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Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
12 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Liberalism and Big Government,
By
This review is from: The Strange Death of American Liberalism (Paperback)
Brands attaches liberalism to big government like most conservatives, yet notes repeatedly how conservatives have embraced big government when the times suited them. The book is less an autopsy on liberalism than it is a study how big government has evolved, gathering mass like a snowball until it became a behemoth no one wanted to claim responsibility for. He notes how the growth in big government has corresponded with each of the major wars, dating back to the American Revolution, but once the wars were over a skeptical public generally demanded that government be reduced. Not so after WWII, when Truman initiated the Cold War which stretched nearly 40 years and saw the most substantial growth in liberal policy, which Brands attached almost exclusively to the dawn of the Nuclear Age. What began as the Truman Doctrine was expanded under successive presidents, including Eisenhower, which saw sweeping reforms in domestic policy more or less tied to national security interests. I think Brands stretches the connection a bit too far, but he makes many salient points as to how Cold War ideology and Liberalism were intertwined, most notably in the Kennedy-Johnson years. Many of the federal programs became institutionalized, such as welfare and social security, reaching the status of sacred cows that later conservative presidents were afraid to touch. But all that came crashing down with the collapse of the Cold War, which Brands noted began with our withdrawal from Vietnam. Even when Reagan tried to revive the Cold War in the 80's, he found little support among the electorate or in Congress. Instead, Reagan focused on delimiting the domestic policies of the federal government by reducing the tax base which supported them. Yet, the Reagan years saw a soaring of the federal deficit, as he continued to pour money into National Defense, and was unable to get all the cuts he sought in domestic spending. While this book provides an interesting recap of the growth of big government, it offers very little into the contemporary liberal ideology beyond the Cold War paradigm. Brands sees these two as inextricably intertwined, and I think here is where his argument unravels as he tries to tie too many loose strings together in what is a rather short book on the subject.
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
An Interesting if Sketchy Argument,
By Jeffery Steele (Taipei, Taiwan) - See all my reviews
This review is from: The Strange Death of American Liberalism (Hardcover)
H.W. Brands has developed an interesting thesis in his recent book "The Strange Death of American Liberalism" that neither liberals nor conservatives will much like. Liberalism, Brands argues, is a centralized political arrangement that can only thrive in the U.S. during wartime. Because of the depth of Americans' distrust of the central government, the natural political fallback position of Americans is conservatism. Only during war do Americans drop this instinctual distrust of the federal government and allow it to take over new responsibilities. So why do some Baby Boomers think that liberalism is a natural and permanent condition in U.S. politics, simply in need of resuscitation? Brands says the duration of the Cold War fooled them. Whereas wars involving the U.S. had been relatively short in the past, the length of the Cold War allowed for a more sustained intrusion of the central government into Americans' lives than ever before. As Brands' book is only 170 pages long, he merely breezes through U.S. history (surprising for a historian), but nevertheless gives an interesting historical sketch as a preliminary test of his hypothesis. He argues, for example, that the basic nature of both progressivism in the early 20th century and the New Deal in the 1930s were both fairly conservative. On the other hand, he also buttresses his thesis by showing the solid advances in power made by the federal government during WW1 and WW2. One of the more surprising bits of data that Brands gives is a poll in 1939 that asked Americans whether the U.S. federal government was spending too much money, not enough, or just the right amount. 61% answered that the government was spending too much. Only 10% said too little. And throughout the 30s, even with unemployment rates never dipping below 10%, and once going as high as 25%, most Americans thought it should be a priority for the government to balance its budget and reduce its debt. On the eve of FDR's second administration, 50% of Democrats and 80% of Republicans said they hoped it would be more conservative than his first administration. Conservatives are probably gleeful to read this. Is there any more palatable thesis to conservatives than that their political philosophy is the natural state for Americans? But while Brands' interpretation of U.S. history is likely to provide some succor for conservatives, his reading of the importance of Reagan will probably turn their stomachs. Reagan, according to Brands, could not overcome the public's distrust of the federal government to enlist its support for new foreign adventures beyond Grenada, or for a more general support of the Cold War beyond increased defence spending. It's here that Brands' argument becomes strained. Aren't huge increases in defence spending still a sign of American trust in the central government in at least one regard? Brands' book is so short that he never gets around to properly answering these kinds of questions. He says that others must take up his hypothesis to test its explanatory power. Brands should have spent the time to answer these questions himself. "The Strange Death of American Liberalism" was published just prior to 9-11, but if its hypothesis is correct, such an event might prove to be the resurrection of liberalism as Americans turn once again to the federal government for solutions to problems that only it can provide. But whatever its relevance to current events, this book gives an interesting twist to the traditional conservative/liberal divide.
10 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Is the Return of Big Government Hegemony Around the Corner?,
By
This review is from: The Strange Death of American Liberalism (Hardcover)
"The Vietnam War and Watergate combined to undermine the American public's confidence in government?" How many times have you heard a variation on this theme to explain the long, precipitous decline of activist government? H.W. Brands posits a novel and provocative twist on this well-worn theory. To wit: skepticism toward government is the natural condition in America, and the retreat from Post-War liberalism over the past 30 years has merely marked a return to historical normalcy. Only during war time, Brands argues, do Americans turn to the Federal government for solutions to the nation's problems, and it was the Cold War that allowed government to flower so spectacularly in so many aspects of American life. The Post-War period was not a cycle, but an "anomaly," Brands avers. "The appropriate image was not a pendulum, but a balloon . . . When Vietnam destroyed (Americans') confidence, the balloon deflated, and expectations of government descended to their traditional low level. Pendulums swing back on their own; balloons require refilling." While Brands acknowledges that his argument will hearten conservatives and discomfit liberals, he is no right-wing ideologue (as his chapters on Reagan's Presidency will attest). Rather, he's a distinguished Texas A&M historian and author of highly acclaimed biographies on Theodore Roosevelt and Ben Franklin. By Brands' lights, recent events may, in fact, suggest brighter horizons ahead for believers in government activism. Only a credible national security threat, he maintains, can refill the balloon, and revive American's faith in government. That threat, of course, is on us now. Does that suggest that Wellstone or Daschle or -- heaven forbid -- even Hillary could take up residence at 1600 Pennsylviania Ave come 2005? Only time will tell.
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