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States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China

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A new way of studying political sociology was first initiated when Skocpol's "States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China" was published in the 1970s.

Skocpol's discussion in the book is based on Marxist class struggle revolution, combined with the consensus theories which explain revolution as response to disequilibum of social system. In the very beginning, Skocpol attended on a fundamental question on most revolutions happened in old-regimes: Why revolution occurred in predominantly agrarian countries? (refer to "Old-Regime State in Crisis") He clearly stated a logical development from the three cases. Revolutionary crises developed when the old-regime states became unable to meet the challenges of evolving international situations. Disintegration of centralized administrative and military machinaries had therefore provided the sole unified bulwark of social and political order. Skocpol concluded that in most cases the pre-revolution states were fully established imperial states. They had a proto-bureaucratic: some officers, especially at higher levels, were functionally specialized. State not in a position to control directly over local agrarian socioeconomic relationship. Before social revolutions could occur, the administrative and military power of these states had to break down. Finally, the old regimes to their downfall were not due to internal conditions alone. Intensifying military competition with nation-state abroad that possessed relatively much greater and more flexible power based on economic breakthroughs to capitalist industrialization or agriculture and commerce. Success in meeting this foreign competition depended on the ability of the monarchy suddenly to mobilize extraordinary resources from the society and to implement in the process reforms requiring structural transformations. France, Russia and China did mobilize to meet foreign competition in the nineteenth century, but avoiding social-revolutionary transformations.

It preserve a way to address a deeper analysis on the role of peasantry in the revolutions (refer to "Agrarian Structures and Peasant Insurrections"). Peasant revolts or mobilization for guerrilla warfare played a pivotal role in each revolutionary process. In agrarian countries where peasants are the major producing class. From Skocpol's point of view, without peasant revolts, urban radicalism in predominantly agrarian countries has not in the end been able to accomplish socio-revolutionary transformations. Peasant revolts against landlords were a necessary ingredient in France, Russia and China revolutions, whereas successful revolts by urban workers were not. According to Skocpol,the revolts weakened mainstays of the socioeconomic and political orders of the old regime. Together the extensiveness and anti-landlord focus of the revolutionary peasant revolts created decisive constraints at the societal level on the range of sociopolitical options available to elite contending for national power. Peasants participated in these revolutions without being converted to radical visions of a desired new national society, and without becoming a nationally organized class-for-themselves. Instead, Skocpol thought that they struggled for concrete goals-typically involving access to more land, or freedom from claims on their surplus. Political and cultural marginality and relative socioeconomic immobility, bears the burden of varying combination of taxes, rents, usurious interest rates, and discriminatory prices, peasants always have grounds for rebellion against landlords, states agents, and merchants who exploit them.

Skocpol then exploited the transformation process of the peasantry from local levels into a collective force capable of striking out against its oppressors by answering first, the relation of peasantry to the field of power which surrounds it, and second, class structure. For the first question, Skocpol did a great job by analyzing the degrees and kinds of solidarity of peasant communities, the degrees of peasant autonomy from direct day-to-day supervision and control by landlords and their agents, and finally the relaxation of state coercive sanctions against peasants revolts. He answered the second question from the view point of relations of direct producer to one another, to their tools and to the land in the immediate process of production, and relations by which an unpaid-for part of the product is extracted from the direct producers by a class of non-producers.

In the last part of the book, Skocpol asked what would be followed the revolution. (refer to "What Changed and How: A Focus on State Building") He answered this with flying color as well. He provided his idea with couple elements. First, the changes after revolution. According to Skocpol, the pre-revolutionary landed upper class was no longer exclusively privileged in society and politics. Second, new authority and emergent political leaderships were challenged by disunity and counterrevolutionary attempts at home, and by military invasions from abroad, to build new state organizations to consolidate the revolutions. Third, Skocpol pointed out that peasant and urban worker were more directly incorporated into national politics and state-run project after the revolution. Forth, Skocpol believed that new state leadership acted as state builders rather than as representatives of classes. Fifth, the old-regime states had once broken apart, fundamental political and class conflicts were set in motion, not to be resolved until new administrative and military organizations were consolidated in the place of the old. Revolts from below directly attacked the property and privileges of dominant classes, thus accomplishing changes in class relations. Last but not least, political ideologies probably functions nothing, but served the political reality and aim of leaders.

