Customer Reviews

Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

Little by little we learn more about the war in the East in WWII. Until the Russians opened their archives to Western historians, most of the events were described through the eyes of German generals who had their own axes to grind. This remarkable volume by an Irish scholar attempts to see the victory through the mind of Stalin. If there are any diaries or other personal memoirs by Stalin, they are still closed to the West. What the author gives us is Stalin's thinking through examination of his daily calender, review of what he said to his colleagues and others such as ambassadors, etc as they reported it, and an analysis of his messages and letters.
He also introduces another aspect of the early defeat of the Soviet forces. He states the Soviet thinking was confined to offense, and it was unprepared to take on major defense as a strategy in the initial stages. There is support for this analysis in Fugate & Dovoretsky's volume, Thunder on the Dnepr. They mention a top secret war game (the third) whose documentation is still closed to the West which gave the Soviets confidence they could defeat the Germans through defense in depth.
Despite his claims, Mannstein was not the originator of the tactical implementation of this strategy.
Citino's book, the German Way of War, reinforces the knowledge that the superiority of German general officers lay in their unquestioned competence in operational matters. Their great weakness was the inability to grasp the strategic implications of their operations. Here, the author points out was one of Stalin's great strengths. Even in 1943, before the great battle of Kursk, he was already thinking about post war implications.
Perrett' book, Knights of the Black Cross, describes how the Germans stripped a regiment out of each panzer division to build enough divisions for the attack on Russia. It built a fundamental weakness into the plan. Now we have Tooze's new book describing, among other things, the inherent industrial weakness of Germany fortelling the ultimate failure of the attack. Thomas Childer's Teaching Company lectures, WWII: A Military and Social History, describes how the German infantry officers encountered a different war than the panzer divisions. Overcoming Russian resistance in the encircled forces was far more difficult than contemplated.
Roberts doesn't blink at the odious consequences of Stalin's torment of the Soviet people, nor does he attempt to coat over it. It's not the purpose of his volume to go over ground that is well-known. He gives the reader insight into how the man managed the Soviet victory. He joins in creating a useable picture for students of WWII of what the man was like in conducting his affairs. His discussion of Stalin's remarkable intelligence supports the narration in Hasegawa's Racing the Enemy. Stalin's grasp of Russian history, his understanding of his armed forces and the thrust of how to conduct the war are awesome. The author points out Stalin's mistakes as well as his success. Regardless of the other sides of the man, as one reviewer emphasized, his place in this area of WWII history continues to grow.
I recommend this volume to any serious student of WWII as well as those curious about how Stalin operated on a day-to-day basis during this slice of his life. The Cold War Years portion of the book were not as interesting to me. Perhaps that era needs more time for history to digest it as well as there may be more archival releases on both sides to give us a balanced view.
This volume belongs in any library that claims to have a military history section as well as the libraries of those who wish to have a better understanding of the events of WWII or how Soviet leadership operated. It will be an important reference work for many years to come.

This book is marketed as a "provocative reassessment" of Stalin's military and political leadership during and after WWII. While "provocative" may overstate the case, this is indeed an excellent new history of WWII as seen through the prism of Josef Stalin.

The blow-by-blow accounts of Big Three summits provide enough detail and background to be interesting but not tedious, offering fascinating insights into the personalities of Truman, Churchill and Roosevelt, especially vis-a-vis Stalin. And there are well-documented and reasoned assessments of everything from the Katyn massacre, to the defense of Moscow, to the victory at Stalingrad. Roberts is masterfully judicious in his choice of which documents, telegrams, correspondence or first-hand accounts to present, always seeming to come up with some perfect morsel over which others have glossed.

In the end, Roberts comes to the conclusion that the correct image of Stalin is not one filtered over the decades, through Khrushchev et al, but rather one more in line with the contemporaneous view of the dictator during his lifetime - as a military leader who deserved praise for the unparalleled achievement of winning the Great Patriotic War: "To make so many mistakes and to rise from the depths of such defeat to go on to win the greatest military victory in history was a triumph beyond compare." (Reviewed in Russian Life)

