydlitz, and Paulus are also quite insightful. No matter what other fine books you have on Stalingrad, i.e. Beevor, definitely add this one to your collection.

I found this book to offer a different view
of von Manstein and von paulus than people
are used to. Written by someone who was
in the pocket of stalingrad, it offers
a first person view of the battle. For fans
of von manstein, the book offers a critical
and i thought a fresh view of the man, who is
held in high regard by most historians but not
so high by this officer in the sixth army.I found
book to be fast read. You'll enjoy it

This was a dificult book for me to read, written in a very stiff style. Only about a quarter of the book is actually about the author's experience in Stalingrad and I felt the restricted manner of writing failed to bring out a feeling of being there for the reader. Other chapters in the book focus on analyzing Manstein's and other's analysis and actions pertaining to the battle. I was looking to feel and understand the horror and tactics of the battle, but instead found this work to be more of a philosophical discussion of the battle, the actions of Germany's wartime leaders, and other peripheral subjects. Any contribution by an actual veteran of the battle is welcome and thus the four stars I am awarding it. However, I was not engrossed in this work and could not even empathize with the author because of the detached style of writing.

With the possible exception of Operation Barbarossa itself, perhaps there has been no other aspect of the German war with Russia from 1941-45 so extensively written about as the battle for Stalingrad in the fall and winter of 1942-43. Some might say that this is due to overwhelming scope of the battle. This is not a satisfactory answer however, as this battle was easily eclipsed in the scope and number of participants by later events such as the Kursk offensive and Operation Bagration, the Soviet operation which entirely destroyed the German center in June of 1944.

So what is the fascination with the battle for Stalingrad? This book looks into one of the most interesting and lesser studied aspects of the battle and that is how the army leadership, starting with Hitler and moving down through field marshal Manstein and generals Paulus and von Seydlitz caused the human tragedy here due to the chain of events that they brought about. After the encirclement of the German 6th army in late November of 1942 by a huge soviet counter offensive there were, according to the estimates quoted in this book 250,000 to 270,000 German and other axis partners trapped in the pocket. What was the cause of this suffering, which rapidly grew to desperate levels as rations fell to 50 grams of bread daily or even less and casualties had to be left in subzero winter conditions to die? This, Mr. Wieder argues, was directly attributable to the failure of those who were in positions to alleviate or end the encirclement to devise a realistic plan of action. An excellent example given by Wieder of this is the plan by Marshal Goering to supply the trapped army by air. The author clearly describes the realization, even at the time of it's proposal, that this idea was a fantasy with no basis in the facts of the situation. It was clear that what this really was was an attempt by Goering to renew the fuehrer's faith in the Luftwaffe, which had several notable and not that distant failures blackening it's record.

One of the key arguments here was that the suffering of the troops engaged at Stalingrad was, from a military stadpoint, completely unnecessary and one very clear indicator of the criminal nature of the Nazi regime-one that should have awoken even the least reflective members of the general staff as to Hitler's immorality in particular and the purposelessness of the war in general. As to why the general staff would have acquiesced for so long in regards to some of the other exceptionally criminal aspects in which the war was carried out, the author is silent- an opportunity missed. The barbarity of the attack on Stalingrad itself, as well as all of the urban fighting which had already occurred, should have been an eye opener to the German general staff. Of course, the complete disregard for the lives of civilians and the activities of the Einsatzgrupen just behind the lines in the Stalingrad have been proven to already have been known by those in high positions within the Wehrmacht. In most cases the atrocities occurring were ignored or even tacitly approved by these generals. Why Wieder doesn't connect these offenses to the broader criminality of the Nazi regime, or of Hitler in specific in waging the war is a failing of this book. It is not a catastrophic failure however and the author does much in other areas to show just how inhumane the holding of hundreds of thousands of lives within the pocket around Stalingrad was.

This book, written over 40 years ago is set apart by it's emphasis on the human tragedy of those locked in battle and the inability or unwillingness of some of the key players, such as field marshal Manstein or General Paulus to either make the necessary decisions. Wieder effectively argues that they along with Hitler, should have ordered the break out from the pocket early on, based on the responsibility they had for the lives of the soldiers under them , or to end the battle when the men were clearly unable to continue to fight. This book is then an indictment against the actions of Field Marshal Paulus and von Manstein, the commanders of the 6th army and the army group Don respectively, as well as Hitler. These men, in Wieder's opinion, due to their positions of leadership, were the ones critical for deciding the fate of the men of the 6th army. He also argues well that many of arguments that these men made in their own memoirs after the battle are clearly efforts to obfuscate and rehabilitate their records of inaction or poor decisions.

Overall this is a valuable addition to anyone wishing to understand the battle of Stalingrad beyond the traditional overview of the battle or personal accounts from the front-line soldiers. It is critical to dissect the decisions made by the generals in charge of the prosecution of the war. Only after they have been put under the microscope can what happened on the frozen steppe and in the cities of the former Soviet Union be truly understood.

I found this book a must for those who are interested in the details of what happened at Stalingrad. The author is troubled with the big question as to who is responsable for this masacre. He tells the story about what happened in the pocket with those who are abandoned by Hitler. Also, a very interesting explanation of Von Mansteins motives or the lack there of to rescue 6th Army. The only negative thing, for a lack of a better word, is that he does not say one word about his time in captivity for 7 years.