State, The [Paperback]

Anthony de Jasay (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 1, 1998

Modern Political Philosophy

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About the Author

Anthony De Jasay

Product Details

• Reading level: Ages 18 and up
  
• Paperback: 330 pages
• Publisher: Liberty Fund (March 1, 1998)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0865971714
• ISBN-13: 978-0865971714
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 5.9 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #934,819 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Seminal Critique of the State!, August 24, 2010

By 

Kevin Currie-Knight "Education Grad Student" (Newark, Delaware) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 500 REVIEWER)   

This review is from: State, The (Hardcover)

I don't speak lightly when I say that Anthony de Jasay's "The State," deserves consideration alongside some of the great works of contemporary political thought. That it is not already may possibly stem from its pessimistic conclusions on two points: (a) the government is not an instrument of the people but must necessarily be its own entity with its own concerns, and (b) any state that wants to stay in power must grow in order to do so. When last comes to last, Jasay is probably best seen as something of an anarcho-capitalist who believes that the best solution may be to leave us to govern ourselves (and offers interesting reasons, stemming from game theory, why we may be able to do this).

So, why see the state as its own entity with its own concerns rather than as an instrument of the people? Well, first, there is the basic reason enumerated by other public choice theorists that the state - as any organizatoin - is a collection of individuals who have their own interests, and while they may be "public servants," they are also their own people. Second, any state that is worth a salt (even a minimal government) must be concerned with having enough power to retain power, even if this is only a well-intentioned interest in staying around to maintain order. That, in itself, means that it has at least one (self-serving) concern that is outside of its housekeeping duties.

It is here that Jasay discusses the problems with social contract theory: the idea that government exists because people in a state of nature came together and collectively decided, in the interests of security, to cede at least some power to government. First, why would people do this? If they are the types of selfish sorts who make life "nasty, brutish and short," why would they muster enough altruistic sentiment to sign a contract giving up power for the common good? If they are the altruistic type who would give up personal power for the common good, then a contract would be unnecessary because good will would already abound. If they are distrustful of others abusing personal power and are signing a contract to prevent free riding, defection, etc, then WHY TRUST A GOVERNMENT TO HOLD A MONOPOLY ON POWER (if it can defect, free-ride, etc)? Moreover, a social contract is circular in that it is a contract made to ensure that contracts can be made safely.

Jasay then talks about why a minimal state simply can't survive at its present size (which is why he is not a minarchist). A minimal state is one that allows freedom of contract and interferes only when there are disputes over contracts and to ensure enforcement of contract law. But in order to have enough power to successfully do this, and to stay in power doing it, it needs more power than is likely to come from a minimal state. (This is not new; it was also written about in the latter part of Oakeshott's The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism). By way of example, the then-new United States found immediate faulty with its 'weak' government under the Articles of Confederation, and even when writing its 'minimal government' constitution, saw fit to include a clause essentially allowing the government to do anything above and beyond the constitution that IT judged to be 'necessary and proper.' Incidentally, this is also why Jasay writes against the belief that constitutions can be checks on power: only people can be checks on power, and when the people checking the power are members of the same organization to whom power is vested, well...

But what about democracy - the concept where government can only be government based on the consent of the governed? Jasay sees reasons why democracies (and any government that rests on consent) is sure to grow: they must buy votes by favoring some over others. In order to get votes and keep votes from one's competitors, one must please a majority of those who will vote by "serving" them (tarrifs, redistribution, actualizing their favorite programs, etc) and, since those cost money that the government does not itself generate, it must coerce money from other citizens. But this can't simply happen in one shot: it must keep happening because, as long as there are elections, there is competition to outdo who is trying to outdo you. People must be pleased and as old favors become habit, new favors must be promised. Etc.

Quite soon, we have a scheme where government has quite a bit of power, for as long as you have the power to give to some with the wealth from others, you have the power to pick winners and losers, generally rather arbitrarily by imposing a favorite view of fairness onto everyone. Some might object that in a democracy, the government simply adapts the policies of the majority and their notion of fairness and that may be true. But as Jasay writes, she who can decide who's view of fairness will win the day is essentially deciding which view of fairness she thinks is best (even if 'best' only means 'most advantageous to my situation').

One more thing must be mentioned: Jasay's compelling critique of utilitarian argumentation, which government must NECESSARILY use (except in the rare instance where taking sides leaves none worse off and at least some better off). The problem is that there is simply not "objective" way to compare interpersonal benefit. Will Jones be less worse off if we take his money than Smith, the recipient, will be better off? WE have no way of knowing because (a) we can't know all the consequences of that act, (b) we can't really know what they each would do with the money, and (c) we can't, in any reliable way, tell whether Smith's enjoyment of the money does or doesn't outweigh Jones's enjoyment of the money except with subjective intuition. Yes, we can argue about marginal utility, but Jasay tears that to smithereens. Long and short: any utilitarian justification for making some worse off to make others better off is a necessarily subjective intuition that imposes government's favored view onto everyone coercively.

I go on so long because I want to give you a flavor (albeit a vastly oversimplified one) of what Jasay's book argues. His influences are eclectic, drawing heavily on public choice economics, game theory, political theory, etc. And he is quite good at all of them. Even if one is tempted to disagree with some his conclusions, his analysis is very astute and absolutely well-reasoned. This book is one that anyone concerned with government and its relation to individuals simply should not ignore!