State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror [Paperback]

Robert I. Rotberg (Editor)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0815775733 | ISBN-13: 978-0815775737 | Publication Date: February 1, 2003

Since September 11th 2001, the threat of terror has given the failed state problem an immediacy and an importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimensions. In the past, failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now failed states pose dangers to themselves, to their neighbours and to people around the globe. Preventing nation states from failing, and reviving those that do fail, has become a strategic, as well as moral, imperative. The introduction to this text develops a theory of state failure and suggests how it may be guarded against. The subsequent chapters illustrate the state failure paradigm by examining cases of state collapse (Somalia), state failure (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and the Sudan) and states at risk for failure (Colombia, Fiji, Haiti, Indonesia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan). The last chapters ask when and how weak states succumb to failure, and how that fatal slide can be arrested.

Editorial Reviews

About the Author

Robert I. Rotberg is president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the John F. Kennedy School of Government's program on interstate conflict, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Product Details

• Paperback: 368 pages
• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press (February 1, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0815775733
• ISBN-13: 978-0815775737
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #680,456 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4.0 out of 5 stars State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, September 12, 2007

By 

Michael J. Cataldo - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Paperback)

Robert Rotberg, as a prominent scholar of the problems of the developing nations has compiled a set of essays by academicians on nations in Africa, South America and Asia which have been on the spectrum from weak to collapsed in recent years. Together these essays highlight in a descriptive manner the events and causes of state failure. Individually, many of the essays suffer from an academic writing style which makes them difficult to read due to their over-reliance on detail wherein the reader loses sight of the forest to for the trees. This volume would have benefited from a review chapter outlining the: causes dynamics, features and resolution of nations which have failed.

5 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars inaccurate in its review of at least one country, November 2, 2004

By 

resident alien (Stillwater, OK USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Paperback)

I can only judge the article on the the government failure in Tajikistan, as it is a country I both lived in and studied for many years. The author, Nasrin Dadmehr, explains the weakness of the current state by examining its historical background, but that background, as he presents it, is full of omissions and inaccuracies.

For instance, the word "basmachi" used to describe the armed rebel groups in 1920's Central Asia, does not mean "bandits" in Russian, as he claims. It means nothing in Russian because it is not of Russian origin but was adopted from one of the local languages, Tajik or Uzbek.

Another example is that the author keeps referring to the two factions fighting for control over government as "Communists" and "Islamists". It is true that these labels have been exploited by both sides in order to attract foreign aid from countries where those things matter (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Russia). However, the actual division is based entirely on people's ethnic/regional affiliations. So unless you accept the idea that everyone born in Kulab is a Communist and a Gharmi accent automatically makes one a devout Muslim, those labels mean as much as the logos of two opposing teams in a football field. Chicago Bears are not really bears, the "Islamist opposition forces" are not united by Islam, and there has not been any Communists in Tajikistan for many years, apart from perhaps a few senior citizens nostalgic for the times when they had something to eat. So whenever anyone describes the conflict in Tajikistan as a struggle between Communists and Islamists it is a good indication that they have very little knowledge or understanding of the political situation in that country.

There are plenty of other inaccuracies as well, like the description of May 1992 events. According to the author, this is when "backed by popular support and two months of non-stop demonstrations <the opposition forces> succeeded in imposing a coalition government on the communists." In reality, the "imposing" part involved an ambush of the city airport by a heavily armed group of militants who proceeded to capture President Nabiyev as he was trying to flee the country and forced him, at a gunpoint, to sign his resignation. There was no "coalition government" created, and the following few months of the opposition's rule were filled with as much oppression and extreme violence towards Kulabis as was later directed at Gharmis when the power switched back around.

The two-month long non-stop demonstrations that had led to this incident included one for the opposition and one supporting the government. Both were heavily organized, with people being recruited and bussed in from remote villages to be fed, clothed, and financially compensated for the two months of camping in the middle of the city. No information about who was paying for all that "expression of popular will" on either side was ever publicly released.

Even if these omissions in the article seem minor or irrelevant, they reduce the complexity of the war in Tajikistan to a "goodies vs. baddies" comic-book type scaffle that incidentally brings about the collapse of the government. The collapse itself and the resulting chaos is described quite well. But glancing over so many important aspects of what had led to it makes the resulting analysis somewhat skewed and one-sided.