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Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific

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The debacle of the British amphibious assault at Gallipoli during WWI caused conventional wisdom to say that amphibious assaults were too risky and too bloody to attempt. Between the wars, the Marine Corps developed a theory for making them work. They tested and refined this theory in the bloody crucibles of Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Pelileu, and Iwo Jima, with their magnum opus being Okinawa. Success came at a high price, and Alexander pulls no punches in describing the horror.

As a teenager, I once expressed the opinion that it was wrong to drop The Bomb on Japan. My father, a veteran of the Third Marine Division who saw combat at Bougainville, Guam, and Iwo Jima, quickly informed me that I would never have been born if The Bomb had not been dropped. The Third Marine Division had been chosen to spearhead the amphibious assault on Kyushu, an isle of the Japanese homeland, and my father sincerely believes that he would not have survived the assault. Alexander dissects the plans for that invasion, and sums up the anticipated carnage. The assaults from Tarawa to Iwo Jima had this in common. Each was bloodier than the last. Kyushu promised to be a mini-Armaggedon. We can never really know what the bodycount would have been had The Bomb not been dropped. From Alexander's description of what was expected to happen at Kyushu, one could make the case that the death toll would have been much, much higher, both in Japanese and American lives.

Colonel Joseph Alexander's book is an analysis of seven Marine amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II. In his book, "Storm Landings," Alexander lets the reader see these battles through the planning and tactical stages of the Marine and Navy generals and admirals -- as well as the Marines who made the landings. This historical document contains a wealth of data and information, but at the same time is rich in describing the chaos, noise, suffering, and uncertainty of all these storm landings. (Tarawa came very close to being lost.) I particularly remember the words of a Marine batallion commander on Iwo Jima who described the firepower facing the Marines: "I could have lit a cigarette on the stuff going by." The Marines made mistakes, large and small, in these landings, but they studied them and learned from them. For instance, the Marines learned that the hiatus in Navy barrages just before the landings allowed the enemy to regroup and adjust. They learned to get the men ashore more quickly, obtained more efficient landing vessels, and developed weapons suited to the conditions, such as flamethrowers. This book is particularly interesting, since Alexander had access to Japanese documents showing how the Japanese prepared for, and learned from, the assaults. The Japanese moved their defenses from the water's edge, dug intricate tunnels, eliminated mass counterattacks which had proved unproductive, and instead calibrated their mortars and artillery to kill the Marines once they were on the beach. The author makes a hard analysis of these seven amphibious landings and it must have taken some courage on his part to criticize some of those at the highest levels for their mistakes, for even dead generals and admirals have friends and relative whose anger might be brought to bear on a retired colonel. "Storm Landings" is a rare historical book, for it captures the big picture, contains an abundance of relevant detail, gives an inside view of how the Japanese were dealing with these landings, plus it captures the experiences of the Marines who participated in these incredible military maneuvers.

Once again Retired Col. Joseph Alexander has penned a superb text. In "Storm Landings" he captures the essence of seven violent island assaults and the planning of a eighth; Kyushu in the Japanese home islands. These epic battles spearheaded by Marines were the core of the Central Pacific drive. Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, amphibious landings all, were distinguished as storm landings by the Japanese commanders. They were so called as they contained six additional elements: extreme danger, long-ranged, large scaled, self-sustaining, against defended positions under the protection of fast carrier forces. Col. Alexander's strength is his prodigious research skills and an ability to preceive the over all connection between diverse elements. Drawing on these skills the author reflects on the five separate landings on D-Day, Guadalcanal. In an interesting introduction to the main battles, Alexander notes that on Gavutu and Tanambogo the 1st Parachute Battalion, subsequently reinforced by B Co. 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, engaged in the first opposed landings. To Alexander's perceptive eye, the Gavutu-Tanambogo landings represented a microcosm of opposed landings to come. All were violent, relatively short, thoroughly decisive and always bloody. One can not read this work without coming away with a profound awareness of the increasingly fierce determination of the Japanese defenders the closer the din of combat came to the Japanese home land. 100,000 Japanese died defending Okinawa along with 150,000 native Okinawans. On Kyushu alone, 600,000 defenders awaited the invasion force that was to come but for the bomb. Obviously, for both combatants, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, were saved.

The epilogue, quoting war correspondent Robert Sherrod adds, "...no man who saw Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa would agree that all the American steel was in the guns and bombs. There was a lot, also, in the hearts of the men who stormed the beaches." Lt.Col. Robertson after watching the Marines landing at Iwo Jima during the worst of the shelling asked himself, "What impels a young guy landing on a beach from the very first craft in the face of fire?" Reading this book, Marine or not, one has a deeper understanding of the answer to that question. It lies in the Hallmark of Marine pride: "Semper Fidelis".

