Customer Reviews

Steel Inferno

5 star:		(6)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

In his second book thematically centered on the vaunted 1st SS Panzer Corps, retired British Army Major General Michael Reynolds has produced one of the most erudite military histories of the twentieth century. This salient feature alone is sufficient reason why enthusiasts of maneuver warfare should consider this book. In addition, Reynolds also highlights the significant role airpower played in driving the Wehrmacht back through France in the weeks following the Normandy beach landings.

It is noteworthy that Reynolds' breadth is not delimited to the 1st SS Panzer Corps, but covers tactical movements, battlefield objectives, and terrain analysis issues of all contending armies. Hence, at both the operational and tactical levels, lessons abound, and the key to battlefield success was how effective either side exploited time, terrain, and the ability to apply combined arms warfare. So circumstanced, the Germans were tactically successful - amidst impending operational defeat - because they better employed infantry/armor integration, acting upon the urgency to launch counterattacks against Allied battlefield encroachments. Yet overall, German battlefield achievements proved diminutive, for they were continually driven to retrench eastward.

How did the Allies fare? As Reynolds states, the problem with many of the Allied commanders - particularly British and Canadian - was that they "displayed none of the panache, drive, imagination or willingness to take risks" found in their German counterparts (133). Due to lack of aggressiveness on the part of some commanders, they inexplicably paused to go on the defensive in the midst of a successful offensive. Sometimes Allied plans were askew from the start, with only battalion-strength units hurled against much heavier and entrenched SS forces. Time and again, Allied commanders did not follow-up their dearly- won, time-critical advantages while their enemies stood incredulous over their adversary's inefficiency, hesitation, and poor judgement. Through errors of this character, thousands of Germans were able to escape the Falaise pocket, as Allied commanders failed to coordinate between components, or showed a lack of urgency, misapplying their armor, "making the task of blocking German escape routes difficult by day and impossible at night" (336). However, though the ratio of Allied casualties to German in the fighting in the critical Caen area (for instance) was more than six-to-one, Allied manpower superiority held sway. It was this pivotal factor that weighed heavily in critically depleting German manpower.

In retrospect, how were the Germans able to perform so effectively, especially without air supremacy or air superiority? As Reynolds illustrates, it was "weapons handling, marksmanship, fieldcraft, camouflage and night operations, coupled with physical toughness, self control and a sense of camaraderie...[that] created a very formidable fighting machine" (42). Furthermore, German commanders would ensure combined arms coordination, as their Tiger and Jagdpanther aces rolled up column after column of Allied armored vehicles.

However, such tenacity would, in the end, not prove enough: the Germans asseverated time and again the deleterious effects of Allied airpower and artillery upon their armored vehicles. At one point, some three hundred Luftwaffe aircraft promised for the Mortain counterattack never materialized, while Allied fighter-bombers continually thwarted encroachments by German airpower. Against such odds, German flak companies were only sporadically effective, while the tactical efficiency of British fighter-bombers and American bombers proved incisive, even though Allied ground commanders often failed to exploit the time-critical opportunities presented by their airpower advantage. Veridically, Reynolds states that military history should "chronicle military campaigns correctly, to expose any myths that have arisen and point out obvious mistakes and omissions." (xx). In attaining this goal Reynolds' has performed masterfully, setting a standard for the scholarly study of warfare.

While the criticisms tendered elsewhere regarding the poor quality of the maps are valid, for those familiar with the campaign and the territory, they will not find this too much of a handicap to what is an excellent and, for me, a highly revealing book. Despite having read extensively on the subject I still found a mine of new information and in-depth studies of subjects merely touched upon in other works. Two things from my perspective as an ex-serviceman stand out: One: the sheer proficiency at all levels except the strategic of the Waffen SS troops and their junior/middle echelon leadership; and two: a correspondingly poor showing on the part of the British Army at all levels. Another aspect which may raise a few non-British eyebrows is that an essentially classless formation quite simply whipped the pants off of a class-ridden one. In the case of the former, talent was both encouraged and utilised to the utmost, while in the class-ridden formation the opposite attitude held sway with essentially negative results. To me without the air power so assiduously developed in the Desert War keeping the Germans hamstrung, there would have been NO breakthrough in Normandy! Nevertheless, it is also curious that even after North Africa, Sicily and Italy; the Germans chose to field their elite formations almost exclusively against the British - only later realising the much more formidible threat from the Americans. As I say, this book is chock-full of interesting and essentially new Stuff. This is Reynolds best book by far. Once the map deficiencies are dealt with, he should make a Historian to be reckoned with! HIGHLY reccommended-particularly the Paperback!

