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States and Power in Africa

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Herbst does not contend that political geography is the sole determinant in explaining the precarious state of contemporary African nations. Rather he asserts that precolonial social and political norms as well as post-colonial adherence to an imposed state system (reified by the Addis rules) have contributed most to the Continent's current plight. He emphasizes that throughout history, African rulers have had a perpetual disregard for consolidating power in the hinterlands. By means of rational cost-benefit analysis, African rulers historically concluded that the costs of extending formal political authority into the hinterlands pointedly outweighed the purported benefits. Instead, African rulers focused their attention on the capital city and its immediate environs. This precolonial practice soon became a leit motif in African politics. Rulers in contemporary African states continue to focus their attention on the political consolidation of urban centers. When the independence-era African rulers acceded to inheriting the colonial boundaries, Herbst suggests these leaders may have become even less wont to broadcasting their writ of authority. Territorial integrity and the inviolabliity of borders (two salient precepts of the first OAU summit at Addis) convinced African leaders of the futility of broadcasting power past the capital. With no external security threat it seemed pointless to extend political control. Factors such as national design, political geography, and lack of infrastructure (esp. roads) are all strictures exacerbating the sense of alienation and disaffection hinterland populations experience as physical isolation is coupled with political disenfranchisement. These externalities also contribute to many African leaders' reassertion that the travails of broadcasting power are too costly. Consequently, the political ambit of African states remains modest and the prospect of significantly increasing the scope of political authority in contemporary African nations remain dim. Herbst has devised a cogent, compelling, and provocative analysis of state consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa devoid of the many fictions tied to the putative European model. An amazon review cannot do this book proper justice (there is much more I have failed to touch on). I only wish to convey that Mr Herbst has afforded us an indispensable opportunity to enhance our understanding of an intriguing phenomenon. States and Power in Africa is a truly outstanding book.

The scholarly literature on state creation and consolidation usually fails to account for the African experience. The central idea of this literature is that the high population density of Europe made land relatively scarce and valuable to control, particularly from the late Middle Ages onward. This and technological change in the methods of warfare (e.g., more sophisticated battle tactics and firearms) drew states into continual conflict. But warfare is costly, and early modern states required resources to attack and defend. To get money for wars, kings had to build bureaucracies, gather information, and map their territory and people. They also had to make concessions- such as creating regular parliaments where citizens could have a voice. All these things were necessary to survive. If a state did not become "stronger", then typically it became extinct. This process created the modern system of nation states with their familiar institutional infrastructures that consolidated in Europe in the nineteenth century.

Herbst's argument is that this process has not taken place in Africa. It did not take place historically in the precolonial era, it did not take place during the colonial epoch, and it is not taking place since or now. Why?

Africa is different because the structural conditions that led to the path of state formation and institution building in Europe were absent in Africa. Unlike in Europe, land was and is not scarce in Africa. Rather, labor was scarce. Thus in the precolonial period, states did not fight over land, but rather people. This meant that precolonial states had vague borders and were often very "weak". Without the constant necessity of defending a well-defined territory, states did not need to invest in bureaucracies, censuses of their populations, tax collectors, or permanent militaries.

This absence of external threats coupled with low population densities persisted. During the colonial period there was little fighting over borders between the colonial powers. The conference of Berlin in 1885 largely determined which European power would have which bit of Africa. This meant that, like the precolonial polities, European colonial powers had little incentive to develop state institutions. Instead they focused on commercial exploitation and outright plunder of the mineral and natural wealth.

Following independence, the situation could have changed but did not, because the international state system and the United Nations decided to enforce the colonial boundaries that had largely determined the form that the new nations took. This trend was reinforced by Cold War politics. Thus African states were still able to survive without having to engage in the type of institution building that occurred historically in Europe.

Herbst argues that the lack of development of African state institutions helps explain many aspects of modern Africa. Since states never had to fight to survive they never had to build effective fiscal institutions. Therefore they have no tax bases and instead have to engage in highly distortionary methods of raising taxes (such as taxing trade) or redistributing income (for example via employment in parastatals). Foreign aid or rents from oil and minerals also allowed them to stay in power without having to develop indigenous channels of accountability. States never had to make political concessions to their citizens, hence the lack of functioning domestic political institutions such as parliaments and the completely unconsolidated nature of democracy in Africa. Moreover, the lack of these institutions can help explain the extent of venality and state corruption in Africa since these institutions provide key checks on such abuses.

This book discusses not only the history and politics of state creation and consolidation, but also evaluates policy alternatives that might address some of the fundamental political challenges Africans states face today. Its contention that the international community should stand ready to accept partition or the redrawing of borders is likely to keep fueling debates in the years to come. But although the potential costs of anarchy and chaos that a territorial restructuring of Africa could bring about are legitimate concerns, they need to be weighted against the current ongoing decay that prevails in several parts of Africa and that has already ignited a process of territorial reshuffling. We may have to accept the fact that in twenty years, the map of Africa is unlikely to look like that of today and of forty years ago.

