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Storm from the East: The Struggle Between the Arab World and the Christian West (Modern Library Chronicles) Paperback – April 17, 2007


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Product Details

  • Series: Modern Library Chronicles
  • Paperback: 197 pages
  • Publisher: Modern Library (April 17, 2007)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0812974190
  • ISBN-13: 978-0812974195
  • Product Dimensions: 7.9 x 5.1 x 0.4 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 5.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 3.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,491,816 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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About the Author

Milton Viorst has covered the Middle East as a journalist and scholar since the 1960s. He was The New Yorker’s Middle East correspondent, and his work has appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and The Wall Street Journal. He has written six books on the Middle East and lives in Washington, D.C., with his wife, the poet Judith Viorst.


From the Hardcover edition.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

I Memory 622—1900

America’s war in Iraq, from its start, did not go as President Bush’s administration had predicted. Though the U.S. army captured Baghdad and Iraq’s other major cities easily enough, and encountered little resistance in abolishing the detested regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqis did not greet America’s forces with the gratitude that they had been told to expect. Far from treating America’s soldiers as liberators, which is how they looked upon themselves, Iraqis regarded them as conquerors. It was a characterization for which most Americans were shockingly unprepared.

Frustrated, the American invaders believed they were being misunderstood. The leadership in Washington had proclaimed repeatedly that its quarrel was not with the Iraqi people but with Saddam’s regime. It had assured its soldiers of the nobility of their mission, not just to end a dangerous military threat but to wipe out tyranny and create the conditions for democracy. Wasn’t that why the armies of their fathers and grandfathers had disembarked in 1944 in France, to a delirious welcome by the local population? In 1945, moreover, the defeated Germans and Japanese, taking for granted the victors’ benevolence, willingly established free and democratic regimes. So why were the Iraqis so hostile?

Notwithstanding the political and cultural diversity among them, most Iraqis took the position that the American army was their enemy and placed serious obstacles in the way of its efforts to stabilize the country. This was the response of Sunnis and Shi’ites, Baghdadis and provincials, extremists and moderates, students, tribesmen, professionals, peasants, Saddam’s followers and his foes. By the third year of the war, many Shi’ites, perceiving an opportunity to shift political domination to themselves, had adopted with some wariness a strategy of cooperating with the occupiers. Iraq’s Kurdish community, to whom the occupation presented an opening to long-sought independence, did the same. But the once-powerful Sunnis, with nothing to gain, waged a fierce insurgency against the occupiers. United in mistrust of the Americans, however, Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds were all impatient for them to go home.

Why were Iraqis so much more hostile than America’s defeated enemies had been after World War II? Why, unlike the Germans and the Japanese, did they impugn America’s ideals and objectives? Why, after President Bush declared “mission accomplished,” did Americans keep dying on the battlefield? Clearly, the leadership in Washington had initiated the war on the basis of a grievous miscalculation of Iraq and of the Arabs.

What the American leadership had failed to calculate, or simply dismissed, was Arab nationalism. Much as Iraqis were driven by sectarianism—Sunnis versus Shi’ites, Arabs versus Kurds—a long history of hostility to foreign occupation served as a bond among them. Yet American leaders, in deciding to invade Iraq, chose not to take this bond, and the deep emotions of Arab nationalism, into account.

Back in mid-2003, a few months after the invasion, when it looked to Washington as if its war had been won, President Bush was cautioned by French president Jacques Chirac about Arab nationalism, the power of which he had experienced as a young army officer in Algeria forty years before. Chirac told Bush that Arab nationalism was a rising danger to allied forces. “I cannot disagree with you more, Jacques,” Bush replied. “Iraqis love us. We liberated them from a bloody dictator. The very few who fight against us are either remnants of the old regime, who are responsible for massive massacres and the use of torture chambers, or foreign terrorists, who hate life itself.” The bloodshed of the years since then has confirmed how poorly informed the American president was.

To be sure, Germany and Japan, America’s enemies in World War II, were driven by their own nationalism. But intrinsic to German and Japanese nationalism was a different conception of the United States, which imparted to both defeated peoples some confidence that the victor’s presence, if not painless, might be benign. That was not true of Arab nationalism, which had embedded in it significant suspicion of, if not outright hostility to, the United States. America represented the Christian West, which had been the enemy of the Arabs for fourteen hundred years. The twentieth century had been particularly catastrophic for relations between them. Then, on September 11, 2001, in the embers of the World Trade Center, the gap drastically widened. History had not been kind to the feelings between Arab and American cultures.