Marine Corps historian Joseph H. Alexander establishes that the two most unique combined arms forms of American naval warfare in the Second World War were the deployment of carrier task forces and long range amphibious operations against stiff opposition. He dubs the latter, "storm landings." Out of the hundreds of amphibious landings that took place in the Central Pacific during World War II, Alexander points out only those landings at Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa fall into this category. Alexander also discusses the proposed landings on Kyushu, in the spring of 1946, which was to be the greatest storm landing of them all. The author's exhaustive research makes this a significant addition to the study of amphibious operations. The three factors Alexander attributes to the success of these complex combined operations were: small unit leadership, logistics, and tactical mobility. Alexander brings to this work the technical specialization of a Marine Corps officer who had served twenty-nine years with amphibious units. His expertise is revealed in discussions throughout the book of such concepts as "situational awareness," combat loading, and the evolution of various types of landing craft developed during the Pacific campaigns. In his analysis of the small unit actions that exemplified the Pacific Campaign, Alexander praises the bravery and leadership at the squad and platoon level: "Tactical success in each case," writes Alexander, "required the leader to inspire small groups of disorganized men to overcome two inevitable characteristics of the assault beachhead-chaos and inertia." The author concludes that the battles waged in the Pacific in general and the aforementioned "storm landings" in particular had a direct influence in the outcome of the war. Alexander has scoured the Marine Corps archival material pertaining to the operations in the Pacific during World War II. The author has also made extensive use of private collections, oral histories, and post war studies. Sufficient maps, photographs, and tables pertaining to various weapons and equipment round out this refreshing study of a uniquely American contribution to victory in World War II. My main critique, however, is that Alexander presents a weak argument when he tries to compare storm landings in the pacific with similar large-scale operations in Europe. Alexander claims storm landings differed from landings made on Sicily and Normandy because, in both cases, those were jointly executed with Airborne drops and culminated in a long ranging campaigns. Sicily, up to that time (July 1943), the largest amphibious operation of the war, was also an island that had to be conquered. The accompanying airborne operation on Sicily, was, unfortunately a debacle, though the paratroopers fought bravely once they were finally organised in land. The operation's only connection to a long ranging campaign was a preamble to the arduous struggle up the Italian boot. Similarly, Alexander conveniently omits mentioning General Douglas MacArthur's use of airborne operations on New Guinea, but chooses instead to discuss only the amphibious portion of that operation. This slight weakness does not, however, diminish from the overall integrity of Alexander's impeccable research and engaging narrative. This book comes highly recommended.

This book is about the landings the Marines made in WWII against Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa. The author defines storm landings as large, risky, long range, self sustaining assaults executed against strong opposition and within the protective umbrella of fast carrier task forces.

