"Under most voting systems, voters have no opportunity to express the intensities of their preferences over candidates. And even when they do, they usually have the incentive to exaggerate the intensities. In this important book, Alessandra Casella develops an ingenious and practicable way to elicit intensities accurately: a voter can save up her votes from elections she doesn't much care about for use later in a contest that really matters to her."--Eric S. Maskin, 2007 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Institute for Advanced Study
is a must-read for economists, political scientists and all those interested in the workings of alternative democratic institutions."--Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics
"Casella has provided a persuasive case for a new method of voting that could be useful in both committees and elections. She makes use of powerful theoretical tools drawn from game theory and creative experimental methods of the kind that economists have found useful. The result is one of the most compelling recommendations for deep reform of age old voting institutions but one which preserves the attractive features of majority rule such as equal treatment of people and proposals. Anyone interested in the theory or application of voting needs to read and study this book."--John Ferejohn, New York University School of Law
"This impressive book combines thorough theoretical analysis with evidence from laboratory and field experiments, and does all this in wonderfully clear writing. It should be required reading for students and researchers in political science and economics, and more importantly, for all designers and reformers of constitutions and committee procedures."--Avinash Dixit, Princeton University
"By now it is rare to find completely new voting systems, much less one as innovative as Alessandra Casella's storable votes. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of storable vote systems, including theoretical background, laboratory and field tests, and useful variations for practical application. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the design of voting systems."--Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University
puts forward a strikingly original idea concerning the design of voting systems. With beautiful clarity, Alessandra Casella shows how the way voting is structured can implicate the most profound issues in democratic theory."--Richard H. Pildes, New York University School of Law
About the Author
is Professor of Economics at Columbia University and Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA) and the Center for Economic Policy Research (London). After studying at Universita' Bocconi in Italy, she received her Ph.D. in Economics from MIT, and taught at UC Berkeley before moving to Columbia. From 1996 to 2010, she was also Directeur d' Etudes at the Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, Paris).
Casella's proposal for a system of Tradable Deficit Permits in the European Union has been widely studied and was briefly implemented in Austria to discipline the creation of domestic debt.