It is fair to say that America, in initiating the war, had a duty to foresee—or, at least, to make a serious effort to foresee—what it would encounter among the Arabs. Arab nationalism was not a hidden phenomenon. Grasping its essence did not demand sophisticated minds, much less sophisticated secret services. The intelligence establishment’s failures in bringing on the war have been amply documented. The blame for miscalculating what ensued after the American army rolled over Iraq must start with the president and be distributed among all those who advised him that Iraq’s conquest would be, in the words of the CIA’s director, a cakewalk.

America had available the wisdom not only of distinguished scholars but also of experienced diplomats and journalists. The literature was copious. Library shelves were crowded with basic information in books of history, religion, and sociology, even poetry and fiction. The books did not always agree—nationalism by its nature is elusive—but America’s leaders cannot be forgiven for dismissing the admonition to know thine enemy. They were derelict in their duty to consult the experts, crack the books.

In an article in The New York Times Magazine, a revealing statement suggested that what was involved was more than neglect. It quoted a senior White House official who derided the “reality-based community,” men and women who “believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discern- ible reality.” In the Bush administration, the official told the writer, “we create our own reality . . . we’re history’s actors . . . and all of you will be left to just study what we do.”1 The assertion, corresponding with what is publicly known of the process that led to the war, has the ring of accuracy. Its disdain for data expressed a worldview that diverges from centuries of Western intellectual tradition. In precluding the need for information, it conveyed a reliance on what can at best be called ideology permeated by elements of the supernatural. It produced a war plan that left U.S. forces vulnerable to Arab fury, which they were not prepared to handle.

Let us admit that Arab culture is, in so many ways, distant from Western experience. American education pays scant attention to the ideas and events that produced the Arab mind. Even at their most diligent, Westerners have a problem getting beneath the surface of Arab society. But that does not absolve the leaders who chose to initiate an invasion of Iraq of the duty to take account of the culture and grasp what the impact of an invasion was likely to be. Arab nationalism, the “discernible reality” that America’s soldiers encountered, proved a powerful force for which they were in no way prepared.

Nationalism, let us repeat, is not easy to define. Arab or other, it is not a doctrine. Nowhere is it rooted in critical thought, intellectual calculation, rationalism. Rather, it is an awareness, a consciousness, a frame of mind. Nationalism can be rash, even passionate, particularly in extreme forms. But at its core nationalism is mystical. A nationalist need not be mystic, since even among the most cerebral a space in the mind exists for mystical bonds. Love is an expression of these bonds; so is nationalism, a kind of love. But what other than nationalism explains one’s choking up over a symbol, a rectangle of often tattered or faded cloth whose design identifies it as a national flag?

All nationalism emerges out of a community’s shared memory. The memory is not necessarily accurate, and it is rarely verifiable. It often embraces collective pride—or shame. It may reach back beyond recorded history, but historical uncertainty does not weaken its hold. Nationalism is a mystical attachment to historical roots that guides a common destiny.

For the Arabs, historical memory is the experience of a community whose members, with rare exceptions, are Muslim and speak the Arabic language. Though they are currently divided into many sovereign states and many more sects, they share an attachment to the Quran, the basic Muslim scripture. Almost all speak the language in which the Quran is written. For reasons of history, the Arab world is geo- graphically and politically divided. But their religion and language unite the Arabs. So do the lessons, correct or not, they have learned from their history.

Ibn Khaldun, the Arabs’ greatest secular thinker, understood the tie between history and mysticism as long ago as the fourteenth century. He identified the Arab people with asabiyya, a term rendered as “group feeling” in the standard translation of his classic, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Other scholars have translated asabiyya as “tribal bonding,” “zealous partisanship,” “the collective will to power,” and “the sentiment of group solidarity that results from kinship, blood ties and common descent.” Each of these translations implies the presence of a mystical tie among Arabs. Ibn...

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

13 of 15 people found the following review helpful By Richard D. Hill on August 4, 2006
Format: Hardcover
This is the best and most succinct narrative I have ever read on the conflict between the West and the Arab countries. While not downplaying the religious differences it clearly shows the hostilities resulting from the political and military actions of the European(and later the American) interests over the ages and particularly since the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. Interlaced with these fascinating narratives are clear descriptions of the Sunni and Shia believers and how they got that way. I agree with Viorst's beginning statement that its too bad President Bush didnt take advantage of scholars' knowledge of these differences as well as the long standing political hostility between the Arab world and the West. Be it resolved that every member of the White House staff and every menber of Congress read this book!
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22 of 28 people found the following review helpful By Moose on September 10, 2006
Format: Hardcover Verified Purchase
This book is a useful statement of the insuperable differences between the West and the culture of the Middle East, and a terse reminder of the offenses against the Middle East populations perpetrated by the West (almost entirely France and Britain) from the time of Napoleon through the Suez crisis of 1956. Its message, that the US effort to transform the Middle East has been doomed from the start, is hard to argue with, at least for me. However, two main premises of this book are incoherent.

