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679 of 750 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
What You Don't Hear On The News, October 1, 2006
I couldn't put this book down. And what I read inside it last night scared me. In short the message of this 600-page expose is this: we are being led by an administration that is unapproachably isolated from reality, our troops are facing unrelenting violence from guerilla fighters abroad, things are growing more violent, and even the Iraqi people wish we'd leave.
I emerged from reading State of Denial, the follow-up to Woodward's two previous books concerning the Bush administration, not only shaken and depressed but renewed in my sympathy for those American troops enduring the nightmare that is my nation's ongoing and misguided military presence in the crumbling, nominal country of Iraq. This book is beyond pessimistic but its message that things will only get worse in the future is backed up by data and testimony that seems all but undeniable. Here Woodward has interviewed top policy makers and those who were or are involved in running our shallow national policy on the Iraq War. As a result Donald Rumsfeld is exposed as a dictatorial yes-man whose frequent careless mistakes have cost many lives. It is revealed that a number of insiders, including the First Lady pleaded with the President to replace Rumsfeld with someone else: preferably an old guard GOP figure like James Baker. Tommy Franks and other generals are shown as short-sighted and clueless figures, often hamstrung by Washington, unable to plan for those long-term goals that should have followed an apparently easy victory in 2003.
One thing that jumped out at me was the raw statistic that attacks against US forces are currently occurring almost quarter-hourly, and of course it's not news but shocking to hear again how radical Islamists are flocking to Iraq from nations thousands of miles removed, all for the chance to secure for themselves a "martyrdom" as they conduct assaults on American forces. This war is a quagmire and State of Denial--aptly named!---makes that very clear. It was entered into on false pretenses, conducted without a clear plan of execution and with scant exit strategy, and even the supposed justification for why we are there has shifted as the Bush administration re-defines its puzzling crusade from season to season. Woodward reveals how the President's own staff are as divided by the Iraq War as is the American citizenry at large. Those who sycophantically bow to Mr. Bush stick around in high-ranking governmental positions, and those who voice opposition to our out-of-control leadership soon find themselves ostracized---as was Colin Powell---or removed from their jobs altogether.
After reading Mr. Woodward's book I feel the mess our President almost singled-handedly got this country into four years ago is at this point all-but hopeless in terms of victory ever coming or a pro-democracy future ever existing in Iraq. A small group of people have created for the entire world a very large and bloody fiasco.
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444 of 495 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Woodward hits hard in Volume III of his GWOT history..., September 30, 2006
State of Denial, the third book in famed journalist Bob Woodward's examination of the Bush administration's approach to war, is sure to be one of the most controversial. State of Denial looks at the policy decisions and inner maneuverings of the administration as America got deeper and deeper into the quagmire that is the Iraq War. As one can see by the reviews already up on Amazon, emotions are running high since Woodward has taken a decidedly harsh view towards the administration. Ironically for Woodward, he was taken to task for being an administration cheerleader in the first two volumes. What State of Denial shows us is that no matter your personal politics, it's important to understand why decisions were made, who were making them, and what people inside the government are saying about the conduct of the war to date. Woodward accomplished that quite well here, thanks to interviews with many of the key players in the process (though notably not with the President and Vice-President.)
One of the main focuses of the book is Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has been under heavy criticism for his heavy-handed management of the war and his failures to make tactical and strategic adjustments. Rumsfeld is in charge of a Pentagon intent on spending billions on high tech and unnecessary weapon systems like the F-22, the DDG-1000 destroyer, and the Army FCS while making little effort on raising the overall troop strength of the Army and Marine Corps. Even with the chorus of military and politicians calling for Rumsfeld's firing, it still comes as a surprise that Andrew Card, Bush's chief of staff and top advisor was pushing for Rumsfeld's ouster as early as 2004. Woodward also claims Card enlisted First Lady Laura Bush in the effort, a story that seems somewhat apocryphal. In several in-depth interviews with Woodward, Rumsfeld comes across as honest, arrogant, and firmly believing in his own success despite the torrent of criticism he receives from the military and NSC staffers interviewed for the book.
Some of the newer nuggets of information offered in the book are fascinating. Woodward reveals that then National Security Advisor Condi Rice was briefed in July 2001 by CIA Director George Tenet and CIA counter-terror expert Cofer Black on the increasing likelihood of an attack on US interests. Woodward discusses how Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, was a key player in advising President Bush before and after 9/11. Another of the book's most interesting revelations is that Henry Kissinger regularly advises President Bush and Vice-President Cheney. Considering Kissinger's status as the architect of a failed Vietnam policy, this tidbit only reinforces Woodward's assertion that the administration refuses to do anything other than "stay the course." Throughout the book the administration is portrayed as as blind to the reality of the Iraq War as it was eager to paint a rosy public picture, ignoring or classifying facts that didn't fit its view of success and labeling those who disagreed as negative and not "team players."