I apologize for focusing too much on the contents of the book. However, why I do it is because we can understand his contribution only if we go deeply into his ideas. Skocpol did a great job here. I gain a lot from reading "States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China". The book is a must for both politics and sociology students, or those have interest in the field.

Theda Skocpol seeks to explain the causes of social revolution through a structural paradigm. Her level of analysis is the state. This paradigm, holding the state as the level of analysis and concentrating on structure, is defined well by Migdal. "This is a system-dominant perspective in which structuralists see states as interchangeable to the degree that they expect them to act similarly if facing the same array of forces" (215).

Skocpol contends that external forces can lead to economic and military instability within a state. This instability weakens both the structure of the state, and subsequently the nation's societal structure. In turn, this creates an environment well-suited for social revolutions. Skocpol defines social revolution as causing two important changes which separate it from other forms of political upheavals: "societal structural change with class upheaval" and "the coincidence of political with social transformation" (5).

In order to discover similar phenomena common across states which lead to social revolution, Skocpol uses a method of comparative historical analysis. She seeks to establish relationships between "causal variables referring to the strength and structure of old regime states and the relations of state organizations to class structures" (35). Her analysis spans three revolutions: France 1789, China 1911 and Russia 1917. In looking for commonalities across state boundaries, Skocpol is using what she referred to in Bringing the State Back In as the Toucquevillian approach. In this case, Skocpol is using the Toucquevillian point of view to explore how "state structures and the activities of states" influence social revolution. Skocpol asserts that revolutions emerge from "political crises centered in the structures and situations of old regime states" (47). The author argues that in the cases of France, China and Russia, all regimes faced similar threats which affected state, and consequently, societal structures.

According to Skocpol, a number of transnational and internal events can lead to changes in state structure: threats of invasion, defeats in war, political dependency and economic inequalities. In discussing state failure, Migdal writes, "States crack when they are hit simultaneously by three sorts of crises - a state financial emergency, severe elite divisions, and a potential and propensity for popular groups to mobilize" (216). In Skocpol's historical analysis, all three old regimes suffered similar pressures.

First, pre-revolutionary regimes could not compete economically with their industrializing neighbors. All three old regimes experienced difficulty making the transition from agrarian economies to industrialized societies. This created economic inequality between states. As Skocpol writes, "Modern social revolutions have happened only in countries situated in disadvantaged positions within international arenas" (23).

In addition to economic disequilibrium, all three old regimes encountered military threats from abroad. These regimes were unable to compete militarily with their neighbors due to their economic disadvantage and lack of industrialization. These pressures lead to Migdal's second type of crisis, "state financial emergency."

Secondly, in response to these external pressures, the structure of the old regimes weakened, and conflict between the state and elites emerged. The international pressures began to drain the state economically. In France and Germany, wars with industrialized rivals nearly bankrupted the state (65, 81). In China, the Imperial court was unable to counter the intrusion of foreign powers and the successive changes imposed to the economic structure (74). This in turn placed pressure on the elites.

In France, the state faced bankruptcy due wars and the lack of an industrialized economy. The state attempted to impose tax reform which would have increased taxation for an elite deeply engrained in the state structure. The elites no longer felt that the state could adequately protect their interests, and began to seek a more representative regime. In turn, this call for more representation weakened the Crown, and coupled with a disillusioned peasant class, was able to change state structure. Similar events in Russia and Manchu China illustrate Migdal's "severe elite divisions."

Thirdly, the weakening of the state/elite relationship and divisions in the dominant class were not the sole catalyst for social revolution. Rather, Skocpol argues that in all three revolutions peasant rebellions against landed elites were necessary conditions for successful change in society's structure. In addition, specific organizational structures found in the peasant class were important in providing the revolutionary potential of the peasant (117).

Skocpol writes, "Rentier agrarian systems, where small holder peasant families possess and work the land on their own, are notoriously susceptible to peasant revolts" (117). Peasants under such a system find themselves economically tied together against landlords. In other words, the peasants suffer collectively under the yoke of the land holding class. As such, the peasants develop "some organized capacity for collective action against their exploitative superiors" (115).

