Customer Reviews

Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals

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If you care even a little bit about international justice, you have to read this groundbreaking book. The research is incredibly painstaking--there's unbelievable stuff about the war crimes tribunal after the Napoleonic Wars, and a riveting reconstruction of the failed tribunal after the Armenian genocide. But there's also great journalism about the search for justice in the Balkans. It looks like international tribunals are going to be the next big thing; this is the definitive history, and the definitive analysis.

Gary Jonathan Bass's book is a riveting, thoughtful read into what has been a long-neglected chapter of history. Piecing it all together wasn't easy. Mr. Bass takes sound scholarship, adds good reporting, and weaves a tale that I, frankly, could not put down. Read it. You won't regret it.

This book is thoroughly researched and footnoted and very well written. It culminates in a balanced account of the development of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and exposes the role of Western nations in supporting- and in some cases, obstructing the tribunal's work. Bass' thesis is that Western nations value human rights and the rule of law,- but not more than the lives of their own soldiers - thus accounting for the sporadic Western support for War Crimes tribunals. This is provocative book which has many insights into the complexities of international organizations, human rights, and diplomacy.

At the Tehran Conference in 1943, Stalin toasted the summary executions of 50,000 German officers, Churchill privately proposed a number of some 100 major war criminals, Roosevelt kept silent, swayed alternately by Hans Morgenthau, Jr., who proposed some 2500 summary executions, and Henry Stimson, who preferred trials. That Stimson should ultimately prevail in the debate owes as much to accidents of history as to any profound historical moment culminating in Nuremberg. How Nuremberg ultimately played out, and the subsequent notion of holding leaders personally responsible for war crimes, is a tale well worth reading.

Gary Jonathan Bass's book, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, debunks several of the myths that grow from such moments. Still, in reviving the story of Leipzig (trials of German officers after World War I) and Constantinople/Malta (trials of Ottoman officers after World War I), Bass has presented not just a useful set of anecdotes on trials that failed and one that succeeded beyond expectation or intention, but a careful history of what drove efforts to hold such trials in the first place, of the limited political will behind them, the complexity and likelihood of failure.

Bass offers two principle insights: first, liberal states have a tendency to support individual accountability through trials for leaders responsible for war crimes that is unique (illiberal states prefer summary executions without second thought). Second, the tendency for liberal states to desire individual accountability and punishment ("legalism," as Bass uses the term) varies directly with the quantity of suffering experienced by that state: France loses 14 times as many men as America in World War I, and Britain 10 times as many men, and both are far more interested in war crimes trials. America, on the other hand, supported prosecutions for those responsible for unrestricted submarine warfare. The first goal of liberal states is to punish those who have harmed their own citizens. The second goal is to do so without risking their own troops. Bass calls this "selfishness."

The principle defect with Bass's amazingly rich work (and apparently, his first academic work following the Let's Go Guide to Egypt and Israel) is that it was published before 9-11, before Guantanamo, the trial of Saddam, the death of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague, the ongoing efforts in Arusha and Rwanda, and the preliminary flickerings of prosecutions before the International Criminal Court for offenses in Darfur, Sudan, and Uganda. An update is urgently needed.

Vainly, one hopes Bass's insights into war crimes trials and the politics behind them will prove unnecessary. Those who anticipate that new monstrous figures will arise in this century may be well-served by a careful read of Bass's work, in that the prospects and pitfalls of trials as a means of addressing global villainy deserve this sort of well-researched, attentively reasoned, albeit somewhat disheartening, treatment.

"In the last analysis," Bass concludes, "the two international war crimes tribunals in The Hague and Arusha stand largely as testaments to the failure of America and the West."

Indeed: a bit more willpower at the right time, and gross atrocities might have been averted. The thing is, this indictment applies not only to these grand tribunals, but to all criminal courts generally: but for a bit more will, courage, restraint, honor, or whatever other moral virtue proved lacking, nearly all crime might be averted. Hence, the issue is not whether courts reduce criminality, but what to do with the folks guilty of the worst order thereof. And at the least, Bass's work provides some suggestions on when they will likely fail, or prove worse than failures, and how to limit total risks of prosecuting the worst villains of history.

If you care even a little bit about international justice, you have to read this groundbreaking book. The research is incredibly painstaking--there's unbelievable stuff about the war crimes tribunal after the Napoleonic Wars, and a riveting reconstruction of the failed tribunal after the Armenian genocide. But there's also great journalism about the search for justice in the Balkans. It looks like international tribunals are going to be the next big thing; this is the definitive history, and the definitive analysis.

The book is very dense and it is essential that the reader is very aware of the wealth of information. But the great merit of the work is precisely the rich demonstration of why the law should always be chosen instead of violence and revenge. Another positive peculiarity of the book is to demonstrate the point of view of several states regarding the defendants of war crimes, proving that the solutions are often the "tailoring" of heterogeneous interests of several winners of a war.

The man has courage to deal with these issues read the book