After Gallipoli in WWI, the Marines and Navy tried to figure out what went wrong, and could amphibious landings be possible in the future. Yet Ike in 1950, before the Inchon landing in Korea said that an amphibious landing is no big deal, just point the boats in the right direction. Ike, while he planned it, was not at Normandy. Had he been, he never would have said such a thing.
Training books were written, and in the 1930's the Marines began amphibious landing exersizes, with the backing of Gen Holland Smith, who insisted on realistic training. He helped Higgins develop the design of the Higgins boat.
The Japs had a lot of amphibious training as they had invaded several Chinese ports as well as Indo China. The Japs landed 10,000 troops at Shanghi in 1932, and it would be 10 years before we could do that. The Japs did amphibious landings on Guam, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Gilberts, Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the Solomons. At the battle of the points in Luzon, Mac Arthur threw the Japs back into the sea. The most embarrassing setback was the Jap attack at Wake Island. The Japs were better at night fighting. The pulled troops our of Kiska, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, at night.
In 1942 Marine General Vandegrift said that landings should not be made against opposition. Lot's of other military commanders agreed with himm including MacArthur, who thought that land based aircraft were needed to support an invasion.
In 1938 Gen Thomas told Congress he could defend Guam against 60,000 Japs if they gave him some money for fortifying the island. Congress refused, so the Japs were able to take the island easily.
To conquer reefs, the tracked landing craft had to be used. Higgins boats needed 3-4 feet of water, and reefs were exposed during low tide, especially at Tarawa. Higgins boats could land where there were no exposed reefs, so quadrupled the ability of Marines to land in places other than ports.
The allies tried two large amphibious raids. Dieppe and Makin. Neither did very well. The Makin raid worked well, but Carlson left 9 men on the Island, and the Japs caught and beheaded them. The Japs also knew by that raid that we were coming, and started fortifying the islands.
Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, proved that we could land large forces against defended territory.
War planners overlooked the smaller but opposed landings at Gavabutu and Tanambogo. Lack of training was apparent, lack of naval gunfire support, lack of intelligence on what was on shore. Troops could not
communicate with each other. With no lessons learned passed on, the same thing happened at Tarawa.
A chapter is devoted to the horror of Tarawa, where a reef stopped the invasion due to a very low tide only seen very seldom. The tracked landing craft (LVT's) that Holland Smith had insisted on bringing to the invasion over Navy objections, made the landing success possible. Tarawa shoed what each landing would show, a period of vulnerability and chaos on the beach.
Holland Smith was responsible for the Marines having the tracked landing craft and the Higgins boats, having been in the planning for them in the 1930's.
The battle between MacArthur, who wanted all troops under his command and a single line of attack to re take the Philippines, vs. Nimitz, who wanted the line of attack aimed at Japan is discussed. In the end, both lines of attack were followed, which caused casualties at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, as they could have been invaded months earlier, had a single line of attack been followed. MacArthur's insistence on attacking the Philippines delayed the Iwo and Okinawa invasion, so the Japs had time to complete their defensive fortifications.
Mac Arthur had Nimitz waffling, but Admiral King backed Nimitz, knowing better than Nimitz, that if the Marine and Navy plan was followed, that the taking of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian would but Japan within range of the B-29. So the islands were taken. The Japs defended to the death, as they had seen crashed B-29's and knew their range. A chapter is devoted to the Saipan invasion,
Another Chapter is devoted to Iwo Jima. This island had to be taken, as the Japs were using the airfield to attack B-29's going to and from Japan. They were also bombing Saipan from Iwo Jima, and the Air Force lost more B-29's from the Jap raids from Iwo Jima than they did on combat missions.
With Iwo Jima in our hands, our fighters could escort the B-29's to and from Japan. Iwo would also be used as an emergency landing strip for the B-29's on their way to and from Japan, and saved over 2400 Airmen. 22 Marines won the Congressional Medal of Honor, 11 posthomously, at Iwo.
The Saipan invasion occurred at the same time as the Normandy invasion, showing how great our productivity was, enabling two major invasions to occur thousands of miles apart at the same time.
A chapter is devoted to the invasion of Peleliu, insisted on by MacArthur to protect his flank on the invasion of the Philipines, considered by many to be a waste of time and many good men. The invasion cost 9600 Marines and the lessons learned were not forwarded to the troops about to invade Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

A chapter is devoted each to Okinawa. Okinawa was the biggest and bloodiest invasion of the war, involving 4 Army divisions and 2 Marine divisions, which is why an Army man, Gen Buckner, ran the show. Buckner did not like amphibious invasions, and rejected a landing in the Jap rear, which would have greatly shortened the battle. Instead, the battle was fought face to face, across the island. A lot of people were wishing Holland Smith was in charge. When Buckner got killed, Marine Gen Roy Geiger took charge. The Army was alarmed, so sent Gen Stillwell in to take charge, but by the time he got there, the battle was over.
Okinawa cost 100,000 Jap lives, and the 10th Army had 40,000 casualties. Marines had 19,500 casualties.

A chapter is devoted to the planning of the invasion of Japan, and expected casualties there. Fortunately, the atom bomb was dropped, saving thousands of lives on both side.
Note is made that historian Allan Millett calcuated the 18 Army divisions did 26 amphibious landings in the Pacific, compared to 6 Marine divisions doing 15 invasions. MacArthur had his own Navy, the 7th fleet.
Robert Sherwood, in demonstrating the danger of invasions, noted that the 4th Marine division fought 61 days during the various invasions of the Marshalls, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. In those 61 days, they suffered 75% casualties.

I loved this book. I got it from a friend and I was glued to it. It was about the battles from the Solomons up to Okinawa and even goes beyond to the planned invasion of Kyushu.It was written by Joe Alexander who spent 29 years as an assault amphibian officer for the Marine Corps.Great job Joe.