This is one of the few books that takes a more objective view of Stalin. Taken is the fact that the man was responsible for many deaths throughout his tenure as leader of the Soviet Union. But at the same time it is presented that there was much more to him than simply being labeled a 'killer.' Starting from the beginning of the Second World War the reader is presented with the activities within the Soviet Union to first avert the war, that is make an alliance with England and France against Germany, and then to create the best possible position for the USSR to be in, that is to make a pact with Nazi Germany. Some might think this a betrayal of some sort but the fact remains that Stalin and the USSR were the first to propose an alliance against Hitler, when the Munich conference went through without Stalin even being invited this in essence showed what the west thought of him. Up until 1941 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany had trade relations from which both benefited and Stalin was trying his best to avert war even when told that it was imminent. While he made mistakes in this instance it is also true that he authorized troop movements, the calling up of reserves, etc that were meant to help the Red Army combat any enemy activity. Sadly, this proved to have been unable to stem the tide of the German advance into the Soviet Union. Throughout the beginning period of war, that is up until the battle of Stalingrad, Stalin was responsible for some of the mistakes which cost the Red Army hundreds of thousands of casualties. But it should be kept in mind that Stalin never took a decision on his own. There were also those that choose to side with a certain action and those who wanted to go against it, at times Stalin would choose the worse action but he was never a sole figure advocating for it. While this doesn't excuse him it sheds light on the fact that he was not the only one making mistakes at this point in time. Eventually he would relegate more control to his generals and Marshals with the outcome being greater and better organized operations like Uranus, Bagration, etc. While the military takes up a large chunk of the book it should also be noted that this is also a political history. Mainly looking at the activities of Stalin and his wartime allies, the US and England. Various meetings were held throughout the war; Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam which made arrangements for what relations would be like after the war was over. The Polish question was on everyone's mind as well as the question of what would happen to Germany and of course the USSR and her entry into the war against Japan was always a main point for Roosevelt. One of the interesting aspects of this book are the ideas behind Stalin's insistence that Eastern Europe should be a Soviet sphere of influence. What's interesting is that when asked to leave Greece to England, he agreed. He took little interest in the developments in Norway, Holland, and a number of other territories freed by the western allies and established once more as independent states and within the US and England's sphere of influence. Yet when it came to Poland or Hungary and Bulgaria there were the allies having to voice their opinions about what should be going on there. Stalin's thinking was that it took Germany 20 years to get into another war, it could take another 20 for WWIII to begin so why shouldn't the USSR do the most to protect itself? These Eastern European states would become the buffer zone for her to protect her from future German aggression, especially since Germany wasn't going to be broken up as he had proposed again and again. Of course I am only presenting details from here and there in the book, there is much more useful information to be found in this work about Stalin's thinking and actions and how they fit into the grand scheme of things. Many archival sources are used which adds a lot of interesting information as well as recent works on the Soviet Union which can't be tainted, as is sometimes done by some, as 'propaganda.' In my opinion an excellent addition to literature on this time period and especially on Stalin.

It's about time that someone has written an objective book about what Stalin accomplished. Robert's book is excellent, provides a long overdue reassessment of Stalin's role in World War II. If it hadn't been for the Soviet Union's resilience in face of the Nazi onslaught, western civilization would have been finished off by Hitler. If it hadn't been for Stalin going along with Roosevelt's ideas about the postwar world, we wouldn't have the United Nations.

Geoffrey Roberts book "Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953" offers a new look at the dictator's wars of aggression and defense. The scope of this book is unique in that it begins with the Finnish war and ends with Stalin's death as the Cold War was heating up. The strength of this book is the author's presentation of Stalin's actions within these important eras. As Stalin was the absolute master of the Soviet Union it is difficult to imagine Soviet history playing out the same without him. The chapters on the Second World War are very well done and informative, as are for the most part those on Stalin's foreign policy in the early Cold War. The book does tend to run out of steam toward the end, lacking as it does the desperate contingency of the war against Hitler. Also, the reader would have enjoyed more on the Finnish war. The episode, all too commonly, is dealt with as merely a prelude to the "Great Patriotic War". The Russo Finnish War, 1939-40, deserves greater attention in works of this kind, as it shows Stalin at his most devious, aggressive, and impotent. This is a good book that students of the Eastern Front or early Cold War should definitely check out.

At the height of the Cold War one could have possibly excused a Leftist academic for stretching the truth to make even history's greatest murderer not look so bad in order to support a political agenda. Now, however, there is no excuse for this slavering, obsequious, work designed to document Stalin's position as "the greatest wartime leader." While paying vague lip service to the unquestioned fact that Stalin murdered tens of millions of his own people (more than the Germans killed in the war), not to mention citizens of other nations, the author attempts to portray a great crusader for peace who almost singlehandedly defeated Hitler and the fascist menace. He not only ignores newly available material from Russian sources since the end of the Cold War (as many revisionists do) but he blatantly contradicts facts known long before. As an example, he claims that the Soviets did not stop their offensive into Poland in order to allow the Germans to annihilate the Polish uprising in Warsaw. He claims they did not stop at all. And this after years of Soviet historians, politicians, and generals explaining that they did stop, but only due to supply shortages. Even Soviet historians working under the threat of sudden death did not worship so completely at the shrine of Stalin.