Reynolds provides a detailed look at the troop movements, locations and casualties of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, as well as military commentary from both sides of the Normandy Campaign. The author seems to have made a good effort to sift through the bias of his sources in an effort to get the actual details. Very informative of a small portion of the overall European conflict, and entertaining in a dry way.

You cannot write a military history book like this and expect the reader to understand what is going on if you provide a handful of shoddy maps which don't show the starting positions of the forces involved. Reynolds fills page after page with the exact starting locations of the German forces but it's no better than gibberish because without decent maps the reader has no chance of deciphering what on earth is going on. Great subject, poor book

Reynolds has produced a superb book, full of detail, anecdotes and information. Well worth it. Buy the paperback and save a lot. It's so cheap you shouldn't think about it if you are even vaguely interested in the Normandy campaign.

A very solid and well researched book about the battles of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Division. Contrary to what some other reviewers mentioned Mr. Reynolds has not written a book full of admiration for the Waffen SS, but a critical and factual account of the fighting. Especially his view on the battle around Villers-Bocage is very interesting. His criticism on the units of the 2nd British Army is , to my opinion, too harsh. It seems to be fashionable to belittle the role of the British in Normandy, but in general they fought well and let us not forget, despite Saving Private Ryan and Band of Brothers, that they did the most bitter fighting against the strongest German units. What I like about this book are the details. Mr. Reynolds painstakingly researched his conclusions and doesn't make the same mistake many authors of books on Normandy made; turning in the same old circles and copying Max Hasting's Overlord. I hope Mr. Reynolds will continue to write more books on Normandy, which seems to be his expertise, especially on the role of the 21st Panzer Division, one of the most neglected units of this campaign. I also hope that also his other books will be published in paperback. All in all a very gifted author, from whom I hope to see much more books, such as this.

This is an excellent book that does not go into minutiae of the Normandy campaign but rather explains how Waffen-SS forces totally out-numbered were able to fight back against the odds. Managers should well read this book and see what methods of leadership and training made forces such as the 12th SS Hitlerjugend Division such effective fighting machines.

This is obviously a painstakingly researched book by the retired British general author, who, in the custom of some other English writers, tells you more than you need to know. The book is not an easy read, unless one is very familiar with small towns,villages, rivers and streams in the Normandy countryside. There is also too much detail about various British and Canadian military units such as the "Nottinghamshire Yeomanry", "2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry" (both of which conjure up images of soldiers with pikes and longbows)"Royal Scots Greys", "Green Howards" and so on. Of more interest would have been greater emphasis on the larger battle picture. For example, I found "Panzer Commander" written by Colonel Hans von Luck much more compelling as it detailed the battle picture from the German side.

A little realised fact is that the battle of Normandy was no push over. The Germans fought very well and determination to stop the Allies. This book is as good a discussion as you will get on the fighting.

I got loss in the details. I felt after awhile that I was just reading stories of battle scenes.

Reynolds has written an outstanding book about the 1st SS corps.
One of its many positive points is the detail. The author deals point by point with their every action, which I quite enjoyed. It gives a good perspective of the "other side" (a quite infamous side too!). It also "corrects" statistical errors made by other books such as (12th SS general) Kurt Meyer's "Grenadiers" released in post-war.

While I enjoyed the book, I felt that the maps were lacking. They were "ok" at best but there were several times where I had to use other external maps to follow the book.

Overall, I enjoyed the book. It compliments well to other Normandy books such as "Six armies in Normandy" written by John Keegan.
~Shc~