In "Storm Landings" Joseph Alexander has written an excellent analysis of the business end of the Central Pacific campaign, 1943-45.
The challenge of crashing onto a defended beach "defies imagination," says Alexander, especially since the Marines (who carried out most of the storm landings) who did it were armored with "only a khaki shirt."
Alexander distinguishes between ordinary amphibious maneuvers, which are dangerous even in peacetime because of surf, and "storm landings," against heavily defended shores.
There were seven of these in the Central Pacific campaign: Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. If it hadn't been for the atomic bombs, the biggest, bloodiest of them all would have taken place on Kyushu in November 1945.
Where I live, Maui, you can still see the remnants of the training the 4th Marine Division did to prepare for its part in three storm landings, Saipan, Tinian and Iwo Jima. assaults. The leading war corespondent of the era, Robert Sherrod, noted that the 4th Marine Division's war was compressed within 13 months. It suffered 75 percent casualties (from a strength of about 18,000 men), yet was in combat just 61 days -- more than half of than on Iwo Jima.
In that cataclysm, 35,000 Americans fought 28,000 Japanese for more than a month over an area no bigger than about 10 golf courses. Almost all the Japanese were killed, and, uniquely, the Americans suffered more casualties, though fewer killed.
Alexander's history is outstanding in the attention it gives to the Japanese side of the battlefield. Not many of the defenders survived the war, so we have no memoirs, though there are scraps of information in diaries and letters.
But Alexander has mined a significant source, heretofore little used by American historians, in the action reports and field regulations of the Japanese commanders.
At first, both sides were fumblers in this new warfare, which World War I experience had taught most armies was impossible against modern volumes of fire. The U.S. Marines were unique in the '30s in considering it could be done.
It proved much more difficult than even the Marine pioneers had imagined. The mistakes at Tarawa haunted public opinion for years, though it was a small fight by European standards -- three days, a thousand American casualties (not counting Navy).
Early on, the Japanese commanders helped the Americans by ridiculous banzai charges, which heaped up bodies in front of Marine BARs (Browning automatic rifle, their favorite weapon).
By late 1944, though, first at Biak (an Army operation), the Japanese commanders had abandoned the suicide charges and the defense of the water line, which could not stand up to the thousands of heavy caliber shells delivered by battleships, supposedly obsolete.
The Japanese strategy was not to win, nor even to survive. By 1944, they hoped only to sell their lives so dearly that Americans at home would be ready to accept a negotiated peace. (They never actually decided themselves what terms they would have been willing to offer, and when the time came, it turned out it was the Japanese, not only the Americans, who were not interested in negotiations. See my review of "Racing the Enemy.")
They underestimated the resolve of the American government and people, but who can say by how much? By this stage of the war, the relatively vulnerable flat coral islands had been left behind, and the Japanese enjoyed perfect terrain for their methods -- rugged places full of natural caves, improved by the amazing ability of Japanese soldiers to dig, with only hand tools.
"Throughout the war, the Americans failed to appreciate or anticipate the digging ability of the common Japanese soldier," writes Alexander.
It is still impossible for anyone who did not havve to do it to quite imagine what motivated a young American to throw his body at the entrance to a Japanese cave, which was covered by supporting fires from several other caves.
Lt. Col. Donn Robertson, a battalion commander at Iwo Jima, wrote afterward, "What impels a young guy landing on a beach from the very first craft in the face of fire?"
The battle for Iwo Jima was probably the longest, most violent, densest encounter of arms in human experience. The fury of Verdun or Stalingrad were greater in total, and lasted longer by the calendar, but there were pauses.
Even harder to understand is what kept the Japanese caveman going. As early as the capture of the islet of Tanambogo in August 1942, the Marines adopted their most effective method of taking a cave -- TNT and gasoline.
Impossible to imagine, impossible to forget. I get shivers every time I drive past 4th Marine Division Memorial Park on Maui.

This book is one of the absolutely best works ever written about the US Marine Corps amphibious operations in the Pacific during World War II. It contains a multitude of details and it was really a revelation to learn that the landings of 1943-45 were made mostly on amtracks and not on Higgins boats as the Hollywood movies imply. The chapter about Operation "Olympic" (which fortunately was never executed) is a real gem of professional analysis. This book is not ideal for the casual reader or someone who adores personal stories and first hand accounts but it surely is for the specialist and the military history buff.

Author Joseph Alexander spent 29 years in the Marines with amphibious units, saw combat and is a subject matter expert on seaborne invasions. Some writers are great researchers, but can't tell a good story, some not so good at fact finding, but weave a good tale. Alexander does both. Storm Landings is what the Japanese called US Marine tactics of `hitting the beach'.

Of all the amphibious assaults in WW2, Alexander describes seven as `epic' with one planned, fortunately, never executed (the invasion of Japanese homeland). Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Pelieu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa are defined as risky, long ranged, large scale, self sustaining frontal assaults on heavily defended soils. The author does not mean to diminish the importance or sacrifices made in other battles, just narrow his focus to the strengths and weaknesses inherit in frontal assaults.

