Customer Reviews

States of Injury

5 star:		(0)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

In the first half of States of Injury, Wendy Brown's critique of traditional feminism and more broadly identity politics as a whole was based upon the principle that the "I am" clause used by many marginalized groups should be avoided because of its universalizing and finalizing nature. In its place, such groups should focus on the "What I want for us" clause, because of its potential fluidity and room for political action. In the second half of the book, Brown addresses, among other things, the question of what should be desired from a gendered postmodern perspective.

Brown's scathing critique of classical liberalism begins to take shape as she attacks the litigious nature of modern state politics, and more specifically, she builds her case against a rights-based discourse for feminism. Rights require cultural and historical context, and without those important brushstrokes, their picture cannot be painted because of their amorphous or perhaps even polymorphous nature. Brown insists that rights must not be confused with equality and that they "are more likely to become sites of the production of identity as injury than vehicles of emancipation" (Brown 1995, 134). Rights then should be avoided as a political goal, but they should not be avoided altogether. Rights may well serve as a means to an end, their usefulness should not be overlooked as a step in realizing larger goals, but once again, Brown has demonstrated that focusing on rights, like focusing on identity, is a finalizing process; a rights discourse ends the conversation. What happens once rights are granted? If a woman's rights are violated it is then up to the state to uphold those rights as they have been written into law. Protection is then institutionalized, creating a female dependence on state power. There is no discussion of transcending the existing patterns of male dominance within the masculinist state because women have been granted equality under law. The liberal philosophy of writing rights into law thus entrenches and subjugates women into the existing systems of traditional subordination, allowing no real way out of the cycle of dependency, protection and regulation. As much as I was hoping for Brown to articulate some sort of policy prescriptions, or a potential way out of this structure of dominance, I did not see it. Brown herself admits that the final essay develops more than answers the questions that she raises and "it does not build toward policy recommendations or a specified political program" (173). If rights must be seen as a means and not an end, what is the end? It seems that Brown's critical analysis is arguing for a radical transformation or complete transcension of the late modern political structures found in the liberal state. Is the best hope for feminism to be found in the private sphere, away from the state? What is the way out for Brown's structural-historical analysis of feminine subordination? Is her answer to be found in the last sentence of the book? Here she suggests that "feminists can both exploit and subvert, but only by deeply comprehending in order to strategically outmaneuver its contemporary masculinist ruses" (196). It is great to understand, and it may be the first step to political action, but comprehending is not action in itself.

This book looks at how gender and the political theories of our time (liberalism, theories of the state, Foucault, etc.) intersect. I have only read three of the chapters so far, which are self-contained, and I enjoyed them very much. Brown's response to Catherine MacKinnon is especially well-argued and helpful: she draws out how Marxism influences MacKinnon's thought, and then shows how Mackinnon's thought demonstrates the extent to which freedom for women can be incompatible with freedom in general. The prose could be better.