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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
very disappointing, March 25, 2010
This review is from: Stalin's War: Tragedy and Triumph, 1941-1945 (Hardcover)
Having read and really admired Hoyt's book Japan's War for its detail, insight, wit and well-crafted prose, I had hoped for a similar treatment of the eastern front from a generally Soviet point of view. Unfortunately, this book is a failure in every important way.
First, it is really poorly written and edited. There are countless typos, misspellings, multiple spellings of the same word or location, the language is cliched or plain weird ('foofaraws'?), well known dates are wrongly given, etc.
Second, the sidebars sprinkled throughout the book seem to have been written by someone else (?), as they often repeat verbatim or nearly so the nearby (and sometimes not nearby) main text; at other times they completely contradict it. They often have their facts screamingly and hilariously wrong, as well.
Third, for a book covering the whole war in the east, it is wildly strange that there are b&w photos of sometimes unrelated material (basically stock photos that would fit into any WWII book), but not one single map. Not one!
Fourth, the story as told is hopelessly mangled in terms of point of view. Stories are repeated from page to page, sometimes on the same page, repeating the same detail. Some details are given on a minute by minute basis, then rehashed like a cow chewing its cud on and on and on; then the giant gains of the Soviets in 1944 in the Bagration campaign all the way to Warsaw are covered in a few general sentences. The personal stories with long quotes (and no footnotes) in a book allegedly about Stalin's grand strategy simply don't belong here. We are supposed to learn about how Stalin conducted the war; there is no other book on the market about the war on the eastern front that has less insight into Stalin than this one.
Fifth, factually there are major problems. We get completely false and erroneous asides about the Tiger tank. We are told that in 1944 the Russians finally outnumbered the Germans in the field, when in fact there was not one single day on the eastern front on which the Germans had numerical superiority in manpower. We get this quote on page 221: "The Russian desire to kill or beat up German prisoners had largely disappeared" (by 1944) - really? Another quote, from page 187: "The war against the Russians had ceased to exist in Hitler's mind...Hitler had given up thinking about it" (again in 1944). Who writes this stuff? Another bizarre quote speaks of "the fair-haired von Manstein," and so on. Meanwhile, when we again return to the campaigning, Hoyt fails to even bring up the Soviet Lucy spy network as regards the Kursk victory, and while early in the book he seems to credit Ernst Topitsch's theory on Stalin's supposed plan to attack Germany first, this is never addressed in other than a cursory mention.
Hoyt's references, to the extent that he actually credits books other than his own previous efforts, are few, and one perceives heavy reliance on Alexander Werth's book Russia At War. This may have been acceptable in 1964, when this book was published, but is completely unacceptable 40 years later, given the huge amount of material which has come to light and been declassified since then.
Even the last sentence of the book, "Malenkov was the front runner," dangles out there, apropos of absolutely nothing, following paragraphs on Brezhnev, Yeltsin, and Putin and the evolution of today's Russia. What?
This is a very bad book. It begins poorly and sloppily, and gets steadily worse as facts are botched, the story is confusingly told, and the language is mangled. Those serious authors such as David Glantz, and the less serious ones like Charles Whiting, should be ashamed of their back jacket blurbs, and should be forced to actually read this book before praising it to the skies.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Stalin's early mistakes and attitude almost cost Russia the war., April 16, 2010
This review is from: Stalin's War: Tragedy and Triumph, 1941-1945 (Hardcover)
During the War the author worked at the US Office of War Information where all the information of the war was gathered and assimilated. He has used this connection and other primary sources to assist him in writing his more than 150 books throughout his 50 year writing career.
With that many books to his credit plus the years as a foreign correspondent, Mr Hoyt knows how to write a book.
This book is an overview but its not a general overview of the battles per se. The battle action is secondary to show the huge losses that were generated from Stalin's decisions. It's a select accounting of Stalin's decisions and orders, showing how those orders impacted his field commanders and events on the battlefield. Since the worse military decisions were made early in the war, the author spends the most time discussing the early battles. Operations Barbarossa, Typhoon, Blue, Citadel, Kharkov 1942 and 43 receive the most attention.
After Citadel the coverage of the battles subsides because Stalin had improved his battlefield skills, gave more authority to his key field commanders as well as the fact his armies now had the dominant position. Its not an error or an oversight on the author's part for this reduction of coverage. The author's main theme concerns how Stalin personally prosecuted the war and with fewer mistakes being made starting in mid 1943 there is less referencing to the battlefield. That's also the reason for having only one map. (A map showing the front line just before Operation Typhoon launched in late 1941.) With the battles not being the main issue, maps aren't required.
Using diary entries and communiques between Stalin and Stavka as well as Stalin and his field commanders, the author clearly shows that Stalin, obsessively intent on being the aggressor and ignoring his advisors and generals made poor decisions that almost cost Russia the war in 1941 or 1942. As a secondary issue, its also shown how a few of Hitler's bad decisions helped the Russian cause. The biggest example of Hitler's bad influence occurred during Operations Blue and Citadel.
The tactical coverage is brief and is shown to give the reader background information and to describe the terrible results of Stalin's decisions. The author is not biased; he gives an accurate appraisal and profile of Stalin throughout the war and afterwards.
Included within the main narrative are side issues. Most issues are pertinent and interesting but there is often duplication with the main story and is a little bizarre.
There are 26 photos: some of them include Stalin and the people he dominated or negotiated with. Hitler and Runstedt are also present. The remaining photos relate to human conditions of the war for both civilian and soldier. There aren't any hard core battlefield pictures.
I enjoyed this book; it has some valuable insight that new and intermediate students can take advantage of but it was rated four stars for it does have a few issues. There are a few typos and some repeatedly. There is an error when the author mentioned Rodimtsev's 125th Guard Division crossing the Volga into Stalingrad and there is a conflict of statistics when discussing tanks destroyed in Operation Citadel. One time he uses Russian figures which were too high and a second time he used more reasonable numbers.
The author includes general chapter notes but no specific footnotes. There is a list of secondary books offered if further reading is desire. The book ends with an Index.
The author was 80 when he wrote and published this book and perhaps his prose is not as concise or as smooth as his earlier books but its still good and worth reading if you're interested in Stalin's influence on the war or his cunning and paranoiac manner. Other issues mentioned is prewar war doctrine, the preemptive attack planned by Stalin on Germany. Hitler's decision to postpone Operation Typhoon for the detour to Kiev in 1941, the viability of Germany winning the war after its defeat at Moscow, partisan action, post war conquest of Europe, Stalin's relations with Churchill and FDR and more are also mentioned.
While there are several miscues, the good greatly overshadows the bad and the book, while not being comprehensive, is easy to follow and targets key issues. It's informative and is freely recommended for its intended audience.
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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Fairly Standard Hoyt, October 13, 2004
This review is from: Stalin's War: Tragedy and Triumph, 1941-1945 (Hardcover)
This is not a history of the Russo-German War but rather speculation on what Stalin and his cronies may have thought and said. Many conversations are given as direct quotes, but without attribution. When the author does appeal to authority to support his conclusions, that authority is often one of his own books! But this is not intended to be a scholarly work, just an enjoyable, easy read, which it is. One lack I noticed is that there is not a single map included in the book. But then again, the book is not really about what is going on on the ground (though major campaigns are described), but what is going on in Stalin's mind. Offsetting the lack of maps is the inclusion of many sidebars, some a couple of pages long, that I often found more interesting and informative than the text itself. Good for Hoyt fans.
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