Pre WW2 planning by the US Marines called for amphib assaults, but there was little money for equipment, practice, work out the bugs and coordinate with the Navy. It took time, effort, hard training, new, better & more equipment that led to improvements in the concepts created by a few creative minds. Without these factors, victory in the Pacific would have been much delayed. Alexander shows the evolution of the doctrine, what worked, what did not. His conclusions are not surprising given his background but that does not detract from this book at all. The facts are that these tactics did and still do work. Arguments pro and con of frontal assaults are examined objectively, battle by battle, opinions well supported by facts, dates, statistics, primary research, first hand accounts, interviews with survivors- from both sides- that justify Alexander's observations.

Anyone familiar with amphibious assaults understands the logistical & planning complexities behind a victorious outcome - witness Gallipoli in WW1 as a lesson of what happens without such planning. Storm Landings really drives that home, making the accomplishments by the Marines and Navy in WW2 that much more impressive in scope, size and audacity. Serious, long term historians will learn new things from this book, yet it is accessible to novice students as well. This is something I'd want to read if conducting or planning airborne or amphibious assualt. I very much enjoyed this book and highly recommend it.

I've read "Utmost Savagery" so expecting this book to be good seemed logical. Besides being a 29 year veteran as an assault amphibian officer in the Marine Corps, the author has made this area his specialty of study and authorship. Its obvious Col Alexander has given this topic a lot of thought and study for the coverage is excellent. The high price that had to be paid by the Marines / Army in perfecting this dangerous strategy is clearly spelled out, showing the improvements made after each successive landing as well as some of the negatives that persisted too long into the campaign. He also shows the individual contributions made as well as the fact that certain people were not as helpful as others in improving this strategy.

The author begins his book by stating how difficult an amphibious landing is against a prepared defender. He then proceeds to describe the evolution of the US amphibious warfare doctrine before and during the war. After describing the essentials of successful amphibious warfare and how the US went about in achieving that success, the author describes some of the costliest and toughest landings of the Pacific War. They include Tarawa in late 1943 followed by the three important islands of the Marianas, Northern New Guinea, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The author finishes his narrative by describing the plans for Operation Olympic, the invasion of southern Japan on Kyushu Island that was to launch almost two years after taking Tarawa. The many preparations of the Japanese for receiving that landing was also covered. The Japanese were prepared to fight to the last man and bullet and if the offensive had launched, it would have been many times worse than Okinawa for both sides.
The coverage of these difficult landings is not a hardcore operational reconstruction but a high flight overview with the main emphasis on describing the techniques and maneuvers used in the latest landing and the qualitative results of those changes in the overall victory. Each amphibious landing is less than 25 pages so the operational coverage is the barest essentials but is enough to give the reader a basic understanding of what our Marines and soldiers went through on each island which had its own set of particular problems.

You will learn many things about the war effort. The dispute of the Navy and Marine Corps is a big issue that runs through the book and how the Navy, at least in the beginning, was very timid in giving support to the Marines during and after the landings. Admirals Fletcher and Ghormley are two examples but there were others. When the Navy became more supportive the landings and the fighting on each of the islands improved. The controversy of Gen "Howling Mad " Smith and Gen Julian Smith on Saipan was not original but an extension of friction between the two men that started months earlier during the landings on Makin Island. The good and bad attributes of Adm Turner are also discussed as is the friction between Adm Nimitz and Gen MacArthur. The Japanese commanders of each island is also highlighted.
The chapter on the planning of Kyushu Island was one of the largest and very interesting. The invasion was going to be the accumulation of everything learned of the past four years by the biggest contributors. Every successful technique and every weapon that helped in that success was going to be implemented. Mr Alexander also covers the many preparations the Japanese made as well as the huge mobilization of the country that would be ready when the offensive launched. The author makes a good point that by planning the launch point for November and not soon after Okinawa, it gave the Japanese time to prepare and train their new soldiers. Another good point brought up was the fact that since the US didn't mobilize nearly enough men (for either theater), the exhausted men of previous campaigns would be called on for Operation Olympic. Some of the men retruning from Europe would be called on for extra duty as well when phase two began.

Each landing has its own map and few photos to support the narrative. In the Appendix, the author profiles ten men that made important contributions to the war effort. There are extensive Notes and an Impressive Bibliography if further research is desired.

This book would be useful for new and experienced readers. For the new reader, it would offer an interesting and informed summary of the Pacific War. For the more experienced the coverage would be appreciated and there might be a few new things that could be learned. This book is highly recommended to all who are interested in the Pacific War.