Customer Reviews

Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943 (Modern War Studies)

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"Stopped at Stalingrad" is one of those genuine surprises. Just when you think you have read everything you need to read or want to read about a given subject, along comes a book that forever alters your view of that subject.

This book's principle focus is on the Luftwaffe's role on the Eastern Front. It may, indeed, be the only book length treatment of the subject. Joel Hayward demonstrates with great care that the German's use of air power as a tactical, and not strategic, weapon in close support of ground forces was perhaps THE key factor in the German army's early successes in the East. Patton and the Allied Generals could only DREAM of tactical air-ground support on this level. Writes Hayward, "The Luftwaffe, together with the army meticulously co-ordinated their operations and created joint "Schwerpunkte"(points of main efforts)." I may be demonstrating my own woeful lack of knowledge, but this is the first time in all my reading about the German war effort that I encountered a discussion of the critical doctrine of Schwerpunkte.

But one of this book's best offerings, comes at the very beginning where Hayward outlines in detail the crucial role that oil, or the lack thereof, played in the entire German war effort. From the outset, the German's were running at a critical deficit. And even with the Rumanian oil fields running at full capacity, the German's were in terrible trouble. And every time they absorbed a new chunk of territory, their situation became all the more desperate.

So great was Germany's reliance upon the Rumanian oil fields that Hitler became obsessed with the potential for Russian bombers to turn them in to what he called, "an expanse of smoking debris." The fear proved, of course groundless, the Russians were never able to mount an effective long-range bomber command. But this fear led to a costly, Quixotic "cleansing of the Crimea" -- the so-called "Operation Bustard Hunt".

When the German's launched Operation Barbarossa, their requirements for oil became critical. And this chronic problem led Hitler to focus on the oil fields of the Caucasus. Indeed from this point on much of the German strategic war effort was geared towards securing a reliable oil supply (or developing alternatives).

The effort to reach the Caucasus proved, in many respects, to be Germany's undoing. And it was a fruitless effort to begin with. It assumed that: (A) they could reach the fields at all; (B) that if they reached them the oil fields were not so badly sabotaged that they could be put into production in time to make a difference; and (c) the oil supply once secured could be actually brought back to German over a SINGLE rail line of varying gauges that crossed thousands of miles of terrain open to sabotage and air attack. But Hitler was blind to all of this.

Hayward writes with great passion and precision. At times one feels a little overwhelmed by details. But his portraits of the individual German pilots and commanders, as well of the shocking conditions under which they fought and died, is truly memorable.

This is a book that is not only for the specialist. Anyone with an interest in the Second World War needs to read this book. It makes a brilliant companion to Antony Beevor's book, "Stalingrad".

You'll have to search hard to find any book that better interweaves a rollicking good narrative with top-notch scholarly analysis of tactics, operational art and strategy. Added to that are good clear maps, a helpful glossary, thorough source and footnote details and a full index. This book initially upset a lot of buffs by slaying several sacred cows, yet Hayward's interpretations have not only survived, but they have been widely accepted by scholars and Stalingrad enthusiasts alike. This has indeed, as another reviewer noted, become a necessary "standard work" on Stalingrad.

The author has done an outstanding job on this book. I was very pleased with the coverage of the Crimean battles of early 1942 and the launching of Operation Blue when Richtofen's Corps was moved north to support the attack. You get a good, solid picture of the decision's at Army Command, Group, corp, and Division level throughout. The best part for me about a book is when I learn not just one thing, but learn new info on several aspect's of this huge struggle in the East. Enough praise now purchase this book! Anyone interested in the Eastern Front of WW2 should have this book.

This account of the Luftwaffe's cooperation with the German army in the east during the long year from March 1942 to 1943 is historical reconstruction at its very best. Expertly it explains war in all its levels, from tactical to operational to strategic, and it focuses for the first time in any such book on the complex everyday operating relationship between ground and air forces. Scholars may think Hayward too hard on Hitler's and Goering's "incompetent" decision-making, but they'll be hard-pressed to disprove his theories. That's because Hayward's account is based on unpublished wartime documents and diaries. You don't have a complete record of Stalingrad without this book!

This is a detailed book with a strong analytical component, great new photographs, and a good bilingual bibliography. The author begins in March 1942 and takes the Stalingrad campaign through to its death in February 1942. Both air force and ground operations get good coverage, but the real strength of this book is its explanation of how the two branches (and even the German navy in the Black Sea) cooperated together. The account is based on a careful reading of scores of unpublished war diaries and other rare documents, and is therefore a nice surprise after reading countless previous Stalingrad books which all quote the same, readily available sources (Lost Victories, Chuikov's book, etc). The book is stronger overall than Beevor's book, even if the latter is faster paced and has more on the Soviets.

Beevor's famous book covers both sides in equal detail. This one doesn't. It deals mainly with Germans and their Romanian, Hungarian, Croatian and Italian comrades. But unlike Beevor it covers all three armed forces: airforce army and navy. As such it is actually a very rare book. Its conclusion that the Luftwaffe were at least equal partners in all German operations, and sometimes even the dominant service, is hard to refute. The story is engaging and the writing excellent. Maps and photos are helpful and the index is more than adequate. All things said, therefore, this is an excellent book.

Put plainly: you can't understand the Battle of Stalingrad without this book. It is the only analysis of air and joint components of that hell on earth battle. Its author did a huge amount of work in archives and relies on unpublished diaries, notebooks, situation reports, squadron records, afteraction assessments and so on. The argument is clear and persuasive: that much of the credit for German successes during the eastern battles of 1942 must go to the Luftwaffe. Whereas many enthusiasts and some scholars have always presented the Luftwaffe as the secondary, supportive arm, with the army dominant, Dr Hayward makes clear that that view is out of date and unsupportable. The Luftwaffe led and dominated during the entire 1942 campaign. That doesn't mean that it could perform the impossible task Goering and Jeschonnek gave to it: supply of Sixth Army. Hayward's analysis of the airlift is the only authoritative account. The book is superbly crafted and compellingly written. It is one of three or four books that every Stalingrad reader MUST own.

I read Antony Beevor which got me hooked on Stalingrad, and this book is as good as Beevor's. It is also as good as Hayward's new book on Admiral Nelson. Both get my high praise. Scholarly works that are also readable are few and far between, so make the most of this guy's work.

This may have been written for professional military scholars and experts, but it is also of immense value to amateurs and military buffs. This is solid, heavy going but deeply analytical and more informative than any other book on the subject. It ranks alongside Ziemke and Bauer, David Glantz, and John Erickson (who have written a stunning review of it) as a top Stalingrad book.

This book is mandatory reading to anyone interested in the Wehrmacht's campaigns on the Eastern Front. The study has been meticulously researched, is reflective, well written, and evidence that the author is one of the foremost experts of German military operations against the Soviet Union during 1942. The book is a scholarly, detailed study of the Luftwaffe's campaigns during this critical year, yet provides perfect analytical context by explaining army operations, which the Luftwaffe was closely affiliated and therefore necessary for understanding its own activities, and also the strategic/political factors driving the Wehrmacht's overall campaign. It also demonstrates, to often overlooked in most campaign studies, the significant role that individual personalities can, and do, play in war. This book is a MUST read to anyone that is especially interested in the Luftwaffe, joint warfare, dynamic leadership and airpower. All military practitioners, scholars and commentators will thoroughly enjoy reading it.