Customer Reviews

The Stand of the U.S. Army at Gettysburg

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This is a clear and concise account of the Battle of Gettysburg that has several interesting views about the personalities involved in the battle. Hall believes that Sickles flawed position in the Peach Orchard actually helped the Union cause because it slowed the Confederate advance. Hall praises General Warren for moving his forces to the southern end of the battlefield and repelling the Confederate attacks, but Hall states that the famous charge on Little Round Top was not organized by Chamberlain, but rather it was an spontaneous act by the Union soldiers. Hall is very critical of Longstreet in this book and thinks that if Longstreet attacked earlier on the second day of the battle that the Union army coud have been defeated. According to Hall, Longstreet also failed on the third day of the battle because he did not give enough forces to General Pickett and this allowed the Confederate force to be surrounded by Union forces since it did not have enough flank protection. I would reccomend this book to anyone interested in a new perspective of Gettysburg. .

In sports parlance, Jeffrey Hall is a "fan" of the Battle of Gettysburg. He is a biologist by occupation who has fallen in love with this one particular event of the Civil War and through study has made himself an "expert" on it. Like most fans of anything he carries a prejudice with him, that being that Mr. Hall is a Union man, pure and simple. He announces this loudly in the Introduction: "Gettysburg was a battle that was not sitting there for the Confederates to win or lose. ... The Army of the Potomac was much more than a passive participant that benefited solely from Confederate errors . . . the Southerners did not flounder at Gettysburg; they were outfought." What follows in the text is a detailed and well-argued account of the battle and events immediately surrounding it that attempts to make good Mr. Hall's premise.

Beginning with the cavalry engagement at Brandy Station on June 9, Hall traces the movement of Lee's army up the Shenandoah Valley and across the Mason-Dixon Line and Meade's accompanying moves to the east. He discusses Stuart's well-known raid that brought him many miles north of Gettysburg at Carlisle on July 1 and is very critical of it. At Gettysburg proper he discounts a Southern "victory" on the First Day since the Union forces gained the best ground for the fighting that would take place the next two days. Through the use of many (literally hundreds) of excellent maps, Hall explains what precisely occurred on the battlefield throughout the battle. Hall believes that only a small fraction of the advancing Southern forces in "Pickett's charge" ever made it to the Union lines, thanks largely to the actions of the 8th Ohio which was positioned west of the Emmitsburg Road on the Southern left. Hall also writes about the Southern retreat and, in appendices, about other (mainly cavalry) battles.

Again in the Introduction Hall says he did not want to go into "excruciating detail" about the battle, and one might want to dispute him there. Though "excruciating" is one of those relative terms, Hall is about as detailed as one could be while still being relevant. He is also prone to draw comparisons with specifics from other world battles; it was a bit disconcerting at first to suddenly find a detailed map of part of Crete from 1941, for example, placed there to explain some of the action on Little Round Top. Once again, though, I found the superb maps to be the highlight of the book. Hall's annotations are also thorough and interesting. It's an excellent book for serious students of the Battle of Gettysburg. Highly recommended.

This is an average book on Gettysburg with most of the "historical revisions" added. The author agrees with all of the revisions with out presenting any of the things that made them impossible at the time. Did/did not Chamberlain order the charge, probley not, but his actions that day inspired it and he did hold the line. Longstreet was late, yes, but it had as much to do or more to do with Lee's actions than anything else. Pickett's Charge was a bad idea and nothing Longstreet could do would change that. Mlavern Hill and Fredicksburg had already proven this to everyone but Lee.

Sears' book is much better and if you want a large format book look at David J. Eicher's "Gettysburg Battlefield".

The premise of this book is that the Union victory at Gettysburg was due as much to the actions of the Northern commanders and soldiers as it was to supposedly poor choices by the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia.

On the whole, I think Mr. Hall presents a pretty good case. He demonstrates that General Meade, only a few days in command, arrayed his troops (admittedly, along interior lines) in a way that allowed him to parry every thrust at his positions by Robert E. Lee. Hall has a very interesting take on Sickles' movement of his corps to the Peach Orchard. He also gives credit to the fighting men in the ranks themselves, noting how they girded themselves to defend Northern soil only a couple of months after the humiliating defeat of Chancellorsville, and a longer stretch of beatings administered by the rebels.

Hall also calls to attention examples of earlier and later wars in which similar problems of command and terrain manifested themselves. I'm not too sure about the effectiveness of that, however, mainly because my working knowledge of the two world wars is not what it should (or what I'd like it) to be.

This is a big (8" by 10") book, loaded with maps and what amount to flow charts depicting the forces involved (some 175 and 110 of each, respectively). The main flaws I could find were several instances in which "westward" was substituted for "eastward" in the text; whether this is the fault of Mr. Hall or the publisher is not known.

I've checked around at several book review sites, and could not find much on this work, which I don't understand. Although not quite at the level of Coddington, Pfanz, or even Trudeau, this is a book that every serious student of Gettysburg should read. I think it makes a great companion to "Last Chance for Victory" by Ward & Bowden.