Smart and insightful - a realistic look at the causes of many of Africa's problems today, without the usual shallow laying of blame on colonialism or traditional African society. Beyond that, it makes one take a critical look at state formation and the limitations and assumptions that go with it, coming as a welcome respite from the European models of state formation that are too often foisted on the rest of the world. Others outline the content well, so I won't bother. Just to say I highly recommend it. A book of practical realities.

Herbst claims to be making a generalizable argument about the implications of political geography (which for him seems to consist solely of population density) on state building. That is, low population densities are problematic for state officials trying to broadcast their authority throughout the territory they supposedly control. Whether or not his theory holds for African states is debatable given the shoddy evidence presented. Even more questionable, though, is whether this theory has any value for understanding state building in the non-African world - lots of countries with low population densities (like canada or australia, for example) dont face nearly the same problems as African states do with regard to authority broadcasting and state formation. overall, this book is an interesting and perhaps innovative take on political development, but it ultimately fails to make a persuasive case for bringing political geography to center stage.

Herbst provides a valuable contribution to political science in forcing the field to consider precolonial history as a determinant of state power. Unlike Europe, where interstate war led to strong state formation, in Africa geography and low population densities led to weak states. This fundamental development impacted colonial state building and eventually the state capacity of modern African countries. Hopefully, more scholars will consider deep history and its causes on modern politics.

While Herbst writes of Africa his thoughts could just as well be titled 'war and the state' in general. Herbst begins by questioning a few elements of conventional historical study. He argues that pre-colonial Africa was important in relation to current political situations. The nature of population movement and strategies of control and power cannot go unnoticed in the pre-colonial era. What does this mean for theory of states and our international system? In another look at state formation, Joan Lockwood O'Donovan questions the African state model noticing that while Africa has been cut in to the international mold of state systems it also has the largest number of refugees. For O'Donovan, this means the state system is not a good fit for Africa where nationalism is lost in debate between state loyalty and cultural, ethnic and linguistic loyalty.

Herbst explains the refugee phenomenon further by claiming that when Europe formed its states' systems over densely populated areas, African leaders enforced their power over a central city, projecting their power outward in concentric circles without borders. The availability of land allowed for free movement of Africa's inhabitants. During the colonial era this meant whole villages could cross political borders to escape the harsh rule of one colonizer for the dominance of another less harsh. The initial jubilation of state loyalty (classical nationalism) was short-lived during the independence movements of the 60s and 70s.

As the new African state leaders moved to consolidate their power this also meant their boundaries; creating rules for citizenship, currency and power projection. Herbst excplaimed that Africans lacked creativity in their African rulership. The international system dominated with state structures, most likely the main influence in stemming the imagination of the leaders from developing a more 'appropriate' African response to modern government.

I found most interesting the condemnation of peace not only in the colonial era but also in the post-colonial era. More than once Herbst quotes historians that vouch for the lasting peace of Europe by means of initial prolonged wars. Interstate wars were not to be in Africa. When the conference of Berlin established its rules for 'scramble' it included a half-hearted colonial attempt and utmost respect for peace. Ironically, respect for peace meant little to no road development, which is a pre-cursor to border protection and expansive power.

When the independent Sub-Saharan African's voted to maintain the colonial borders they also passed up 'cleansing, finality' of war in place of a tepid peace. Herbst seems to blame colonialism for not better developing Africa when it had the chance. He never blames them for colonizing to begin with, while he does question the motive.

Ultimately Herbst regards the state system as a Eurocentric construct idealized through war but stunted under strictly political negotiation. War has a way of cultivating ideological loyalties, carving out deep boundaries and even creating lasting peace. "States and Power in Africa" is not only a criticism of the state system on Africa's unique history and condition but is a debate in war and peace. What historians and theorists rarely touch on is the counter-factual, 'what would Africa look like, what could have Africa developed outside of colonialism?' The truth is, Africa would have had a slow growth in to the international economy regardless of the last 300 years.

Herbst leaves room for greater secessionist movements and the respect for non-state actors. He wants to see more literature on the options for Africa outside of the state system. Interestingly, it appears as Franz Fanon had a small way of explaining the current problem. The inherited corrupt powers used the state system for their own interest. Power has stunted the creative, imaginative capacity of Africa's leadership. In the end the structural, realist argument of Herbst comes around again to the relations of state and power.