There are many history books on Stalin. This is one of them that you should not miss. It differs from many traditional opinions about Stalin. Stalin has always been portrayed as a ruthless dictator, cold war instigator and warmonger. Because of the opening of the Soviet archives in the last 15 years, the author was able to look at history from a different perspective. In this book, Stalin is depicted as one of the greatest military leaders during the Second World War. Approximately 60% of the book is devoted to Stalin's leadership during the Second World War. There is without any doubt that the Russian Great Patriot War could not have won without the leadership of Stalin. Hitler showed great admiration of him as a military leader. On the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, Hitler confided Joseph Goebbel: "Compared with Churchill, Stalin is a gigantic figure........ Churchill has nothing to show for his life's work except a few books and clever speeches."

The rest of the book deals with Stalin's role in the cold war and his foreign policy. The author concluded that after the Second World War, Stalin tried hard to maintain the Grand Alliance with Great Britain and the US and world peace. The cold war started when Truman invited Churchill to his home state Missouri and Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech. The book also concluded that Churchill and Truman were also responsible for the cold war. As the author puts it "Chruchill and Truman were unable to see that beyond the alleged communist threat was an opportunity to arrive at a postwar settlement that could have averted the cold war and avoided the ideological warfare that obscured the paradoxical truth that Stalin was the dictator who defeated Hitler and helped to save the world for democracy"

History can be a just court. Nobody will dispute that millions died because of Stalin. We should never forget that Stalin is a great military leader. Without the Russian, it might take a much longer time to defeat Hitler. Stalin had also tried hard to make peace with the West.

The reason I give a 4-star rating is because there are a few spots in the book that are a little bit slow. However, I enjoy this book enormously.

Geoffrey Roberts has written an interesting new perspective of Stalin's wartime performance. In this book, Roberts repeats David Glantz's thesis that Stalin followed his generals advice in attacking on a broad front during the Battle of Moscow and repeatedly in 1942 eventhough the net result was a series of Soviet setbacks. But Roberts believes that Stalin and his generals adopted more measured advances in 1944. Roberts also states that Stalin had a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs and wanted a popular front strategy for the Eastern European countires which were to be led by a combination of Socialists and Communists parties. The creation of the Marshall Plan made Stalin change his mind and impose Communist regimes in Eastern Europe out of fear of Western involvement in what Stalin considered to be the traditional Russian sphere of influence. The only weakness of this book is Roberts view that Stalin and his generals had more of measured response in their military operations and did not attack on a broad front in 1944 is flawed because David Glantz's new book about the Soviet Romanian campaign seems to disprove this thesis about Soviet military operations in 1944. Other than this weakness this book gives a new account of the origins of the Cold War unlike the American triumphalist accounts written by John Gaddis.

This book is a very useful corrective to myths about the Second World War and the Cold War. It shows how the Soviet Union played a key role in winning the World War, defeating more than 75% of Hitler's divisions. As President Roosevelt said, "The Russian armies are killing more Axis personnel and destroying more Axis material than all the other twenty-five United Nations put together."

Roberts concludes, "Stalin was a very effective and highly successful war leader ... [who] was indispensable to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany." Churchill continually promised to help the Soviet war effort. For example, in August 1942, he told Stalin that by spring 1943 a million British and US troops would have opened a second front in Western Europe. But Churchill delayed the second front until June 1944.

Roberts argues, "Stalin worked hard to make the Grand Alliance a success and wanted to see it continue after the war." The postwar Attlee government, on the other hand, worked hard to break up the Alliance, being more concerned to save the Empire than to keep the peace. Stalin said the Labour government was more conservative than the Conservatives in their defence of the British ruling class's imperial interests.

In 1947, President Truman adopted Labour's hostility to the Soviet Union and peaceful coexistence and launched the Marshall Plan. "For Stalin the Marshall Plan was the breaking point in postwar relations with the United States." The Plan put Western European countries under US control, enabling the US state to interfere in their internal affairs. It led straight to the formation of the anti-Soviet Western bloc, which started the Cold War and split the world into two camps.

Stalin's policy of peaceful coexistence did not mean accepting whatever the imperialists did. Two years after US forces intervened in Korea, he said, "One must be firm when dealing with America ... It's been already two years. And the USA has still not subdued little Korea. ... They want to subjugate the whole world, yet they cannot subdue little Korea."

This treatise comes as close as I ever want to see to an apology for its cruel and vicious subject. The author claims he wants to balance the view we have of Stalin, but "balance" is not to be found here.

If Stalin was a good wartime and political leader, then what does that make Churchill or FDR?

This book is not worth reading.