The author uses the example of Russian obshchina as an organizational structure that provides a means to collective action and ensuing peasant revolution. The obshchina was a communal village which administered commonly held lands and disseminated the right to use among the villagers. In turn, the members of the obshchina were "collectively responsible for payment and labor obligations to service-nobles who possessed nearly exclusive jurisdiction over them" (128). Because of the closely knit relationships and responsibilities of peasants in the obshchina, the structure was conducive to collective action. Similar organizational structures of the peasant classes in France and Manchu China illustrate Migdal's "potential and propensity for popular groups to mobilize."

Four the past several weeks, I have been attempting to obtain copies of reviews of States & Social Revolutions that would have been written at the time of the book's initial publication. In fact, I had hoped that I could find whole books dedicated to rebutting much of the flawed argument that Skocpol puts forth in this book. I could find neither. But first, let me state my case against Skocpol.

First, there exists the problem of mid-level political theory. There is deep level theory, mid level theory, and what I deem specific political commentary. In deep level theory, one can make certain broad, rather common arguments: when states come under external military pressure, it impacts their economy. On the specific level, one could comment on how a specific war impacted a specific economy. But in the mid level, the arguments become tenuous. This happens when a scholar attempts to take a handful of countries, and to claim that a rather specific series of events (X, Y, Z) impacted those countries, took place in those countries, and had the same results in those countries. This is mid-level theory (in my understanding), and it is often highly flawed.

Skocpol advances three test cases to "prove" her argument. Indeed, she writes as though her book is empirically proving a mathematical equation to be true. This is one of the more superficial (though irritating) aspects of the book. Notwithstanding her penchant for a heavy-handed egotistical tone of writing, her argument is still tenuous. Her three test cases are France, Russia, and China. Essentially, Skocpol argues that all of these countries were impacted by their international situation and/or conflict. In France, the external actor was Britain's military might and the situation was exacerbated by France's poor geographic position. In Russia, the actor was WWI. In China, the Sino-Japanese war. These external situations necessitated governmental reforms in all three nations; reforms that would allow the nation to deal with threatening international conditions. Such reforms would deal with agricultural production, taxation, gathering of a military, etc. According to Skocpol, one of the key causes of a social revolution is that the elite classes in the countries where the revolution occurs will be antagonistic to the government's attempts at reform. When this antagonism reaches a hilt, social cohesion and coercion mechanisms fail, and the peasants revolt.

The first aspect of Sxocpol's argument is a sound one. In all three cases, there was international pressure and the government attempted reforms. As the argument progresses, it becomes quite weak. In France, the nobility were - as Skopol's claim requires - antagonistic to government efforts for reform, this did result in a breakdown in social cohesion and in coercion mechanisms. In China, the same held true. In Russia, however, the government reforms were accepted by the nobility. (STRIKE ONE).

According to Skocpol's logic, a rejection of governmental reforms by the nobility should result in a social revolution. In France, this happened. In Russia, there was no rejection by the noble class, but a revolution too place nonetheless. (STRIKE TWO). In China, there was no peasant revolt, yet Skocpol uses China as a case to prove her argument. (STRIKE THREE).

The argumentation in the book is poor. France is Skocpol's best case. But furthermore, it is instructive to note that Skocpol focuses exclusively on states, classes, governments---- but never on individual people. Her model is a very deterministic one: If conditions X, Y, and Z are present, there will be a social revolution. This is poor logic. She excludes any social/cultural factors that may have led to revolutions in any of her test cases. A great example is the case of Russia. Skocpol ignores Czar Nicholas' personal incompetence, and the difference between his ruling style and that of his predecessors. Furthermore, she ignores Russia's rapid industrialization and the power of a growing working class culture/shared identity/etc.

I reccomend this book to everyone interested in politics, if only because it will give you some good historical grounding for the periods and cases studied, and because it is always fun to deconstruct the "standard work".

Skocpol's "comparative analysis" leaves out only one minor detail: people. It seems never to occur to her that social revolutions are ultimately the consequence of human agency--that is, people taking history into their own hands. Marx's famous dictum from the opening of the "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napolean" that "men make their own history, but they do not make it exactly as they choose," is lost on Skocpol. Rather, such phenomena as socio-economic classes, states, political institutions, etc., exist for her as if they were variables in Euclidian geometry. By comparison, Stalin could pass for Kant, if not Hegel, and Althusser might as well be Lukacs. If you care about this subject, look to Barrington Moore, Jr., E. P. Thompson, and more recent studies of each ofthe three revolutions Skocpol compares.

