Customer Reviews

Strategic Intelligence for American National Security: (Paperback with new afterword)

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This is an even-tempered book, combining a good primer of the nature of the intelligence process with some analytically-oriented thoughts on needed improvements. Their appendix listing things that can go wrong at each step of the intelligence cycle is of lasting value, as is their glossary. Their forthcoming book, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (Yale, April 2000) will assuredly be a major contribution.

"Strategic Intelligence for American National Security", first published in 1989, is a solid, if now dated, survey of the means, methods, pitfalls, and lasting importance of strategic intelligence.

Authors Berkowitz and Goodman wrote at a time when countering the Soviet Union was still the number one U.S. security challenge, and when the Iran-Contra scandal was the latest failure of American intelligence. It is a tribute to the quality of their writing, and to the stubborn challenges of the intelligence business, that this book is still valid reading for the general student and for the dedicated professional.

With clear, even-handed prose, the authors guide the reader through the steps of the intelligence cycle: planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination, while addressing the challenges particular to each phase. The authors deserve credit for suggesting plausible fixes as well as pointing out faults. They rightly note that many so-called intelligence failures are equally the fault of the intelligence consumer or decision-maker. Their lengthy discussion of the importance of diligent Congressional oversight of intelligence is both timely and ironic in the wake of the current Global War On Terrorism. An appendix with a checklist of the things that can go wrong with the intelligence cycle is a key takeaway for the intelligence professional.

The current complex threat environment facing the United States, only hinted at in an afterword by the authors, is if anything an even tougher intelligence challenge than the long twilight duel with the Soviets. Likewise, the book does not address the benefits and the shortfalls of the Information Age and networked warfare. Nevertheless, this book is highly recommended to the general student and to the intelligence professional as a good survey.