The book is well-researched and compelling, presenting a myriad of interlinking causal factors that makes the European-style nation-state unworkable in Africa. For example: the placement of colonial centers (today's capitol cities) to favor expediency in commerce over effectiveness in ruling; the existence of a multitude of distinct national (tribal) identities, many with pre-existing governance systems; people's propensity to ally with these national identities rather than with the nation-state; the population's mobility and the willingness of individuals to shift their allegiance to neighboring groups (resulting in the practical irrelevance of state borders); the lack of a shared history between the populace and the elites that could result in a contract of mutual obligation (in Europe this was worked out over the centuries because of security concerns); the colonial preference for one-crop economies, the complexity of language politics in Africa, and much more. All this leads to conclusion that the cost-benefit ratio of extending rule effectively outward from the capitol is just not worth it. Of course, that's an oversimplification, there's a lot more here. In all the pool of evidence is deep and wide. One criticism is that some think the model is not applicable elsewhere - well, it is (I'm currently working in the Philippines). But really, I don't care if it isn't. Political science has for too long been hamstrung by the search for universal, one-size-fits-all models. The world doesn't work that way, and this book is a step toward helping the discipline grow up.

Interesting explanation for the weakness of the African state. The importance of this work is illuminated when one realizes that weak states are not only primary causes of many of Africa's ills but direct results as well. Herbst really gives one food for thought.

Drawing heavily upon the work of Charles Tilly, the most attrctive aspect of Herbst's work is the eloquence of his thesis: the application of theories of european state formation to the African state system. Herbst argues persuasivly that the problem with state boundaries in Africa is not that they are too weak, but that they are too strong. Indeed, it is the case with most states in sub-saharen Africa that there is a gap between the area that they are supposed to govern and the area that they can govern. In Europe, the flexibility of national bounardies ensured that weak and failed states were conqured by strong states, and that a sort of natural selection based on state power is the determineant of state bounaries. This however never happened in Africa...anyways, that's the thesis....

In States and Power in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst frequently uses the term "international system." An instinctive reading of the term may lead to the idea of "international community" (another term that is frequently seen in the text), and there are moments in Herbst's narrative that seem to support this interpretation. Yet Herbst repeatedly stresses the importance of state development in Africa to the international system : does he mean to say that the rise and fall of Zaire or Mali are seismic events in the world community?

In fact, I would posit, "international system " refers to more than just one type of international system in Herbst book. Sometimes, the term refers to the Westphalia state model. Other times, it refers to a model that is specific to Africa only. Yet there are still moments when the term is used to mean a "meta-international system" that incorporates both the European and the African models.

First, Herbst recognizes that the Western states and the African states are fundamentally different. The Western states are built on the establishment and mutual recognition of sovereignty. But in Africa, many states have only limited sovereignty at best. For example, many African governments are effective only in urban areas; they have a hard time collecting taxes; some cannot even enforce a single currency within their borders (p226). But most telling of all: African states do not always have a monopoly on the use of force (p255).

Second, Herbst describes how the subsequently formed Western international system is equally different from the African international system. Whereas the Western system is bound together by the threat of anarchy and violence, the African system is more loosely organized but has a tradition of cooperation (p26). Although Herbst repeatedly assures us that, "fundamentally, there is nothing exotic about African politics," (p31) there is nevertheless an overwhelming sense of "otherness" in how Herbst portrays the relationship between the Western and the African international systems. For example, Herbst states at one point, "It will ... be up to the Africans to come up with alternatives to the nation-state. However, the international community can play an important role ..." (p269) If the Africans are truly part of the international community, then why the "However," but not "The rest of"?

Third, in order to have the two international systems (Western and the African) working together, Herbst urges the world to embrace a new system in which sovereignty is no longer a prerequisite (p269). To paraphrase Herbst: if the power or control is exercised within a sub-national unit (a tribe or a region, for example) why can't the international agencies engage the sub-national unit directly? Assuming Herbst's definition of engagement includes the representation of those units (or we are back to the Colonial days), he is in effect proposing a different international system--a meta-system as I termed earlier--that is a mishmash of sovereign states and non-sovereign polities. This meta-system is what he has in mind when he theorizes the relationship between state development and international system (p27).

The metamorphosis of the term "international system" reveals a fault line in Herbst's work: in essence, he is trying to replace an existing concept (Westphalia international system) with a new one (meta-international system) by using terminologies that are alive only within the existing concept. Sovereignty, system, state and nation are terms conceived in the West, and are laden with Western historical experiences . Using terms such as "sovereignty" to construct an international system without sovereignty is bound to cause enormous confusion.

However, the misappropriation of terminologies is only a minor transgression compared to the implication of Herbst's conclusion. What he advocates, in essence, is to relieve the suffering in Africa at the expense of state building . Yet he has failed to make the case that, without the kind of power that Western states have to mobilize resources within a secured border, the proto-states in Africa can survive in today's global economy--one that was created by and for strong states only. Consequently, even if the international community can find ways to accommodate a continent full of chiefdoms, people in Africa may find themselves forever condemned to impoverishment and dependency.