Those seeking a work that will enlighten them on the cause of state revolutions will be sorely disappointed with this book. The title takes its cue from Lenin's The State and Revolution and belies the fact that this book is nothing more than a thinly veneered attempt to justify Marxist-Leninist doctrine through picking and choosing elements of history instead of a true academic work.

Assuming the reader can stay awake, he or she will find incredible repetition of a few small arguments with no real bases. It is hard to detect at times as the whole book is written in what can only be referred to as 'pseudoacademia', that language which has been used by many professors over the years to lengthen their works and ensure that no one will stay awake long enough to realise that what they have written is rubbish. (This is a common problem as many universities are more interested in their professors publishing than teaching. The latter forces one to learn to communicate clearly.)

Should the reader not be familiar with the French, Russian, or Chinese revolution, he or she will find rough outlines of the conflicts couched only in class struggles. Mrs. Skocpol fails to grasp the real source of these revolutions. The French Revolution was based on an issue of pride and warmongering in France that was both bankrupting the country and destroying the incomes of those engaged in trade. It is the trade issue that made for the resistance of peasantry that were isolated and enable the co-opting of the peasantry that lived in villages needing trade. Similarly, Ms. Skocpol does not understand the issue of war-weariness and bankruptcy in Russia, either. Without the Bolsheviks blatant desire for power and the purges of resistant elements, Russia would likely have remained tied to the West. Similarly, the peasant support of the Communists in China had less to do with real class struggle and more to do with the loss of economic basis for the Kuomintang and their loss of power fighting the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Communists evaded the Japanese while recruiting from the peasantry.

In her conclusion, should the reader reach that point, Ms. Skocpol almost comes clean about how she believes Marxism is the best way to explain social development. She clearly espouses a view that society will go from feudal to capitalist to communist systems as a form of evolution. Her lack of study in the realm of economic development and its ties to power structure allow her to use labels that conjure up extremely simplified and woefully inaccurate models.

This utter failure to present more than straw man arguments as opinion opposed to her Marxist views fails to meet any serious academic criteria. Masking in archaic form and circular argument is shameful. It is a blight upon the reputation of Cambridge University Press that they continue to publish such garbage as an academic work or that it is considered important in revolution studies given the broad corpus of work that has come out since that utterly debunks Ms. Skocpol's theories.

I bought this for a political science class. The book is decent and what the title states is what the book is all about. To be honest I didn't read it in its entirety, but I'm sure if I did it would have all right.

Skocpol uses very informative, historically packed writing to demonstrate her view on the reasons behind the three revolutions. Her opinions make very much sense as is clear through her thourough analysis and tons of obvious research. She repeats her main points when things get a little heavy and confusing but does not talk more than is necessary. I recommend to anyone interested in the theory of revolutions and state systems in collapse.

If one is interested in comparitive-historical sociology I think that it is absolutely essential that they own this book. I don't think that it is essential because one needs to read it in order to understand the whole of what is going on, but instead, because it shows some of the inherent weaknesses of the discipline. What Skocpol is doing here is writing a dissertation and following the guidelines. Even though she's drawing heavily from the Marxist tradition she makes it seem as though her research and ideas are thoroughly unique and new and, on top of that, revolutionary. But she makes several crucial mistakes that render this work either nearly useless or bad.

So if it's nearly useless (or bad) why should you own it? Because there are some crucial and sociological valuable conclusions one can draw from it. Also, as stated earlier, it is a roadmap to avoiding poor comparitive-historical work and it is the quintessential structuralist account of revolution to which many are in debt.

Milan3 introduced a very excellent further reading in the review. Morre Barrington's work, of course is more original for political sociology as he is Skocpol's teacher. However, at least to me, Skocpol's comparative study is more interesting and more easy to read for new comers. Surely, no single book can cover all elements in such a wide field. "people" seems essential and important in studying political sociology, but not just a minor detail. I agree to Michael Springfield, Skocpol already expresses her views convincingly and with conviction, especially on "people"'s role in revolution. anyway, I enjoy discussing with Milan3 and Michael Springfield here and thank you!

This is clearly Skocpol's best work. She expresses her views convincingly and with conviction. I highly recomend this book.