1. Viorst claims that the main cultural dynamic in the Middle East is "Arab nationalism," and that "Islamic nationalism" is but an offshoot of it. He states that the geographic core of Arab nationalism is Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and that this area "stands apart" from Egypt and the rest of north Africa, and from Arabia itself. Yet the book describes the lack of Arab nationalism during the Ottoman Empire and the lack of cohesion among Arabs after the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of French and British colonialism. The very notion of Arab nationalism was invented by Bedouin Arabs during WWI. That notion is irrelevant to the animosity between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs. Viorst shortchanges the power of Islam to cross cultural boundaries and the role of Egypt in the Islamic resurgence. Both Samuel Huntington and V.S. Naipaul make a good case that Islam trumps and even obliterates culture. Which concept is more useful to an analysis of the historical coincidence of events in Iran, Afghanistan, Morocco, Algeria, the Balkans, Kashmir, and Chechnya, as well as the Middle East? The Islamic resurgence or Arab nationalism?

2. Viorst overstates his indictment of the West.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful By Thomas V. Millington on May 12, 2008
Format: Paperback
I stumbled upon Storm from the East in the library and once I started reading it, I couldn't put it down.

Let me be clear, this is not an exhaustive or authoritative treatise on the Middle East. It is simply a well-written, concise offering on some of the elements, particularly in the 20th century, that have contributed to Arab hostility toward the West. I have noticed that some reviewers say that Viorst is anti-Bush. This was not my interpretation at all. If Viorst is critical of anyone it is the French and the British goverments whose actions in the Middle East caused repercussions that are still being felt today. Their biggest failure, according to Viorst, is that they did not understand the power of the umma, the Muslim community, or the dynamics of a nascent Arab nationalism.

Viorst also spends some time analysing the often dichotomous nature of Arab unity. Often times we see a conflict between Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. The chapter spent on Nasser's efforts to create a United Arab Republic, which eventually led to tension with Syria and Jordan, document this scenario very well.

For anyone unfamiliar with the Middle East, this is a good primer. It covers some of the most important events in Middle East history, such as the Balfour Declaration, the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Peel Commission. What I liked about this book is that it is not one of these verbose encyclopedia-like volumes so full of jargon that the reader learns nothing. This is well-written and informative. It could have delved a bit deeper, but it provides the newcomer to Middle East Studies with a good base from which they can continue learning about this fascinating region of the world.
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6 of 7 people found the following review helpful By Frank A. Orban on January 9, 2007
Format: Hardcover Verified Purchase
This compact well-written 177 page book is essential reading for those interested in the the Middle East and in particular Iraq. It outlines the history of Arab nationalism, fudamentalist Islam and the critical 19th and 20th century historical/political events that produced the Middle East as we find it today. If you are looking for one book to provide you with essential background, this is it. This work was first brought to my attention by individuals with life-long professional political involvement in the Middle East.

Frank A. Orban III

Executive V.P.

The Institute of World Politics

Washington, DC
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful By Joseph Elias on January 23, 2008
Format: Paperback Verified Purchase
I was not a fan of Milton Viorst. I had read his Sandcastles and Sands of Sorrows and was disappointed. I saw the book on my list and that President Jimmy Carter had endorsed it. I took a chance. I was surprised on how well Mr. Viorst presented the Arab perspective in such few pages. For a general reader, this book will provide a good introduction. For a the serious student, it provides a quick reference point. I have two observations that made this book a "Four Star" rather than a "Five Star." First, Mr. Viorst's handling of Israel. The complex role Israel has played in the Middle East is not simply relegated to the conflict over Palestine. Israel has played a far more active role. It interfered in Lebanon's politics; it had a policy of aggressive behavior on its borders as admitted by the late Moshe Dayan on the Syrian front; it has reached out to non-Arab players to threaten its Arab neighbors--successful in Turkey and in Iran until the fall of the Shah. Two, Mr. Viorst's analysis of Osma bin Laden was shallow. In the rush to turn this into a war of religions, the emphasis on the most radical and dangerous elements is appealing and gains headlines. For all the hype about bin Laden, his strian of Islam has not brought the community of believers any closer together than Pan-Arabism did. The Sunni-Shiite divide has not been bridged by bin Laden. Moreover, the nationalism of Arabs would go a long way to preventing a pan-Islamic movement. It dosen't take much to have Saudi Arabia fearful of Iran. And, how many Arab/Islamic countries have come to the aid of Syria as it faces the aggressive foregin policy of George Bush? With these two caveats, I do reccommend Mr. Viorst's book and look forward to buying his next writing.
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