13 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Good Analysis, May 27, 2004
This review is from: Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Hardcover)
Very good analysis of the two sides and their attitudes and ideas toward tanks and what could be expected in future wars. What was very interesting was seeing how both German and Soviet cavalry officers tried to prove that cavalry would always be needed and the armored forces wouldn't prove to be as useful and instrumental as those who advocated armored forces thought. Each side took much from the British and each other during their agreement to build a tank school at Kazan, on Soviet territory, and train both Soviet and German soldiers there with instructions from German specialists. From the Soviet side one can follow the progress in tank industry and how it became entangled in the purges as well as the consequences that followed the purges, for both the industry and the army. The fall of Tukhachevsky among others is explained and put into context how Soviet 'deep battle' and 'deep operations' ideas were put on ice while commanders re-examined their positions and went on board with those who were against Tukhachevsky, to save themselves from the purges. Lastly would be the wars that raged throughout Europe before the two sides went to war in 1941, for the Soviets at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol, for the Germans in Poland and in France, as well as both sides in Spain, etc. A very good investment for those interested in what both sides were doing with tanks during the inter-war years. The only reason I gave it 4 stars instead of 5 is because it got repetative and dry at times. I skimmed the epilogue and a few pages of the last chapter only because the information had already been gone over and the problems examined already mentioned numerous times before throughout the book.
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10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An interesting analysis of Soviet and German armor doctrines, March 25, 2003
This review is from: Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Hardcover)
Habeck does an excellent job of comparing German and Russian armor doctrines. Acccording to Habeck both the Germans and the Russians copied the British concpet of independent armored formations to strike the flanks of the enemy army. The Soviet and the German doctrines differed in the role that they gave junior offices. The German doctrines allowed a great deal of intiative to the junior officers while the Soviet doctrine set clear instructions to be followed to the letter by junior officers. Another difference is that the German army believed in the decisive battle while the Russian army thought a series of battles had to be fought in order to achieve victory. The Germans ignored the experience of the Spanish Civil War since the terrain did not favor armored movements. But the Russian opponents to armored warfare used the Spanish Civil War as an example of why armored formations failed in combat.Another reason why the Soviet doctrine appeared to fail was that Russian junior officers could not understand their directions during war games and the Russian army lacked mechanics to fix broken down tanks. As a result Soviet generals favoring armored tactics were purged and the Soviet army returned to an infantry centered force until the results of the German blitzkreig in France made them change their doctrine at the last minute. I would reccomend this book for anyone interested in the development of Russian and German armored doctrine.
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14 of 28 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Interesting, but . . ., April 14, 2003
This review is from: Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Hardcover)
The book is pretty interesting.
What's surprised me, though, is the vitality of the myth of the so called Tukhachevskii's "military genius." This legend is based solely on a fallacy: Stalin was bad; Stalin killed Tukhachevskii; ergo, Tukhachevskii was good. The only military operations successfully conducted by Tukhachevskii were against the anti-Bolsheviks revolt in the Tambov district, when this "genius" used hostage-taking "tactics" and chemical weapons (does it remind you of something?) against the insurgents, i.e. Russian peasants.
A remarkable detail: among different reasons for the Red Army's defeats in 1941, the author DOES NOT mention "obsolete" tanks. "Obsolete" Red Army tanks is just another popular myth, originated in GlavPUR, and being disseminated still by the History Channel.
Some extra photos could have made this book more interesting.
What I've been having a problem with, are the countless errors in the transliterated titles of Russian books and archived documents. What was the point of the transliteration, anyway? For those who read Russian, Cyrillic letters would do just as well; for those who do not, it doesn't matter. I don't believe that Cornell UP has no Cyrillic typefaces at its disposal. Furthermore, it's comparatively easy to find a Russian-speaking proofreader in the United States--not to mention an English-speaking proofreader who might do a much better job on this book.
Is the decline of publishing quality in this country irreversible?
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