As with many other Woodward books, the book reads quickly and quite cleanly. The level of detail is impressive, and State of Denial expands upon the material covered by James Risen and Thomas Ricks. The material on Bremer and his disasterous tenure as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority was adroitly addressed in detail in Rajiv Chandrasekaran's Imperial Life in the Emerald City, and Woodward doesn't add anything new in that regard. One wonders how much of the material given by Woodward's sources is slanted to better represent their role in history's judgemental eye and how much is actual truth. Woodward lays out the material in its entirety from the many sources, and lets the reader decide which is revisionist and which is reality. Partisans on both side will either love or hate this book regardless of its content, but as a whole this book is fair and balanced. Woodward is no partisan attack dog, he is a journalist committed to telling a story fairly and accurately without regard to what his critics may think. Highly Recommended.
A.G. Corwin
St. Louis, MO
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151 of 165 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent - Tells How the Iraq Tragedy Unfolded!, September 30, 2006
State of Denial" documents the Bush administration's Iraq debacle from the beginning. First there are Bush's initial rationale for becoming (our least-prepared modern-day) president prior to completing his first term as Texas' governor - basing his entire rationale on tax cuts, modernizing the military (eg. missile defense), education reform (Bush's major Texas "success" in Houston turned out to be a fraud), and helping faith-based initiatives (no thoughts whatsoever about foreign policy). Another Bush motivation to run, per Prince Bandar, Saudi Arabia's Ambassador, was to get revenge for his father's defeat by Clinton/Gore; then there was the smoldering need for finishing the job on Saddam Hussein. (Needless to say, these do not total to good rationale for becoming U.S. President, nor are they indicative of a serious thinker.)
Selecting Cheney as V.P. running-mate also helped set things in the wrong direction - his bias towards finding evidence of WMD (eg. digging into unverified intelligence cables), focus on secrecy and regaining executive powers underlay much of the Iraq War marketing. Then there was Bush's selection of Rumsfeld for Secretary of Defense - partly based on the idea of proving Bush #1 wrong (didn't trust Rumsfeld, thought him too self-sure and arrogant), and Rumsfeld's subsequent selection of Joint Chiefs Chairmen that were easy to roll over (eg. reduce requested Iraq troop strength; fail to take their issues directly to Bush, per Nichols-Goldwater).
(Failing to send enough troops into Iraq probably is the single most disastrous mistake made in Iraq War II, other than invading in the first place. However, it may be unfair to blame Rumsfeld - the Bush administration "group-think" (except for Powell) was that we'd be out of Iraq within a few months; further, it is doubtful that the U.S. has the troops to sustain levels the generals believed were needed. On the other hand, Rumsfeld has no excuse for not immediately taking action to improve vehicle armor against IEDs, failing to create a military strategy - besides aggravating all Iraqis through night-time raids, then driving up and down the roads allowing them the opportunity for IED revenge - to achieve security, and failing to create a set of 3-5 key performance measures and goals.)
Deeper into the plot we get CIA Director Tenet's July 2001 effort to convince Rice to make terrorism a priority, only to get the "brush-off" from her - Woodward documents that no terrorism plan was even made ready for approval until 9/10 (after eight other issues), hardly the priority Rice claims. Far worse, if the FBI had simply been focused and monitored one of the two hijackers it knew were in the country, it would have learned that he bought ten tickets for himself and other terrorists for those fateful 9/11 flights - possibly unraveling the entire plot!
"State of Denial" continues on to assemble other key pieces, including Bush's stubbornness, over-reliance on Cheney and Rumsfeld, and lack of curiosity (probably also the reason Bush #1 did not communicate his serious Iraq concerns pre-invasion), Rice's inability to challenge others' thinking, to move beyond "you're not on the team" vs. dissenters, follow-up on action items, and failure to update Iraq planning as the situation changed, Bremer's extremely damaging decisions (delaying elections and turnover of power, disbanding the Iraq army, de-Baathing the nation), Powell's failure to use his moral authority to confront Bush, and an incredible administration-wide inability to make decisions in an open and inclusive manner, set goals, delegate, pursue performance descepancies, resolve disagreements (eg. assign responsibility for postwar Iraq security), or follow-up. (How did he ever get through Harvard Business School?) Meanwhile, as the "Iraqis stand up" (hundreds of thousands of trained police and army recruits), we fail to "stand down" because the number of attacks continually increases - despite Bush's constant claims of progress.
Bottom Line: President Bush, our first "MBA president" both lacks the requisite experience and skills, and is psychologically unfit to lead the nation; to compensate he focuses on being a "cheerleader" (simply willing things to happen), and distorts and withholds information.
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